Scepticism surrounding Chinese diplomatic agreements is highly justified given the historical pattern of unilateral actions along the LAC

A day after the September 12-13, 2026, BRICS Summit attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping and preceded by the August 25, 2026, Special Representative Talks on the India-China Boundary Question in Beijing, India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) publicly released its 2025-26 Annual Report, stating that the PLA had scaled down its deployments opposite India’s northern borders. The timing of this report led to viral social media claims and news summaries inadvertently implying that the troop pullback was an immediate, direct result of the 2026 summit. Soon afterwards, the MoD clarified that this troop reduction took place in 2024 and 2025.

While the India-China eight-point agreement offers mutual security and economic mechanisms, critics are apprehensive about the “early harvest” approach as it primarily suits Beijing’s strategic pacing. They argue that it favours China because: (a) it is a shift from a comprehensive package to piecemeal delimitation; (b) it focuses on easier middle/Sikkim sectors first; (c) it leaves the basic western/eastern disputes unresolved; (d) it normalises ties before full 2020 status quo restoration; and (e) it allows China to project a peaceful diplomatic image globally.

The mutual benefits for India are: (a) reduction of immediate military friction along the Line of Actual Control (LAC); (b) adds hotlines to prevent accidental tactical escalation; (c) resumes traditional Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra pilgrimage batches; (d) reopens designated local border trading points; and (e) restores routine diplomatic communication channels. While experts believed that all previous special representative talks have been used by China primarily as a........

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