Why Donald Trump’s Tariff Wars Are Far from Over

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The White House still has multiple options to impose tariffs unilaterally and create leverage for its trade agenda.

The Supreme Court made media waves with its decision last month that struck down most of President Donald Trump’s tariffs on foreign trade. Trump showed considerable anger initially, but immediately also made clear that this court’s action would not stop his trade agenda. 

In any case, the court did not rule against the presidential authority to levy tariffs generally. It only decided that, contrary to White House claims, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) specifically does not give the president power to impose or modify tariffs. 

The Iran War will no doubt consume the White House’s focus in the coming weeks, but in truth, Trump has at least four options available to him that do not require a congressional vote. Besides, Trump’s agenda never saw tariffs as an end in themselves. Rather, it sees them as purely instrumental leverage to exact more favorable trade deals. This White House will certainly continue to pursue this strategy.

When Trump first took office, his approach to trade was admittedly obscure. He seemed to want tariffs for their own sake, as a way to disadvantage America’s trading partners and collect revenues in the process. It still looked that way on April 2, 2025—Trump’s so-called “Liberation Day”—when he claimed authority under the IEEPA to impose massive tariffs on just about every other country. The underlying agenda became clear only shortly afterwards, when Trump invited bilateral trade negotiations to begin. He had effectively said: “If you don’t like these high tariffs, what will you give the United States to get relief?”

The tariffs, clearly, were always only a bargaining lever for these subsequent negotiations. And, as with any competent advocate in any lawsuit, the opening bid asks for the world, leaving ample room for the inevitable compromises of negotiations. And that is just what has happened. According to congressional reporting, the White House has negotiated agreements or frameworks with 14 nations and the European Union (EU) since “Liberation Day.”

In every case, the final tariffs fall significantly below the originally announced levels. A complete review is unnecessary. A couple of examples are revealing enough. 

Negotiations with the EU went quickly, at least by trade-negotiation standards. Announced on August 21, the framework of an agreement reduced US tariffs on European goods from the 39 percent advance on Liberation Day to 15 percent. In return, the EU committed to buying more American energy products and to removing restrictions on American-made automobiles, especially agricultural products. 

Negotiations with Japan produced a similar compromise. On September 4, 2025, the White House announced 15 percent tariffs on Japanese goods entering the United States, far lower than the 46 percent quoted on Liberation Day. Goods from Japan that are not produced in this country or are produced only in small amounts would enter tariff-free. In return, Japan would remove long-standing barriers to imports of American rice and other agricultural products.

In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, EU lawmakers have decided to shelve the agreement announced in August, presumably on the assumption that the loss of IEEPA authorization would limit Trump’s future negotiating leverage. The EU seems to have misread the situation, for the White House has many alternative ways to re-establish the punitive tariffs of Liberation Day. Japan did not make this mistake and opted to stick to its existing agreement. 

In addition to a congressional vote, four other such authorities stand out. 

The White House could turn to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. This piece of legislation gives the president the authority to impose tariffs of 15 percent and otherwise limit flows of foreign goods into the United States for 150 days, after which he would need congressional authorization for an extension. 

If this is insufficient leverage in negotiations, Section 301 of the same act would give Trump extensive power over trade relations, though only after a thorough review of whether a country’s trade restrictions are “unfair” to US trade. The Office of the US Trade Representative announced on March 11 that it would begin investigations into 14 countries and the EU for intentionally manufacturing more goods than their domestic markets can consume. 

Similarly, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 would, after a review, allow the imposition of tariffs. Since the administration would conduct these reviews, the Europeans should have little doubt that the White House would gain the necessary tariff authority, even perhaps to re-establish the Liberation Day tariffs.

Alternatively, the White House could turn to Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. It authorizes tariffs of up to 50 percent on imports from countries that the president determines have discriminated against American businesses. The act requires no review. Nor does it impose limits on how long the tariffs can remain in place. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has indicated that the administration is considering this powerful authorization.

Since the Supreme Court is unlikely to find against any of these alternative authorizations—certainly not quickly—the EU and other American trading partners should know that the White House can, if necessary, apply the same negotiating pressures it exerted on Liberation Day. 

In short, Trump can easily continue with the strategy he has employed since he took office. Angry as Trump is about the Court’s recent decision, it interferes little with his plans. And he will no doubt return to them when the dire situation in the Persian Gulf allows. Nor is it likely that the court aimed to interfere with his agenda. It followed the law, not a different trade agenda.

About the Author: Milton Ezrati

Milton Ezrati is a contributing editor at The National Interest, an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Human Capital at the University at Buffalo (SUNY), and chief economist for Vested, the New York-based communications firm. His latest books are Thirty Tomorrows: The Next Three Decades of Globalization, Demographics, and How We Will Live and Bite-Sized Investing.

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