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From Reform to Control: Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s New Kazakhstan

11 0
02.04.2026

From Reform to Control: Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s New Kazakhstan

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The latest round of Kazakhstan’s constitutional reforms consolidates power in the presidency, bringing an end to a period of relative openness to pluralism.

On March 15, 2026, Kazakhs turned out in record numbers—73.12 percent, the highest for any national vote since 2019—to approve a sweeping new constitution with overwhelming support. Preliminary figures showed 87.15 percent in favor, with final tallies confirming nearly 90 percent. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed the document into law on March 17, with its entry into force set for July 1, 2026.

Officially framed as the culmination of the “New Kazakhstan” project launched after the government suppressed the January 2022 pro-democracy protests, the reform rewrites roughly 84–95 percent of the basic law. According to Tokayev (who recently penned a defense of the reforms in this publication) and his administration, these changes streamline governance, move away from a “super-presidential” model, and strengthen citizens’ rights amid global volatility.

Yet the underlying logic is familiar to observers of post-Soviet Eurasia. Tokayev, who assumed the presidency in 2019, has followed a well-trodden regional trajectory. Initially positioned as a contrast to Nursultan Nazarbayev’s long rule, he introduced symbolic reforms after the 2022 protests: term limits, modest parliamentary strengthening, and the rollback of the former president’s privileges. But the violent lessons of “Bloody January” (Qandy Qantar)—when unrest threatened regime survival—triggered a rapid recalibration toward centralized control.

The 2026 Constitution consolidates this shift. The reintroduction of the vice presidency creates a clear mechanism for managed succession, allowing Tokayev (now 72) either to step aside early while retaining influence or to reset the tenure rules under the new framework ahead of the 2029 presidential elections. In doing so, Kazakhstan aligns more closely with regional patterns: Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s controlled reforms in Uzbekistan, Sadyr Japarov’s consolidation of presidential authority in Kyrgyzstan, and Emomali Rahmon’s dynastic model in Tajikistan—systems where stability consistently outweighs pluralism and executive dominance remains the norm.

For US interests, this evolution presents a mixed picture. Kazakhstan remains Central Asia’s indispensable state: the world’s largest uranium producer, a critical minerals hub, and a central node in the Middle Corridor that bypasses Russia and Iran. A more centralized and predictable system may........

© The National Interest