This is the first article of a two-part series examining America’s past and present Expeditionary Advanced Base Doctrine. Part 2 will be released next week.

“The US Marine Corps is developing and implementing its Expeditionary Advanced Base Doctrine to support US Navy and air operations in the Southwest Pacific Ocean.” That statement accurately describes an aspect of the 2025 Indo-Pacific strategic situation. It also described—minus the word “Expeditionary”—the USMC’s doctrinal work from 100 years ago, when America faced a rising and aggressive power in the Pacific Ocean.

The United States acquired Guam and the Philippines after victory in the Spanish-American War. Defending those new possessions naturally fell to the US Navy, though the Army maintained a significant presence in the Philippines. Neither service needed to look far to identify the most likely threat. Imperial Japan was an emerging world power, as evidenced by its shocking victory over Russia in 1904-1905 during the Russo-Japanese War—during which it notably mauled the Russian Navy during the Battle of Tsushima Strait.

The Navy began fortifying its Far East outposts, but the 1921 Washington Naval Conference forbade further work, leaving the Philippines and Guam mostly defenseless. The Navy and Army both quietly conceded that neither possession could be adequately defended against a determined Japanese invasion effort.

Admiral George Dewey had promoted the nascent Advanced Base program in 1905, noting that any Western Pacific campaign would require land-based support via fleet coaling, repair, and resupply stations. Marine Corps Major Dion Williams furthered this idea a year later using as an example the Japanese advanced base at Masampho, Korea during its 1905 blockade of the Russian........

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