The new era of asymmetric war exposes the limits of conventional warfare

What do the conflicts in Ukraine, Iran and Lebanon have in common? They each demonstrate how technology permits a weak state or even a non-state actor to hold a powerful adversary at bay. They are asymmetric wars, conflicts in which one side fights for its survival while the other has a limited objective. 

“Asymmetric warfare” is a new term for an old phenomenon. 

The U.S. gained its independence in an asymmetric war. The small Continental Army and state militias never faced the might of the British Empire, whose army and navy had to defend territory around the globe, especially after the French entered the war. The colonials won by making it clear to the British that they could not defeat them at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure.  

The U.S. faced a similar dilemma in Vietnam. Despite its overwhelming advantage in conventional weapons, it failed to defeat an insurgency with popular support. Afghanistan reiterated that lesson for the Soviets in the 1980s, and the U.S. and NATO after 9/11. In both cases, the invaders rapidly occupied the major cities but were bogged down and eventually driven out in a guerrilla war of attrition. 

The lessons of history did not stop Russia from getting bogged down in Ukraine, the U.S. from attacking Iran or Israel from invading Lebanon. Now, however, technology has enhanced the ability of the weaker adversary to counter the stronger. 

Vladimir Putin assumed he could march into Ukraine and annex it with little effort. Determined resistance by the Ukrainian armed forces and ordinary people using every resource at their disposal stopped the invaders.........

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