India, Pakistan — redefining deterrence
'Deterrence' in military parlance is, simply put, to 'deter' a potential adversary of the outsized consequences and disproportionate response to any (military) adventurism. Deterrence is established when two sides possess the means to inflict losses on each other in case of hostilities and hence decide not to initiate hostilities. Deterrence can be 'conventional'— through capabilities of conventional air, land, sea, cyber and space forces or 'non-conventional' through possession of nuclear weapons and capabilities.
Before Pulwama/Balakot in 2019, conventional and non-conventional deterrence averted military escalation between India and Pakistan, especially military incursion in mainland Pakistan by India. Kargil war (May-June 1999) before that was fought across an undefined border termed as Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, where there is a tacit understanding and practice of occasional flare-up on and from both sides.
Pahalgam/Operation Sindoor in 2025 ratcheted up hostilities and India, 'undeterred' by Pakistan's conventional and non-conventional military capabilities, launched brazen attacks on some 6 cities in Pakistan proper and AJK. So, the deterrence broke down. A broken deterrence needs to be re-established, hence Pakistan following its strategy of 'quid-pro-quo plus' equalised its losses and re-stablished deterrence through Operation Bunyan Marsoos. Deterrence is said to be established when both sides are standing on the equal rungs of the imaginary two-sided 'Escalation Ladder (EL)', militarily and perceptually. This equal status 'may' control further escalation.
This cycle of deterrence breakdown and re-establishment can go on, if the escalation continues which may result into a 'limited' (uni/bi-service war or conflict limited in aim, scope and........
© The Express Tribune
