Part - II

Where Mirza had stalled, Ayub expedited. Ayub told President Eisenhower that “the talks were going well and would soon result in an agreement” and explicitly welcomed US and Bank financial support.

This represented a complete break from Mirza’s line. US Embassy reporting in October 1958 had already noted Mirza’s constraints, stressing that “even the manner and the timing… will depend upon the advice and assent of the army, as expressed in consultations with General Ayub”. When Ayub seized full power, the negotiations moved swiftly toward settlement.

In retrospect, Ayub’s seemingly bellicose remarks were more a performance for domestic audiences than a negotiating stance. While projecting toughness at home and signalling resolve to India, he was simultaneously assuring the World Bank and Western sponsors that he was ready to conclude a settlement on their terms. This dual messaging allowed him to consolidate legitimacy internally while easing the path to the treaty externally.

Several factors drove Ayub’s approach. Having seized power in a coup, he sought quick diplomatic successes to legitimise his regime. The treaty also unlocked vast international financing for Mangla, Tarbela, and the link canals, reflecting Pakistan’s dependence on foreign aid. At the same time, Ayub made a strategic calculation to prioritise short-term stability with India and the West over long-term sovereignty concerns. However, in his rush for speed and results, he abandoned the safeguards that Mirza had considered essential.

At the time, the Indus Waters Treaty was........

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