The Ontological Bubble of Israeli Society Through the Lens of a New Survey

Research conducted by the Dor Moriah Analytical Center in partnership with the Geocartography Center as part of the Haifa Format project. Sample: 1,009 respondents, representative of Israel’s population aged 18+. Margin of error: ±3.1% at a 95% confidence level.

On February 2, 2026, opposition leader Yair Lapid, following a briefing with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, declared: “The entire State of Israel is united against Iran. We have no disagreements about the importance of confronting this threat.”[1] The day before, both sides had been trading accusations on social media over the “Qatar affair.” The next day—they sat together at the same table on security matters.

This contrast—public warfare within and demonstrative unity without—captures the pulse of contemporary Israeli politics. But behind the ritual of “unity against an external enemy” lies a reality revealed by sociological survey data collected by the Dor Moriah Analytical Center in partnership with the Geocartography Center in early January 2026.

The key paradox: even as politicians demonstrate foreign policy unity, society internally remains fractured. Moreover, we’re not talking about familiar disagreements, but rather a phenomenon that Dor Moriah researchers, through a cycle of 14 sociological studies (2023–2025, over 14,000 respondents), have identified as an ontological bubble—a condition where society splits not merely in opinions, but in the very perception of reality itself: the same events appear completely different to different groups.

Methodological Note: This analysis employs a balance index—the difference between the share of positive and negative assessments. For example, if 50% of respondents rated a situation positively and 20% negatively, the balance index would be +30 percentage points. This metric allows us to clearly see the direction and intensity of public sentiment.

What Is an Ontological Bubble and Why It’s Not Simply “Polarization”

Traditional polarization occurs when people diverge in opinions but exist within the same informational and value framework. An ontological bubble is a qualitatively different state. Its characteristics include: impermeability to alternative facts, dehumanization of opponents, “packaged” perception of positions (where one’s view on religion automatically determines positions on economics, security, and geopolitics), and the formation of emotional dependency on confirmation of one’s own rightness.

Previous Dor Moriah research identified the formation of two stable worldview clusters within Israeli society—religiously-oriented and secular-modernist—with high internal coherence. 61% of Israelis systematically choose radical positions on key issues, and 76% of them reproduce these positions consistently, regardless of the specific topic.

The January 2026 survey provides an opportunity to test how the ontological bubble manifests not in abstract dichotomies, but in assessments of the lived year—events that everyone experienced simultaneously but, as it turns out, in completely different realities.

One Year — Two Realities

Israelis’ assessments of how the country handled foreign policy and defense challenges in 2025 yield an overall balance index of +12.6 percentage points—a moderately positive result. However, behind this average temperature lies a deep divide among different social groups.

Among religious Israelis, the balance index stands at +49.1 percentage points, while among secular Israelis it goes negative (−4.2 p.p.), and in the Arab sector becomes even more negative (−14.3 p.p.).

Thus, the same year 2025 is perceived as successful by some and unsuccessful by others.

Chart 1: Balance Index for Assessment of Israel’s Achievements in 2025

The gap between secular and religious Israelis amounts to 53 percentage points. This is not a divergence in opinions—it’s different worldviews overlaid on the same events. Precisely this pattern—where different groups not only assess reality differently but live in different realities—serves as an empirical marker of the ontological bubble.

60% See Increasing Division, 5% See Decreasing Division

A direct indicator of this divide comes from responses to the question of how 2025 affected disagreements among Israeli population groups: 60.5% of Israelis noted that the year intensified disagreements, while only 5% said it diminished them. Accordingly, the balance index, as the difference between positive responses (about weakening disagreements) and negative ones (about their intensification), stands at −55.5 percentage points in favor of increasing division.

Moreover, as shown in the chart below, secular Israelis feel the division most acutely: their balance index stands at −68.8 p.p., while among religious respondents it’s least negative (−44.4 p.p.).

The Jewish and Arab sectors demonstrate high alignment on this question: balance index values in these groups range from −50 to −56 p.p.

Chart 2: Balance Index for 2025’s Impact on Disagreements

Economy and Security: The Closer to Daily Life—The Deeper the Divide

The transition from abstract assessments of foreign policy to concrete questions—economy and personal security—reveals even more dramatic gaps. This is where the ontological bubble manifests with maximum force.

