As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drags into its third year, analysts have speculated whether Vladimir Putin might turn his sights elsewhere. While most concern has focused on Europe, some have pointed to Central Asia, a part of Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, as a possible next target. Despite Central Asia’s rising geopolitical importance, however, a Russian military incursion into the region remains unlikely for the foreseeable future.

When assessing Russia’s ability to mount a future offensive in Central Asia, it is essential to understand the current state of Russia’s military after three years of war. In its pursuit to subjugate Ukraine, while only managing to capture a fifth of Ukraine’s territory, Russia will soon suffer its millionth casualty. 

This high casualty rate is the result of Russia’s “meat grinder” approach, which involves sending troops in large waves to overwhelm opposing forces. While this method has seen some marginal successes, Russia has been forced to change its practices by using small, dispersed detachments, due to its significant loss of junior officers. 

In addition to battleground losses in Ukraine, Russia is experiencing extreme demographic challenges. During the first three months of 2025, Russian women gave birth to fewer than 294,000 babies, which is the lowest quarterly figure for Russia in 225 years. No recruiting tactic will be able to make up for this societal crisis. 

Aside from workforce issues, the vast distances and rugged terrain of Central Asia pose far greater problems for the Russian military than it has faced in Ukraine. Central Asia is approximately six times larger than Ukraine in terms of land area, totaling around 4 million square kilometers, compared to Ukraine’s 600,000 square kilometers. Even attempting........

© The National Interest