On the night of 28 May 2010, India witnessed one of the darkest acts of Maoist violence in its modern history. At around 1.30 AM, the Jnaneswari Express travelling through West Midnapore in West Bengal was derailed after suspected Maoist saboteurs tampered with railway tracks between Khemasuli and Sardiha stations. Moments later, an oncoming goods train rammed into the derailed coaches. The carnage was horrific.

At least 148 innocent passengers were killed and more than 200 injured. Entire families were shattered in a matter of seconds. Mangle d train compartments, bodies strewn across tracks, and desperate cries for help became haunting images etched into the nation’s memory. Sixteen years later, the Jnaneswari Express tragedy remains far more than a railway disaster. It stands as a grim symbol of a period when India’s response to Left-Wing Extremism was marked by hesitation, ideological confusion, and strategic drift.

The decade of the UPA government between 2004 and 2014 saw the Naxal movement expand dangerously across large parts of India, even as New Delhi often appeared uncertain about how to confront it. The consequences of that uncertainty were devastating. From the mid-2000s, Naxalism was no longer a localized insurgency confined to remote pockets. It had evolved into a deeply entrenched armed movement operating across what came to be known as the “Red Corridor” – stretching through Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and parts of West Bengal. In many tribal regions, Maoists had effectively established parallel authority structures.

“Jan adalats” dispensed brutal kangaroo justice. Contractors, traders, mining operators and even poor villagers were forced to pay levies. Schools were destroyed because Maoists viewed education infrastructure as symbols of state penetration. Roads were blown up repeatedly to isolate villages and obstruct security movement. Young tribal boys and girls were indoctrinated and recruited into armed squads. The writ of the Indian state weakened in several interior districts. Yet, much of the political discourse in Delhi during those years remained trapped in intellectual ambiguity.

A powerful section within the ruling establishment insisted on viewing Naxalism primarily through the prism of poverty, underdevelopment and tribal alienation. Certainly, these socio-economic realities existed and........

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