In a seminal article, entitled “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” Stephen Stedman writes that “peacemaking is a risky business.” The greatest source of risk “comes from spoilers—leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”

Spoilers can be inside or outside a peace process. Those inside have signed an agreement but fail to fulfill key obligations; those outside are either excluded from it or have excluded themselves. In terms of managing spoilers, it is important to determine why a particular party is refusing to honor a peace agreement.

Spoilers are already causing problems for the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Iran and the US announced on June 14, after weeks of Pakistani mediators trading proposals back and forth between the parties. The 14-point MOU was officially signed by President Donald Trump on June 17 in Versailles and by President Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran the next day.

The Process of the Negotiations Following the Signing of the MOU

To develop the MOU into a permanent peace agreement, face-to-face negotiations were scheduled for June 19 in Bürgenstock, Switzerland under the auspices of Pakistani and Qatari mediators. But because heavy fighting in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah was violating the first clause of the MOU, which called for the termination of military operations “including in Lebanon,” the Iranians declared that they would not attend and threatened to reclose the Strait of Hormuz. Vice President JD Vance, who was to lead the US delegation, also canceled his flight to Switzerland.

Although the negotiations were successful, several parties—Israel, Hezbollah, Trump, and hardliners in Iran—almost derailed the process and are still attempting to do so.

Nonetheless, on June 20, after Iranian state TV announced that Iran’s delegation, led by the Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, had arrived in Switzerland, Vance departed the US to join Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner, who had traveled there earlier.

The talks, dubbed the Lake Lucerne Summit, began on the morning of June 21 with separate meetings between the leaders of each delegation with the mediators, followed by quadrilateral talks in the afternoon between the two parties and two mediators.

Vance presented a promising opening statement, saying: “Never before has the Iranian and American leadership met at such a high level... What the President has asked us to do is turn over a new leaf to transform our relationship with the people of Iran, and to extend an outstretched hand that says to the people of Iran that if your leadership is willing to give up being a driver of regional instability, if they are willing to give up nuclear weapons ambitions for the long term, then the United States is willing to fundamentally transform our relationship.”

But 80 minutes later, the Iranians got word that Trump (apparently annoyed by the threatened closure of the Strait of Hormuz) told Fox News in a phone call that unless the strait remained open, the negotiators talking to Vance will “never make it back to their country—in fact, they will have no f**king country to return to at all.”

In response, the Iranian delegation protested to the mediators, saying this was an unacceptable threat to their personal safety and then staged a walkout. Their absence was apparently temporary, because Vance, describing the talks as “messy,” later said: “Yes, they did threaten to walk out... but we were negotiating well past one in the morning... so they didn’t [permanently] walk out.” In all, there were about 18 hours of intensive talks and consultations.

The Outcome and Substance of the Negotiations

The talks produced a road map for a final deal within 60 days and created a High-Level Committee for Political Oversight to manage the process and coordinate the three working groups who will report to the committee weekly: a Nuclear Working Group, a Sanctions Tracking Group, and a Monitoring and Dispute-Resolution Group.

Two crisis management mechanisms were also agreed: a Strait of Hormuz Secure Communication Channel (i.e., a hotline) to provide communication links between maritime security forces to “avoid incidents and miscommunication” and guarantee safe passage for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz; and a Lebanon De-Confliction Cell to prevent further military escalation and ensure compliance with the cessation of hostilities.

In the end, the talks were more successful than the first round in April in Islamabad. Vance called them “a good foundation;” Araghchi said the mediators delivered “major progress.” A joint statement by the mediators described “encouraging progress” and cited a “positive and constructive atmosphere.” The Swiss Foreign Ministry also welcomed “constructive progress.” Technical talks between the working groups began the next day.

Although the negotiations were successful, several parties—Israel, Hezbollah, Trump, and hardliners in Iran—almost derailed the process and are still attempting to do so.

The success of the process appears to be due to the mediators employing “the departing train strategy, which implies that the peace process is a train leaving the station at a preordained time: Once set in motion, anyone not on board will be left behind.” It is a determination that the peace process will go irrevocably forward regardless of spoiling efforts. Other strategies that Stedman proposes for managing spoilers include: inducement, socialization, deterrence-coercion, and withdrawal.

Although a comprehensive accounting of each spoiler’s motivation and strategies for dealing with them exceed the scope of this article, some general points can be made.

Long-term enemies, Israel and Hezbollah, reengaged in fighting on March 2, when Hezbollah launched missiles against Israel to protest Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s assassination, followed by intense hostilities between them. Since the first clause of the MOU calls for the termination of military operations, including in Lebanon, this presents a dilemma, since both Israel and Hezbollah were outside the US-Iranian peace process and didn’t agree. Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explicitly stated that since it isn’t a party to the MOU, Israel will not withdraw from Lebanon.

In response, the US established a separate mediation process between Israel and Lebanon (with Hezbollah again outside the process) which agreed to ceasefires of varying lengths, subsequently violated by both Israel and........

© Common Dreams