Those clamouring for 'Political Solution Only' in Balochistan, when sizeable Baloch lands are under active insurgency aimed at seceding from Pakistan, conveniently overlook the overall construct of COIN (counterinsurgency) in modern times. In a situation akin to Baloch lands, political process would naturally follow the kinetic process, or at best be parallel to it, situation permitting.

While enough has been said about genesis of the problems of Baloch Balochistan, following aspects, as responsible problem areas, are and should be undoubtedly under spotlight. First, the criminal lack of governance especially in the less egalitarian Baloch areas, leaving executive, judicial, administrative and even legislative (riwaj) powers in the hands of recalcitrant and predatory Sardars, who exploit their people to maximise their own political and financial advantage. The Sandeman-established Sardari system worked well in 19th and even 20th Century; it has no place in modern state structure. Reinvigorating the system, tested and tried since 1947, is reinforcing the failure. Sardar was and is part of the problem.

Two, the fact that insurgency is confined to the Baloch Belt, and that too in the former Kalat State, and its smaller vassals states like Sarawan and Jhalawan, also the hotbeds of anti-Pakistan insurgency in the 1970s, speaks something about the 'credibility' of the insurgency itself. Why are the entire Baloch and Brahui lands (Makran, Lasbella, 'entire' Kharan, etc) and the Pashtun North not infected? Why is the Pashtun Belt not inspired by Baloch sense of 'deprivation' and grievances? Because apparently, the Pashtuns are more egalitarian, economically enterprising and have........

© The Express Tribune