In light of the surging evidence of climate change, the European Union (EU) has made climate policy a European key priority over the years by committing itself to ambitious goals (Siddi, 2020, p. 4). In December 2019, the European Commission adopted the European Green Deal (EGD), which set the target of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. The EGD has introduced an array of methods and policies directed at transforming the European economy and society through decarbonization in a sustainable, just, and inclusive way (Fetting, 2020, p. 4). With this pioneering initiative, the EU does not only seek to mitigate the effects of climate change locally but has also positioned itself as a global leader in climate mitigation (Sanahuja, 2025, p. 343; Siddi, 2020, p. 4). These efforts have allowed a new standard to be set in which climate action is prioritized over economic growth (Eckert, 2021, p. 81). However, recently there has been a noteworthy shift in the EU’s climate narrative, as its commitment is being challenged by economic concerns (Stoian et al., 2023, p. 16).

This shift has become especially apparent in the implementation of the Clean Industrial Deal (CID) in February 2025. The Commission clearly signals that the EU’s agenda will be dominated by economic security, competitiveness, and strategic autonomy until the 2029 elections (Adolphsen, Könneke & Schenuit, 2024, p. 2). The EU’s shift in focus on protecting the economy accompanied by the CID’s launch raise questions about the EU’s priorities. While the EGD emphasizes the urgency of climate action and prioritizes a green transition rooted in an “environment first” narrative, the CID places greater emphasis on economic competitiveness, advancing an “economy first” narrative, which appears to reverse the EGD’s intention (Adolphsen, Könneke & Schenuit, 2024, p. 2; Eckert & Kovalevska, 2021, p. 1). This shift leads to the research question: How have internal and external political pressures influenced the EU’s shift toward an ‘economy-first’ framing in climate policy since the implementation of the European Green Deal?

Answering this question is of significance on social and academic levels. Socially, the EU’s climate policy has a direct impact on global climate change and the EU’s economic stability, thus affecting every EU citizen (Chateau, Miho & Borowiecki, 2023, p. 24). A shift in priorities could have far-reaching consequences for the balance between climate mitigation and economic stability and competitiveness. It is therefore particularly relevant to identify and examine the causal mechanisms behind this shift, because its understanding helps clarify why the EU’s longstanding prioritization of climate mitigation was disrupted and what this means for future policies.

Academically, while existing studies have explored the EGD’s set targets and its economic implications (Sikora, 2021, p. 690), less attention has been paid to the conditions under which economic concerns gain priority over climate commitments. Moreover, due to its recent implementation the CID remains underexplored, leaving a significant research gap. This study will address these knowledge gaps, by offering insights into the geopolitical and institutional factors influencing the EU’s discursive shift in climate policy, thereby academically contributing to a deeper understanding of policy change in EU governance.

To address the research question, the upcoming sections of this thesis will be structured in the following manner. First, the existing literature about the EU’s shift in climate policy framing as well as the political pressures that might influence this shift will be examined, before establishing a link between the two variables. Next up, the hypothesized causal mechanisms will be outlined, providing the theoretical expectations for the analysis of this thesis. Afterwards, the methodology and research design will be elaborated on and, accordingly, the empirical data will be analyzed and discussed. Lastly, the thesis will reflect on the results and conclude.

Theoretical Discussion and Framework

The main objective of this thesis is to examine the hypothesized causal mechanisms between internal and external political pressures and the European Union’s discursive shift of the European Green Deal from an “environment-first” to an “economy-first” framing. The theoretical framework will commence with a conceptualization of the key terms, which are internal and external political pressures as well as the framing shift in EU climate policy. Subsequently, a discussion of the theories creating a link between political pressures and the EU’s framing shift of the EGD will follow. This theoretical discussion will lay the groundwork for the investigation of the causal mechanisms behind the hypothesized link of the two variables. Finally, the theoretical expectations for the causal mechanisms, rooted in the discussion of existing literature, will be formulated.

Internal and External Political Pressures

To properly answer the research question, its variables must first be conceptualized. To begin with, political pressures are essential to define as they are ever present in the policy making landscape (Jesus, 2010, p. 71). However, within political sciences no direct definition for political pressures has been established (Potters & Van Winden, 1990, p. 63), although several scholars have provided influential contributions. For instance, Bartolini (2024) refers to political pressures as structures that “do not act, but ‘condition the acting’, namely the ‘orientations’ of the actors and their ‘choices’” (p. 4). This means that despite not actually causing actions, political pressures shape the decisions and strategies of political actors by influencing their orientations and available choices. Potters and Van Winden (1990) add to this discussion by determining which factors must be present within a comprehensive conceptualization. They argue that defining political pressures must include the assumption that “the intentionto influence should be present” (p. 63), excluding “behaviour that unintendedly or as a ‘by-product’ affects the behaviour of political rulers” (p. 63). However, the degree of success must be left open within a comprehensive definition. While Potters and Van Winden’s (1990) argument of intentionality is especially relevant for understanding internal political pressures, such as lobbying and voting pressures, it is less applicable to external political pressures, such as geopolitical or geoeconomic developments, as they do not have an explicit intention to influence EU decision-making. Therefore, this thesis adopts a broader conceptualization of political pressures, which draws on Bartolini’s (2024, p. 5) view, that political pressures are causally significant and thus operate as causal factors influencing governmental actors’ choices and ways of thinking.

