Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), informally called drones in public discourse to include entire systems of platforms, ground control stations, their communication mechanisms and payloads, were employed in significant numbers by both India and Pakistan during the May war last year. Used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as limited kinetic applications, they allowed both sides to demonstrate resolve, capability and signalling alongside manned platforms. Despite causing very limited destruction, images and videos of downed drones were widely circulated and quickly became a focal point of public attention. Ever since, both India and Pakistan have accelerated procurement as well as indigenous development efforts to plug operational gaps identified during the operation. This clearly suggests their increasing role in future conflict, which therefore requires attention.

Globally, drone technology is rapidly evolving from quadcopters and micro systems to MALE/HALE (medium/high altitude long endurance) categories and kamikaze loitering drones. As integral parts of operational inventories, these platforms are increasingly becoming autonomous, networked and AI-enabled swarming systems. Micro systems and quadcopters support frontline ground formations with real-time surveillance, artillery spotting and local battle damage assessment, whereas MALE drones operate across borders in hostile environments to gather ISR, closely track high-value targets and deliver precision strikes when required. Loitering platforms are used to target radars, logistics nodes and time-sensitive targets in highly defended areas, shaping the battlefield before manned platforms are unleashed. The Loyal Wingman concept is in advanced stages of development, integrating drones with manned fighter aircraft. Tied in a slaved mode with manned fighters, drones provide extended sensor reach and additional weapons to execute high-risk targeting in contested airspace without endangering pilots.

The Indian armed forces maintain a hefty fleet of surveillance, reconnaissance and loitering drones, mostly foreign-sourced but with growing indigenous development and production programmes. Key assets include Israeli-origin Searcher and Heron variants for long-endurance ISR missions and the Harop loitering munition, a long-endurance kamikaze drone designed to autonomously detect, track and engage high-value targets such as radars and air defence systems. India has signed procurement deals for more potent HALE-category drones such as Predator variants for the Air Force, Navy and Army. It has also contracted Shield AI, a US manufacturer, for V-BAT autonomous drones, highlighting deeper future integration of US drone technology into Indian systems. India operates an increasing inventory of indigenously developed drones such as DRDO’s Netra and Bharat for border-area ISR, the Nagastra-1R loitering munition and the Abhyas decoy drone for training. Under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” initiative, New Delhi is aggressively expanding domestic manufacturing to reduce reliance on foreign sources and accelerate next-generation drone development.

Pakistan also maintains a matching, and in some regards more balanced, inventory of drones. The Pakistan Air Force already operates HALE-category platforms. Its fairly balanced fleet, comprising Chinese, Turkish and indigenously developed systems, covers almost the complete spectrum of roles assigned to these platforms. Killer drones, again a healthy mix of Turkish, Chinese and indigenous systems, have been the focus of PAF attention in recent years. Given existing indigenous design, development and production facilities, their numbers in the PAF inventory are likely to grow quickly. The expanding drone inventories on both sides will have significant implications for the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict.

Tactically, the use of drones may seem less escalatory; at the strategic level, however, they can prove highly escalatory. They enable precision engagement at significantly reduced cost. A limited operational footprint, without any risk to pilots’ lives, minimises the political and emotional consequences of casualties. The resulting lower threshold for force employment encourages more frequent use. Their employment in ISR roles and precision strikes with limited payloads, and consequently a relatively lower scale of damage, allows their use to be framed as localised and defensive rather than offensive escalation. At the tactical level, their use is therefore perceived as less escalatory compared to other kinetic airpower instruments, such as manned fighter aircraft and missiles. At the strategic level, however, frequent employment causes a gradual shift in norms governing the use of force. Persistent ISR and long-range strikes threatening high-value military or strategic assets create fears of pre-emption and vulnerability. Worst-case assumptions about an adversary’s intent can undermine deterrence stability and provoke broader retaliatory responses and risk-taking behaviour. In essence, what appears tactically limited and contained can be strategically highly escalatory and quickly put the conflict on a slippery slope.

Given the rapidly expanding drone inventories in both India and Pakistan, their employment will increasingly shape the ongoing conflict by lowering tactical thresholds while raising strategic risks. Unless carefully managed through calibrated doctrine and signalling discipline, drones may normalise the use of limited force while simultaneously compressing escalation space, making future conflicts faster, more ambiguous and harder to control.

Air Marshal Irfan Ahmad (Retd)The writer is the Director at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Lahore, Pakistan. He can be reached at info@casslhr.com

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