The overall balance index for the economy is sharply negative: −24.2 p.p., reflecting a widespread sense of economic deterioration.

As with the previous question, religious respondents demonstrate the most positive perception of the economic situation, and this is the only group where the balance index is positive (+0.9 p.p.). Among secular Israelis it stands at −36.0 p.p., while among Arab Israelis it reaches catastrophic levels of −44.7 p.p.

Chart 3: Balance Index for Changes in Economic Conditions

Regarding perceptions of personal security in 2025, one of the most pronounced gaps emerges among population groups.

Chart 4: Index of Personal Security Change in 2025 vs. 2024

Religious Israelis, as with other questions, demonstrate the highest assessments. The balance index value for this group’s responses is positive, +29.3 p.p., with nearly half of its members believing security has strengthened.

In all other groups, the balance index is negative. Thus, among secular Israelis it stands at −16.4 p.p. But the most pessimistic assessments come from the Arab sector with an index of −38.0 p.p.

Therefore, the difference between the most optimistic group (religious) and the most critical (Arabs) reaches nearly 70 percentage points, indicating a profound gap between different social groups in their perception of the situation.

Chart 5: Breakdown of Personal Security Assessments by Group

The data reveal a persistent and pervasive pattern: the closer a group is to the religious and right-wing political pole, the more positively it assesses the situation. The farther away—the more pessimistic.

This can be explained by the actual distribution of benefits and costs, the psychological effect of proximity to power, and, critically important, information bubbles—different groups receive their picture of the world from different sources.

Economy and security function as amplifiers of division. When “outwardly” words ring out about a common threat, “inwardly” one’s wallet and sense of personal vulnerability remind: unity is experienced differently and is also paid for differently.

When Internal Matters More Than External

This is perhaps the most paradoxical result in the context of “unity against Iran.” When asked about the main threat to Israel in 2026, people most frequently choose not Iran, but the internal situation.

Chart 6: Internal Threat vs. Iran: By Group

Secular Israelis place the internal threat first with 44.2%—the internal threat is twice as important to them as Iran (22%). The Arab sector presents a similar picture: 43.5% see the main threat inside the country, and only 19.3% in Iran. Only traditional Israelis (33.1% for Iran, 25.1% for internal threat) place the external threat higher than the internal one.

This means that the rally around the flag mechanism—unity around the flag in moments of external threat—is losing its consolidating function. Groups most distant from the current government see the main threat not in external enemies but in internal crisis.

The Ontological Bubble and Trump’s Plan: When 97% Heard but Only 9% Know

The concept of the ontological bubble receives additional confirmation when analyzing Israelis’ perception of U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan for resolving the situation in the Gaza Strip, presented on September 29, 2025.

Dor Moriah’s October survey (1,000 respondents) recorded a paradox of superficial consensus: 97% of Israelis heard about the plan, but only 9% are actually familiar with it. This creates an illusion of an informed society while actually lacking knowledge of the details of this fateful document.

Moreover, different groups demonstrate diametrically opposed assessments of the plan. Secular Israelis are 20 percentage points more likely to consider the plan consistent with Israel’s security interests (46.5% vs. 26.4% of religious Israelis). But religious Israelis have greater faith in military victory over Hamas (64.4% vs. 53% of secular Israelis). Among those who don’t believe in a military solution, religious Israelis are three times more likely to support permanent occupation (46.5% vs. 18.3% of secular Israelis, who prefer regional diplomacy).

These data show how the ontological bubble operates in practice: people use the same terms (“Trump’s plan,” “security,” “Hamas”) but invest completely different meanings in them, relying on different ideas about what is even possible and what matters.

Three Levels of Division: From Consensus to Rupture

Thus, the survey data reveal an important pattern: the closer a question is to people’s everyday experience, the more divergent the assessments become across groups.

First level—shared language of threats.

When it comes to external challenges and state security, society retains a limited space of agreement. Iran remains one of the key threats, and the very necessity of strong defense is rarely questioned.

Second level—assessment of government performance.

