There was an inherent flaw in the structure and organisation of Islamabad Talks 1:0 which may have contributed to the eventual gridlock. Only two of the three belligerents directly involved in the conflict were present. Though distant, Israel had its “presence” felt in tangible, decisive terms. Ironically, Iran appeared to have a clear-cut, focused strategy for the talks, while there appeared to be a wide chasm in the strategic objectives of the US and Israel. This might have led the talks into the inevitable strategic cul-de-sac that it did.

The US and Iran had their own compulsions to sue for peace, while Israel felt compelled to let the war rage on endlessly. The US-Israel combine’s rather unplanned, unprepared war effort was already floundering quite abysmally and was nowhere close to attaining any of its fast-changing strategic objectives. It needed an off-ramp quite urgently. Iran, on the other hand, despite its multifarious losses, is still defiant and resilient. It had fought off the military might of the US-Israel combine single-handedly with credit and sought an off-ramp too. Thus, it moved to negotiate with the US from a position of relative parity. Israel, however, displayed conflicting compulsions. It primarily wanted all potential threats to its security to be neutralised. However, PM Netanyahu’s personal woes appeared to overwhelm his decision-making. He felt compelled to keep Israel perpetually at war, moving rather swiftly from Gaza to Iran and now back to Lebanon. As long as Israel is at war, his domestic........

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