The Unexplained Op Sindoor Ceasefire that Gave Pakistan a Diplomatic Escape
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With various versions still in play, the precise circumstances remain murky but the fact is clear that India and Pakistan agreed on a ceasefire at around noon on May 10 last year. There is, however, a major unanswered question: Just why did India, by its own account, “accede to the request of Pakistan” for a ceasefire? After all, by its attacks on the Pakistani air defence nodes and various sites across the country, it had established air superiority by May 10.
The premature ceasefire actually enabled Pakistan to wriggle out of a sticky spot that the escalation of hostilities had created and ride on US shoulders towards diplomatic rehabilitation. As a result, the terrible terrorist act at Pahalgam lost its resonance and India’s campaign to isolate Pakistan failed. In short, India was unable to convert its claimed military victory into a durable strategic reality.
The issue also raises questions about the tensions in Indian policy – terror proxies were treated as separate entities in the military operations, while in terms of political rhetoric it is asserted that there is no difference between the terrorists and the Pakistani establishment.
As much is evident from the remarks of Air Marshal A.K. Bharti, who was speaking on May 7 in Jaipur at a press conference on the anniversary of Op Sindoor: “Our fight was with the terrorists and their support infrastructure. And that is what we hit, ensuring no collateral damage. We had achieved our objectives, and our mission was complete.” India had to undertake the operation because “the Pakistani establishment decided to side with terror and make it their own fight, we had no choice to respond in kind. It was about self-defence, much beyond a counter-terror operation.”
Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.
This is in line with the Indian Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) calling his Pakistani counterpart on May 7, 2025, to tell him of India’s compulsions in striking at the terror infrastructure and to convey the message that the Pakistani military should not interfere. But the Pakistani side made it clear that it would be compelled to respond and was, indeed, preparing to do so.
A lot of this seems to go against the grain of the Indian belief that there is little or no difference between the Pakistani state and the terrorists. Indeed, the terror establishment is the state itself.
But the differentiation was there right from the top. It was the basis for........
