The normalisation of Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara by the United Nations (UN) Security Council, as envisaged by Resolution 2797, adopted at the end of October, risks furthering a dangerous trend in international relations that could pave the way for the formal acceptance of other situations of unlawful annexations. These include the conflict in Ukraine, and islands in the Gulf (such as the hardly discussed United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) occupation of Yemen’s Socotra island), as well as those islands occupied by the Chinese military in the South China Sea within its so-called “nine-dash line” (Kattan, 2022). The normalisation of Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara also bears a real risk of becoming a dangerous precedent for the further normalisation of Israel’s occupation and de facto annexation of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza (hereafter the “OPT”), quashing any possible future for a viable and sovereign Palestinian state. The recent Security Council’s Plan for Gaza, with its vague provisions and oblique reference to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, does not seem to dissipate this fear. If accepted, the normalisation of territorial acquisition through prolonged occupations would amount to the death of the cardinal principle in the UN Charter that forbids territorial annexations and would deliver a mortal blow to the much-beleaguered right to self-determination that ushered in the process of decolonisation.  

In this essay, drawing from the recent developments regarding Western Sahara and the OPT, we advance the argument that the Security Council is increasingly normalising situations of unlawful territorial acquisition, thereby eroding the post-1945 prohibition on conquest and weakening the right to self-determination. Western Sahara serves as the primary case through which the mechanism of normalisation can be observed most clearly: a prolonged occupation is re-framed as a “credible” political solution, gradually converting de facto control into de jure legitimacy. We then compare it with the OPTs, and argue that similar logics may be replicated there, as ambiguous governance arrangements and security-driven frameworks risk transforming temporary occupation into a semi-permanent political reality. Both Western Sahara and the OPTs represent prolonged occupations marked by settlement activity, resource exploitation, and the steady extension of the occupying power’s administrative and legal structures. In each context, these material practices have been accompanied by recent Security Council interventions. Together, these cases illuminate a broader pattern in which geopolitical expediency overrides the foundational norms of the UN Charter. 

The Western Sahara Dispute and the Law of Decolonisation  

Western Sahara is perhaps the clearest contemporary example of how prolonged occupation and de facto annexation can be transformed into a politically acceptable, and increasingly legitimised, territorial arrangement. On 31 October 2025, the Security Council voted in favour of Resolution 2797 extending the mandate of the long-standing UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). So far, so good – but for the first time, the UN Security Council also explicitly referenced Morocco’s controversial 2007 “Autonomy Proposal”, inviting parties to take it “as basis … [for] a final and mutually acceptable political solution”, adding that “genuine autonomy could represent a most feasible outcome” (para. 3). The choice to refer to “a” rather than “the most feasible outcome” certainly represents the fruit of disagreements within the Security Council, with some countries insisting on leaving the possibility open for other alternative outcomes.  

It is clear from the declarations of state representatives of several non-Western countries in the Security Council debate that they attempted to resist Western efforts to erode any meaningful notion of self-determination. However, the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK) defined the Moroccan Plan as “credible and realistic” and “the most credible, viable and pragmatic basis for a solution” (UN Press, 2025a). And in fact, the language of the Resolution clearly indicates that Morocco’s proposal is the preferred one. Have no doubt about it, this “Autonomy Proposal” (which Morocco calls a “Plan”) is a project for the unlawful annexation and integration of Western Sahara into Morocco. The language of Resolution 2797 effectively normalises Morocco’s de facto annexation of Western Sahara by conferring a measure of international legitimacy upon an occupation that has persisted for half a century. 

This attempt to legitimise Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara stands in sharp contrast to the well-established principles of international law forbidding annexation and supporting national self-determination, as repeatedly affirmed by the UN since the mid-1970s. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its Western Sahara Advisory Opinion on 16 October 1975, in response to a request by the UN General Assembly, which was supported by Morocco at the time. The Court found that while certain “legal ties of allegiance” existed between some of the Sahrawi tribes and the Sultan of Morocco (and, at the time, Mauritania), these ties did not amount to territorial sovereignty (ICJ advisory opinion, 1975, para. 162). On that basis, the Court affirmed that the people of Western Sahara possess a right to self-determination to decide the international status of the territory.  

In light of the ICJ’s findings, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed its commitment to the decolonisation of Western Sahara as a UN-listed Non-Self-Governing Territory, in accordance with Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples). The Assembly determined that the Sahrawi people must be enabled to decide their own political future through a referendum, the outcome of which could include full independence or association or integration with another state, but only as a result of their freely and genuinely expressed choice.  

The General Assembly reaffirmed this position in several subsequent resolutions, including Resolution 34/37 (1979) and Resolution 35/19 (1980), recognising the national liberation movement of the Polisario Front as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people and calling on Morocco to end its occupation of the territory. To facilitate the implementation of this right, the UN Security Council established MINURSO through Resolution 690 (1991), with the primary mandate of monitoring the ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front and organising the long-promised referendum on self-determination. However, despite repeated affirmations of this mandate, political obstacles, disputes over voter eligibility, and Morocco’s resistance to any option that includes independence have paralysed the referendum process. 

The resulting stalemate has allowed Morocco to consolidate effective control over Western Sahara, in defiance of international law and the repeated calls of the UN for a process of genuine self-determination. Since its occupation of the territory in 1975, following Spain’s withdrawal and the signing of the Madrid Accords, Morocco has progressively integrated Western Sahara into its domestic legal, administrative, and constitutional framework.  

The 2011 Moroccan Constitution, for instance, explicitly defines the kingdom’s “southern provinces” as part of its national territory, codifying the annexation within its supreme law. This formal incorporation has been accompanied by the extension of Moroccan institutions, including courts, into the occupied territory, blurring the distinction between Morocco and Western Sahara in both legal and administrative terms. While it maintains some military presence, especially at the border in light of the ongoing armed conflict with the Polisario Front, Morocco has fully extended its civil law and administration to Western Sahara.  

At the same time, Morocco has pursued extensive policies of settlement and infrastructure development aimed at consolidating its control and altering the demographic and economic character of Western Sahara. Tens of thousands of Moroccan citizens have been encouraged or incentivised to relocate to Western Sahara through employment opportunities, housing subsidies, and tax advantages (Haklai, 2022). The result is that as of today, Sahrawis constitute around one fourth of the population living in Western Sahara (CJEU, Front Polisario, 2024, paras 127-128). Major infrastructure projects, such as the Dakhla Atlantic Port, new road networks linking the territory to southern Morocco, and energy developments in renewable sectors, have further integrated Western Sahara into Morocco’s national economy (Pelliconi and Kattan, 2025). These policies have not only changed the population composition........

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