Benjamin Netanyahu has long since ceased to be merely an Israeli politician. After nearly nineteen years in total at the head of government, he has become a political and social phenomenon around whom much of Israel’s public debate has come to revolve.

To his admirers, “Bibi” is the statesman who helped turn Israel into an economic, diplomatic and military power; the leader who resisted international pressure, recognized the Iranian threat early on, and transformed Israel’s regional standing. In the aftermath of the October 7 trauma, he is also, in their eyes, the man who led what his supporters call the “War of Revival” with exceptional determination and audacity, restoring Israel’s ability to strike its enemies and reshape the regional balance of power.

To his opponents, October 7 tells precisely the opposite story. Far from vindicating his stature as a statesman, it represents the historic failure for which Netanyahu, as Israel’s long-serving prime minister, bears ultimate political responsibility. In their eyes, he also embodies the corruption of power, the weakening of institutions, the deepening of social divisions – and, for some, a threat to Israeli democracy itself.

Between these diametrically opposed portraits, it is difficult to reach a dispassionate judgment of Netanyahu. The task, then, is to return to the facts, his record and his choices: to weigh his achievements against his failures, distinguish legitimate criticism from what has sometimes hardened into political narrative -and understand why no other Israeli leader has inspired such profound identification and such intense hostility.

Strength as a Worldview

To understand Netanyahu, one must begin with his worldview. An heir to the Likud’s national-liberal tradition and to Jabotinsky’s doctrine of the “Iron Wall,” he believes that Israel can base its security neither on the goodwill of its enemies nor on the guarantees of the international community. The country must be strong enough -militarily, economically and diplomatically – to make its destruction impossible and cooperation with it advantageous.

This conception also explains his approach to the United States. While regarding the American alliance as an essential pillar of Israel’s security, Netanyahu has always insisted on Israel’s freedom to defend its vital interests, even at the cost of confrontation with the White House. His public opposition to Barack Obama over the Iranian nuclear issue -culminating in his 2015 address to Congress -was its most dramatic expression. His supporters see this as the mark of a leader willing to stand up even to Israel’s most powerful ally when he believes the country’s security is at stake; his detractors argue that he has at times unnecessarily politicized and strained an essential strategic relationship.

As finance minister in the early 2000s, Netanyahu introduced sweeping free-market reforms: cuts in public spending and some welfare benefits, privatization, incentives to return to work, and measures to encourage investment and competition. The policies were painful and controversial, but they contributed to the recovery of an economy in crisis and to the emergence of a more dynamic and competitive Israeli economy.

The same conception underpins his foreign policy. The 2020 Abraham Accords challenged the assumption that normalization with the Arab world necessarily had to await a resolution of the Palestinian conflict. They demonstrated that Arab states could also seek relations with Israel because of its military, economic and technological strength.

The same is true of Iran. For years, Netanyahu’s insistence on the Iranian threat was portrayed as an obsession. His style and theatricality could be criticized; it is far harder today to argue that the threat itself was imaginary. Iran’s nuclear program and the “ring of fire” Tehran built around Israel have vindicated the centrality of the danger Netanyahu had been warning about for decades.

Between Ideology and Pragmatism

Alongside Netanyahu the ideologue stands a Netanyahu far more pragmatic and cautious than his image might suggest. The Hebron Agreement, the Wye River Memorandum, the Bar-Ilan speech, his decision not to proceed with annexation, and successive ceasefires in Gaza all show that, in practice, he........

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