A POSITIVE that can be extracted from the ongoing confrontation with Afghanistan is that Pakistan has taken an ideological turn before it could drift further into ‘institutionalised radicalism’. The worst aspect, meanwhile, is the loss of lives on both sides, and the shattered dream of a friendly state on Pakistan’s western border as a strategic shield against India and geo-economic connectivity beyond Afghanistan and Central Asia up to the borders of Europe.

It may be hard for many to grasp the argument that Pakistan has taken a turn away from institutionalised radicalism — especially those who believe that the country is already suffering on account of religious extremism. There’s little doubt that religious radicalism had been a power elite project that was nurtured for multiple purposes — crafting national cohesion, cultivating proxies for geopolitical aims and shaping a strategic outlook in which the West and the Gulf were allies during its formative phase. Faith was also used to give the masses a sense of belonging to the state and to make them obedient to authority, rather than to grant them civil rights.

The power elites had crafted the system for the masses whom they sought to rule, though it held little meaning in their own lives. But they failed to achieve their aims of political and national cohesion through religion. Policies that allowed madressahs and religious groups — ranging from moderate to violent — to proliferate failed both state and society. Meanwhile, the major question of national cohesion still looms over the power elites: the Baloch insurgency, rights movements from Gwadar to Azad........

© Dawn