An Axios report on Monday indicated that Pakistan, alongside Türkiye and Egypt, has been relaying messages between Washington and Tehran and may host a high-level meeting in Islamabad later this week involving President Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and potentially Vice President JD Vance, with Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament. The development places Islamabad at the centre of efforts to open a diplomatic channel at a moment when direct US–Iran contact remains frozen.

Yet within hours, the Iranian response underscored the fragility of this opening. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei said messages had been received through “friendly countries”, but denied any direct negotiations. Around the same time, Ghalibaf dismissed reports of talks as “fake news” aimed at manipulating oil markets and easing pressure on the United States and Israel. This dual messaging—public denial alongside indirect engagement—reflects a calibrated posture, designed to balance domestic expectations of defiance with the strategic need to keep diplomatic options open.

Pakistan’s role has taken shape through concrete steps over a compressed timeline. On Sunday, Field Marshal Asim Munir held a reported call with President Donald Trump. On Monday, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, expressing condolences, extending Eid and Nowruz greetings, and urging de-escalation.

On the same day, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar contacted his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi and coordinated with Türkiye and Egypt—both actively engaged with U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff in indirect exchanges with Tehran. These are not routine diplomatic contacts. They represent coordinated, high-level engagement across political and military channels, linking actors who otherwise lack direct communication at this stage of the conflict.

This approach is consistent with Pakistan’s conduct since the start of the war. It has maintained continuous contact with Tehran while preserving its strategic commitments to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. That balance was clearly visible at the United Nations Security Council on 1 March. Pakistan supported a Bahrain-backed resolution condemning Iranian missile and drone attacks on Gulf states, signalling solidarity with Saudi Arabia and regional partners.

At the same time, it backed a separate Russia–China draft resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and respect for international law following the US–Israeli strikes on Iran. That second resolution addressed the broader aggression but was blocked by Washington. The dual vote reflected a deliberate attempt to oppose escalation across the board rather than take sides.

The possibility of renewed strikes remains real, particularly if Iran follows through on threats related to maritime disruption or regional retaliation

The possibility of renewed strikes remains real, particularly if Iran follows through on threats related to maritime disruption or regional retaliation

Pakistan’s relevance in the current crisis rests on access. It is one of the few countries maintaining working contact with Washington, Tehran, Riyadh and Beijing simultaneously. This positioning is not without risk. Pakistan lies closest to the conflict’s potential spillover and remains economically exposed to instability in the Gulf, giving it both the incentive and urgency to push for de-escalation. This position has not emerged overnight; it is the result of a sequence of decisions over the past year that have collectively restored Pakistan’s diplomatic reach.

In early 2025, Pakistan handed over a key ISKP mastermind linked to the Kabul bombing to the United States. President Donald Trump acknowledged this in his inaugural address, singling out Pakistan as the only country mentioned—a clear shift after years of strained ties. This was followed by Pakistan’s participation in Trump’s Board of Peace initiative and sustained engagement at both political and military levels.

Trump publicly noted General Asim Munir’s familiarity with Iran, stating that Pakistan “knows Iran very well, better than most”, while direct contact between the two during the current crisis reflects access built through sustained high-level engagement. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif maintained parallel engagement, ensuring Pakistan remained connected to Washington’s evolving regional approach.

The May 2025 conflict with India further strengthened Pakistan’s position. Islamabad translated its military performance into diplomatic leverage, with Trump repeatedly referencing Pakistan’s operational effectiveness, including remarks on Indian aircraft losses—an unusual shift in US signalling. This moment reshaped perceptions of Pakistan’s military credibility and strategic utility. It also reinforced Pakistan’s ability to convert battlefield outcomes into diplomatic capital.

Then, amid the 12-day Israel–Iran war and its spillover across the Gulf, Pakistan deepened its engagement with Saudi Arabia, culminating in the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed in September 2025, formalising long-standing security cooperation. At the same time, it preserved steady contact with Iran and maintained its strategic partnership with China.

The result is a rare convergence. The country is now simultaneously engaged with Washington, Beijing, Riyadh and Tehran—an alignment of diplomatic access not seen in recent decades. In a polarised environment, this ability to operate across divides is what has positioned Pakistan as a credible intermediary.