However, in context of this thesis it is nonetheless of utmost importance to differentiate between internal and external political pressures. As emphasized by Niemann (2006, pp. 262, 279), supranational decision-making is not only influenced by structural pressures from within the supranational institutions and domestic pressures from national interest groups, but it is also severely affected by external challenges, such as geopolitical and geoeconomic developments.

When it comes to internal political pressures, it is of key importance to consider the concept of multi-level governance, which notes that the EU’s decision-making and its narrative are subject to supranational institutions, as well as national interests and various interest groups (Knill & Liefferink, 2013, p. 119). Thus, internal political pressures comprise acts intended to change the behavior of governmental actors by affecting the public’s perception of the actors’ expected behavior (Potters & Van Winden, 1990, pp. 64-65). This includes actions, in which interest groups aim at influencing the political process of decision-making from within by having their spokespeople be elected to the institutional bodies and consequently shape its decision-making (p. 65).

Contrastingly, Cohen (1990) argues that political interests and choices “ultimately are shaped and influenced by the constraints and opportunities of the international economic structure” (p. 267), which exemplifies external political pressures. It is of significance, as the issue of external political pressures has long been central to political discourse, with policymakers aiming to create conditions that help the (supra)national economy respond to globalization and rising international market competition (Leichter, Mocci & Pozzuoli, 2010, p. 6).

Moreover, scholars highlight the interlinkage of internal and external political pressures. For instance, Potters and Van Winden (1990) emphasize that external political pressures also include actions in which “an interest group points at certain (dis)advantageous consequences of government behaviour due to other agents” (p. 64). Thus, external pressures are oftentimes mediated through internal actors, who point out how global developments could impact supranational matters, thereby influencing political decisions from within. Accordingly, Milner (1988, p. 292) claims that the consequences of external political pressures are in fact internal, since they impact national interest groups’ policy preferences, not supranational policy instruments.

Consequently, considering each condition established by the existing literature, this thesis defines political pressures as structures that condition the orientations, choices, and actions of political actors through, both, mechanisms from within political systems, and mechanisms arising from changing global contexts.

Framing Shift in EU Climate Policy

To investigate the European Union’s shift in climate policy framing, we must first understand what the concept of framing entails and how it impacts decision-making. In this context, Entman’s (1993) Framing Theory will be applied, which defines framing within political contexts as the process of“[selecting] some aspects of a perceived reality and [making] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). Thus, by emphasizing certain elements over others, framing shapes how certain issues are interpreted and acted upon by people and institutions. It is of importance, as it influences not only how policy problems are understood, but also which issues are prioritized on the political agenda and which solutions are considered legitimate in the policy-making process (Kangas, Niemelä & Varjonen, 2014, p. 77).

The question of how framing influences policymaking has been widely explored in the EU’s context (Domorenok & Graziano, 2023, p. 9). Applying Framing Theory to the EU’s framing shift of the European Green Deal reveals that it was initially introduced as prioritizing environmental sustainability, as it emphasized climate change mitigation, reducing carbon emissions, and tackling ecological challenges (Stefanis et al., 2024, p. 1). The EGD’s original framing invoked an urgent, moral imperative to act on climate change (Gerken, 2023, p. 137). Central to this policy initiative is the achievement of climate neutrality by 2050 through an array of measures, policies, and legal regulations (Fetting, 2020, p. 4; Siddi, 2020, p. 4). This includes, for example, the introduction of the Emissions Trading System, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the Just Transition Mechanism, the promotion of a circular economy and the Farm-to-Fork Strategy (Fetting, 2020, pp. 5, 6, 12). Each of these measures reflect the centrality and priority of sustainability and the environment (Stefanis et al., 2024, p. 1).

However, this framing has evolved since. The implementation of the Clean Industrial Deal in 2025, as an industrial policy introduced under the EGD, shows a clear shift in priorities (Adolphsen, Könneke & Schenuit, 2024, p. 2, 6). According to Cornillie et al. (2025), the aims of the CID are “to create a business case for Europe’s clean industrial transformation, thereby focusing on six drivers: affordable energy, lead markets, financing, circularity and access to materials, global markets and partnerships, and skills” (p. 3). The CID emphasizes the promotion of and investing in net-zero industries, it simplifies environmental regulations introduced by the EGD and aims to bring down energy prices for industrial sectors, ultimately promoting economic competitiveness and stability (Hermwille et al., 2025, p. 6). It thus embodies a strategic response to internal and external political pressures and reflects a more pragmatic mindset by highlighting opportunity, innovation, and economic advantage (p. 5).

