Selective Justice: How Power Shapes Blasphemy Laws After Islamabad Imambargah Attack
The suicide bombing inside Imambargah Khadijah al-Kubra in Islamabad was among the deadliest attacks in the capital in more than a decade. Thirty-seven worshippers were killed, nearly 165 were injured, and the sanctity of a house of worship was shattered during Friday prayers. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi confirmed that an Afghan mastermind linked to Daesh (ISKP) is in custody, along with four facilitators arrested in Peshawar and Nowshera. The attack, he stated, was planned and indoctrinated in Afghanistan.
The condemnation was swift. The grief was real. Yet one word was missing. No major political leader, religious party, or prominent cleric publicly described the bombing as blasphemy.
Under Sections 295 and 295A of Pakistan’s Penal Code, acts that damage places of worship or deliberately outrage religious feelings constitute criminal offences. By any ordinary reading, bombing an Imambargah during congregational prayers would fall within provisions dealing with desecration of sacred space and disturbance of a religious assembly. Yet when the perpetrators are militants, the vocabulary shifts. The crime becomes terrorism, not sacrilege. That distinction matters.
When accusations arise against minorities, social media users, or ordinary citizens, the term “blasphemy” appears almost instantly. A woman in Lahore nearly faced mob violence because Athe rabic script on her dress was mistaken for Qur’anic verses. Online posts, sometimes misinterpreted, sometimes fabricated, have triggered lynchings. The legal machinery moves quickly, and public outrage follows.
The disparity is not merely rhetorical; it is institutional. Senior lawyer Sarmad Ali, who has been documenting blasphemy cases since 2023 through a regular newsletter, recently reported that the Inspector General of Punjab Prisons........