But as soon as the question concerns how successfully Israel handled the challenges of 2025, sharp polarization begins. The balance index fluctuates from −4.2 p.p. among secular Israelis to +49.1 p.p. among religious Israelis—a distance of over 50 points.

Third level—personal experience of security and wellbeing.

Maximum divergence manifests where personal life is concerned: the sense of security and perception of economic changes. Here different groups demonstrate not merely different assessments but different lived experiences—from moderately positive among religious Israelis to sharply negative in the Arab sector.

Thus, the survey captures a transition from relatively common frameworks of perception to increasingly divergent social realities: society is still capable of talking about threats in general terms, but in assessing results and especially in personal experience, Israel increasingly fractures into several different worldviews.

The Arab Sector: Zone of Deep Alienation

Special attention deserves the position of the Arab sector, which across all dimensions demonstrates a state of deep alienation from the dominant narrative.

Balance indices for Arab Israelis are sharply negative across all dimensions: on foreign policy −14.3 p.p., on economy −44.7 p.p., on security −38.0 p.p. Added to this is a high proportion of “don’t know” responses on many questions (up to 20–33%)—a sign of distancing from the general security discourse or unwillingness to publicly state a position.

Arab Israelis exist outside the narrative where “we are all united against Iran.” For a significant portion of them, 2025 was a year of dramatic deterioration in personal security and economic conditions. This creates long-term risks for internal stability.

Paradoxically, precisely against this backdrop of alienation from the general Israeli agenda, Arab parties are demonstrating an attempt at internal consolidation. The unification into the Joint List and focus on combating crime in the Arab sector show a drive to mobilize around their own, parallel political program. However, an open question remains: to what extent is this consolidation around an intra-Arab agenda a consequence of alienation from the general Israeli discourse, and to what extent is it its cause? Survey data suggest that the Arab sector doesn’t so much choose distancing as finds itself forcibly pushed beyond the boundaries of the dominant narrative of security and success.

Conclusion: Anesthesia—Not Treatment

The formula “we are united against Iran” functions as a foreign policy message and a tactical tool for elites. But survey data show that inside the country, this slogan collides with the wall of the ontological bubble.

The research establishes several critical conclusions.

Fragmentation is structural in nature. Gaps between groups reach 40–70 percentage points, run along multiple lines (religion, nationality, economy, security), and affect even the basic sense of physical security. These are not temporary fluctuations but different systems of perceiving reality.

External threats have lost their consolidating function. For the first time, internal problems (35%) outrank Iran (25.8%) as the main threat. The rally around the flag mechanism doesn’t work.

Division deepens from abstract to personal. The closer a question is to daily life, the stronger the divergence between groups—from dozens of percentage points in assessing foreign policy to an almost unbridgeable chasm in the sense of personal security.

The ritual of unity has become precisely a ritual—a symbolic action that temporarily covers internal fissures, creates an illusion of consolidation for the outside world, but doesn’t heal disagreements. The feeling of “we’re together” blankets the country in moments of tension, but this is anesthesia, not treatment.

Research data lead to a conclusion: as elections approach, ordinary contradictions among population groups increasingly transform into an ontological bubble—a split not only in opinions but in the perception of reality itself. The external threat of Iran, despite its significance, no longer performs a consolidating function: internal fault lines prove stronger. Division reproduces not because of irreconcilable visions of the future, but because the logic of the struggle for power increasingly builds not on competition of programs but on mobilization through opposition. Under these conditions, different “realities” within the country become irreversibly fixed as a structural element of Israeli society—a condition that will reach its apex at the elections.

Research conducted by the Dor Moriah Analytical Center in partnership with the Geocartography Center as part of the Haifa Format project. Survey period: early January 2026. Sample: 1,009 respondents, online survey, representative of internet users aged 18+ in Israel. Statistical margin of error: ±3.1% at a 95% confidence level. This publication continues a cycle of 14 sociological studies by Dor Moriah (2023–2025), within which the concept of the ontological bubble was developed and empirically validated.

[1] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/lapid-after-security-update-with-netanyahu-israel-is-united-against-iran/

For the full study visit: https://dor-moriah.org.il/

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)