This strategic pivot reflects a shift in framing of European climate policy, in which economic competitiveness, resilience, and leadership in green technologies are not referred to as tools to achieving environmental goals anymore, since they have become central objectives themselves (Adolphsen, Könneke & Schenuit, 2024, p. 2). Thus, instead of aligning the economy with their ambitious climate agenda, the CID reflects EU actions that align environmental action with economic priorities. Linking these findings back to Entman’s (1993, p. 52) definition of framing, it becomes apparent that the EGD’s reframing occurred on all four levels of the Framing Theory. To begin with, the problem definition has been redirected from highlighting the climate emergency as primary issue to emphasizing the EU’s decline in industrial competitiveness (Adolphsen, Könneke & Schenuit, 2024, p. 2, 6). Furthermore, the causal interpretation went from the increasing public demand for climate mitigation (Domorenok & Graziano, 2023, p. 12) to the emphasis of both internal and external political pressures (Adolphsen, Könneke & Schenuit, 2024, p. 2; Knill & Liefferink, 2013, p. 119). Moreover, the moral assessment evolved from a moral obligation of saving the environment for future generations (Gerken, 2023, p. 137) to shielding European prosperity (Adolphsen, Könneke & Schenuit, 2024, p. 2). Finally, the suggested course of action has switched from carbon emission reductions (Eckert, 2021, p. 81) to supporting European industrial competitiveness (Adolphsen, Könneke & Schenuit, 2024, p. 2).

Causal Mechanisms

Due to the European Union’s framing shift of the European Green Deal, scholars are hypothesizing which triggers could have caused this transformation. While some believe that external political pressures have been instrumental in this shift, others claim that internal political pressures were the primary drivers. The following section will explore both sides of the debate to link the variables and investigate the potential causal mechanisms.

Firstly, various scholars see the 2022 Energy Crisis as a trigger for the EU’s discursive shift. For instance, Goldthau and Youngs (2023, p. 121) state that the crisis has accelerated the EU’s green transition by highlighting the need for energy independence and thereby increasing support for the energy transition. The authors argue the EU’s increased focus on energy security enabled it to prioritize advancements in renewable energies as a means to enhance energy sovereignty and economic competitiveness, and to reduce vulnerabilities from energy dependencies. Other scholars claim that the sudden halt of Russian fossil fuel imports harmed Europe’s energy-intensive industries, causing them to pressure the EU to reduce energy costs and create subsidies (Sgaravatti, Tagliapietra & Zachmann, 2023, p. 16). In turn, Fabra (2023, p. 3) contends, the EU has adopted a more pragmatic tone, by placing more emphasis on the economic benefits of the green transition as part of the EGD. The need to stabilize energy prices and protect European industries has thus led to measures that put economic stability and competitiveness as the priority, using the EGD’s green transition as a tool to achieve it (p. 4).

Furthermore, scholars believe that geopolitical competition as external political pressure has a significant influence on the EU’s increasing economic priority. For instance, Cornillie et al. (2024, p. 4) argue that although the EU is a global leader in green technology innovation, Chinese capacity is becoming increasingly competitive, taking away markets for European products. Furthermore, the United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has exacerbated fears amongst EU members that European green technology companies will relocate to the US to gain from subsidies and lower energy costs (Kleimann et al., 2023, p. 3421). Thus, rising concerns about the EU’s position in the global economy have created a sense of economic urgency (Martini et al., 2024, p. 9). European policymakers are increasingly putting emphasis on industrial policy, seeing it as a necessary response to global competition. This highlights a shift from environmental mitigation to save the climate towards climate mitigation to maintain a strategic advantage.

On the other hand, political pressures from within the EU also play a key role. As noted by Knill and Liefferink (2013, p. 119), the EU’s climate policy is subject to multi-level governance, so the supranational institutions, but also national interests and European interest groups. For instance, the radical right massively gained electoral support in EU member states over the years, becoming especially apparent in the 2024 (EP) elections, where the extreme right political groups European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Patriots for Europe (PfE), and European Sovereignists Network (ESN) significantly increased their representation (Mudde, 2024, pp. 126-130). Ćetković and Hagemann (2020, p. 3, p. 5) emphasize that the radical right’s anti-climate narrative is rooted in the assumed economic burdens that come with climate policies. The polarizing measures of the EGD have been leveraged by radical right parties, contributing to their electoral successes on national and European levels (Otteni & Weisskircher, 2022, p. 1116; Timofejevs, 2020, p. 3; Yazar & Haarstad, 2023, p. 9). Yazar and Haarstad (2023, pp. 8-9) find that radical right parties engage in a combination of discursive and institutional tactics to delay and........

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