In the Book of Judges, Deborah and Barak faced a threat that was not only military, but also political. Jabin, the king of Canaan, and his commander Sisera had a formidable advantage: 900 iron chariots. Yet, this story is also about mobilization. Some tribes responded to Deborah’s call; other tribes refrained from answering. Deborah’s song praised the ones that joined the struggle, while rebuking those who remained distant when the common order was in peril.

The ancient lessons have strategic implications for the contemporary era: when adversaries coordinate across distance, frontline countries do not have the luxury of thinking within the confines of their respective regions. Israel and South Korea are separated by geography, history, and immediate threat environments. Israel confronts Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other participants in the regional network. Meanwhile, South Korea faces North Korea’s nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, long-range artillery, cyber operations, and special forces. At first glance, these two security problems seem unrelated to one another.

Iran and North Korea have long understood that geographical distance does not prevent strategic cooperation. Their relationship is, of course, not backed by a formal alliance like NATO. Nonetheless, it is more practical. For decades, Iran’s missile program was drawn from North Korea’s technology and experience, which includes the lineage connecting North Korea’s Nodong missile with Iran’s Shahab variants. Both regimes have also learned how to survive sanctions, conceal military programs, utilize underground facilities, and exploit the West’s hesitation.

The fundamental problem for today is not just about missile transfer. Rather, it is about strategic learning.

Iran studies how Israel, the United States, and regional partners respond to missile and drone salvos. North Korea studies the same subject. Iran’s recent missile and drone attacks against Israel, the Houthis’ attacks against maritime and regional targets, and aggressions against critical energy infrastructure in the Gulf region offer insights about saturation, interception, air defense coordination, and political endurance. North Korea may have observed how rapidly missile interceptors could be depleted, how civil society absorbs pressure, and how alliance coordination functions under attack.

North Korea, in turn, offers the model of nuclear brinkmanship tactics, missile mobility, hardened underground bunkers, cyber operations, sanctions evasion, and strategic ambiguity to Iran.........

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