Can ‘dharma diplomacy’ offer a solution to war?
On the night of 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein unleashed nearly 150,000 troops – backed by tanks, armoured vehicles, and missile launchers – across the Kuwaiti border. Within two days, the small and militarily weak Kuwait collapsed. As Iraqi forces closed in on Dasman Palace, Emir Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah fled toward Saudi Arabia, while his brother Sheikh Fahad was killed and his body desecrated in a chilling display of power.
Kuwait was swiftly annexed into Iraq’s Basra province under a puppet regime. The world responded. The United Nations Security Council demanded Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal. When Saddam refused, a deadline was set – 15 January 1991. Defiance continued. On 17 January, U.S.-led coalition forces began massive missile strikes, marking the beginning of the Gulf War. In a desperate gamble, Saddam launched missiles at Israel, hoping to fracture the Arab coalition and rally regional support.
As later revealed by his foreign minister Tariq Aziz, Saddam believed attacking Israel would ignite pan-Arab solidarity. It failed. Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and others, fearing Saddam’s expansionism, backed the U.S.-led coalition. By 21 February, ground operations began, and within a week, Saddam conceded defeat. But retreat came with destruction – Kuwait’s oil wells were set ablaze, trig gering one of the worst environmental and energy crises of the century. Oil prices surged, echoing the shocks of the 1970s. The consequences were not confined to West Asia.
The ripple effects reached India, then teetering on the brink of economic collapse. Foreign reserves had dwindled to barely two weeks’ worth of imports. Political instability compounded the crisis, with fragile coalition........
