Connectivity, understood as the orchestration of highways, rail lines, ports, and logistics platforms that enable the movement of goods, finance, and political influence, has become one of the most potent instruments of modern statecraft. Far from being mere infrastructure ventures, connectivity corridors now serve as geopolitical templates through which states manage risk, cultivate dependencies, and reposition themselves within shifting regional hierarchies.

Nowhere are these dynamics more visible than in West Asia, where two initiatives, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), have emerged as competing visions for regional order. Their contrasting trajectories illuminate the changing character of U.S.–China competition and reveal the structural limits of strategic autonomy for aspirant middle powers such as India and Pakistan.

Launched in 2013 as the flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative, CPEC has evolved into a US$62 billion programme to connect Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea through a network of transport and energy infrastructure. Its progress, however, has been uneven, disrupted by Pakistan's macroeconomic fragility, cyclical political upheavals, and a deteriorating internal security situation.

Balochistan, which hosts CPEC's signature asset at Gwadar, remains the epicentre of violence. The BLA continues to target Chinese engineers, convoys, and energy infrastructure. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the TTP and TJP maintain operational tempo. The Taliban's 2021 takeover in Kabul further complicated Islamabad's security calculations, enabling TTP units to regroup and increasing cross-border frictions. By October–November 2025, the Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict escalated unprecedentedly, with mediation attempts failing to produce a durable de-escalation. Skirmishes along the Durand Line continue. These security dynamics, not an absence of strategic intent, explain the corridor's incremental pace.

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Yet CPEC's underlying strategic logic endures. During Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif's September visit to Beijing, China reiterated its commitment to "CPEC 2.0," with an expanded focus on industrialisation, agriculture, IT, and socioeconomic development. For Beijing, CPEC anchors its western strategic flank and provides partial mitigation against maritime chokepoint risks associated with a potential blockade in the South China Sea. It also carries significant reputational weight for Beijing to promote its non-Western infrastructure development model through the BRI. For Islamabad, it remains the backbone of long-term infrastructure........

© The Friday Times