Last week, Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government and Alberta premier Danielle Smith did something many thought politically impossible: they agreed to a new oil pipeline cutting to the British Columbia coast, designed to move bitumen to foreign markets.

Their memorandum of understanding (or MOU, a non-binding blueprint for where both governments want to go) lays out the high-stakes deal: Ottawa signals a willingness to ease up on key climate rules and even revisit the BC tanker moratorium. In return, Alberta promises tougher carbon pricing for heavy industry and a major expansion in carbon capture projects—emerging technology meant to trap emissions from oil sands operations and bury them underground—alongside a privately financed pipeline with Indigenous co-ownership.

BC wasn’t brought into the room, and it shows. The province is furious, warning that the MOU weakens coastal protections, heightens spill risk, and resurrects a fight many thought was finally behind us. Several First Nations and environmental groups have already come out swinging.

To get past the talking points, I spoke with Stewart Prest, a political scientist at the University of British Columbia, about what’s actually inside the agreement—and what it might unleash.

What’s the national interest argument here? Why is Carney doing this now?

I think he sees a need to bridge the gap between Canada, its mainstream political movements, and the more populist right-of-centre political movements, which are very much centred on Alberta and the energy sector. That’s not the only issue that they care about, but it’s clearly one of the primary drivers: grievances around Alberta’s ability to access foreign markets with its energy production. I think Carney sees this as a kind of grand bargain, an opportunity to bring together these two sides, which are so divided. It is really the primary line of polarization, the fault line within Canadian politics right now.

What’s the national interest risk here? Why is this a bad idea?

There are real risks with this strategy. Should it fail, it will provide fresh grievance to that populist group and become just another argument for why the two sides can never work together. And if it does fail, part of the reason will be because the agreement has so far been struck without the involvement of either the province of BC or Indigenous communities along the route of the proposed pipeline. Some of those communities are perhaps in favour of taking on an ownership stake and co-operating, but others, concerned about long-term risk to these ecologically sensitive areas, are ardently against the project. That potentially runs afoul of the government’s constitutional obligation to consult with Indigenous groups in good faith.

Other risks?

The other downside for Carney is that, while he may have neutralized some of his opposition by looking like a Conservative prime minister, he is in danger of losing important components of his own coalition. The resignation of Steven Guilbeault, a former climate minister, from Carney’s cabinet is an indicator that those who joined the Liberals under Justin Trudeau because they thought the government was acting in good faith on the environment no longer hold that view. Having voters conclude that a vote for the Liberals is effectively no different on these key issues than a vote for the Conservatives is about the only thing that can bring new life into either the New Democratic Party or the Greens; both of them look pretty morbid right now. And you don’t need to have many voters switching back to one of these other progressive parties for the Conservatives to pop up into minority or even majority territory.

Is there a scenario where Carney wins for losing? What I mean is, even if the pipeline fails, can he still benefit politically?

I think neutralizing Smith, for however long........

© The Walrus