The situation, however, remains fluid and highly unpredictable. President Trump’s announcement of a five-day pause in potential strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure came alongside continued US military build-up, including the expected deployment of US expeditionary Marine forces to the region. Israeli operations have not slowed. Iran, while publicly rejecting negotiations, has acknowledged receiving messages through intermediaries and continues to signal escalation risks, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz.

Even if the Islamabad track does not materialise, the willingness of both sides to engage through channels involving Pakistan is itself a diplomatic outcome

Even if the Islamabad track does not materialise, the willingness of both sides to engage through channels involving Pakistan is itself a diplomatic outcome

This combination of escalation and signalling reflects ongoing brinkmanship. Some analysts have already suggested that the US pause may be tactical—linked to stabilising global energy markets and buying time—rather than a shift towards de-escalation. The possibility of renewed strikes remains real, particularly if Iran follows through on threats related to maritime disruption or regional retaliation. In such conditions, any prediction about the trajectory of the war remains speculative.

The strategic calculations of the key actors further complicate the picture. Israel’s approach appears oriented towards sustaining pressure and potentially widening the conflict into the Gulf, thereby drawing in additional actors and altering the balance of engagement. Iran’s escalation strategy, by contrast, is aimed at raising the economic and security costs for Gulf states and global markets, with the expectation that this will generate pressure on Washington to halt the war. Both strategies converge in the Gulf theatre but are driven by fundamentally opposing objectives.

The United States, meanwhile, is balancing multiple constraints. Military escalation carries domestic political costs, particularly in the context of energy prices and electoral pressures. At the same time, it cannot be seen to retreat under pressure. Gulf states, directly exposed to risks to energy infrastructure, have strong incentives to push for de-escalation and have likely played a role in encouraging the current pause. These overlapping and often conflicting motivations make any diplomatic breakthrough uncertain and potentially temporary.

Pakistan’s role in this context has drawn criticism at home, but much of it misses the point. Commentary—whether driven by anti-US sentiment, pro-Iran leanings, or those outside the current power structure—has portrayed Pakistan’s approach as inconsistent, overlooking its parallel outreach to Iran and its positions at the United Nations Security Council. In reality, this is deliberate balancing in a high-risk environment.

What makes this more notable is the leadership executing it. A field marshal shaped by hard security challenges—counterterrorism, Afghanistan and internal stability—a prime minister known more for administrative governance than foreign policy, and a foreign minister with an economic background have together managed one of the most complex diplomatic environments Pakistan has faced in years. Maintaining simultaneous access to Washington, Tehran and Riyadh under such conditions is not routine; it reflects effective statecraft.

This stands in contrast to India’s approach. Its alignment with Israel has unsettled Gulf sensitivities and drawn domestic criticism, while it remains largely a bystander in the Iran conflict. However, an irritant in Pakistan–US ties, apparently instigated by India, has indeed surfaced. In a congressional hearing last week, the Trump administration’s Hindutva-leaning Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard flagged Pakistan alongside North Korea over missile capabilities reaching the United States, despite India having initiated the nuclear race in South Asia and advancing longer-range ballistic missile systems. The remarks drew a swift rebuke in Pakistan but remain a manageable irritant, given Islamabad’s current proximity to Washington.

Over the longer term, Pakistan’s diplomatic assertion is likely to yield tangible gains at home. Sustained international engagement can translate into economic breathing space, stronger investor confidence, expanded external partnerships, and greater strategic reassurance. As these effects compound, they are expected to ease external pressures, stabilise expectations, and reinforce political and security balance—positioning diplomacy as a central pillar of sustained domestic stability.

Whether talks take place in Islamabad is now secondary. Even if the Islamabad track does not materialise, the willingness of both sides to engage through channels involving Pakistan is itself a diplomatic outcome. The trajectory of diplomacy will depend on decisions taken in Washington and Tehran, and on variables that remain fluid. But Pakistan has already achieved something significant: it has moved from the margins to the centre of a high-stakes diplomatic process at a time of war. In a conflict defined by escalation, mistrust and competing agendas, that position is strategic leverage—and it will endure beyond the immediate crisis.

© The Friday Times