The Pulse | Politics | South Asia

Indian Courts Must Be Mindful of Judicial Limits in Electoral Matters

The Supreme Court’s intervention in the West Bengal SIR dispute must not be so deep as to adversely affect the electoral process.

It is unsettling to watch a sitting chief minister argue an election-related dispute before the Supreme Court. Armed with a law degree and decades of political experience, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee appeared before a bench headed by Chief Justice Surya Kant to contest the Election Commission’s conduct of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls ahead of the 2026 state assembly elections. This is not merely a political moment. It is a constitutional one.

Beyond the political controversy lies a deeper and more enduring question: can courts correct electoral wrongs without assuming control over electoral processes themselves? What is at stake is not just a state election, but the delicate equilibrium between judicial review, electoral autonomy and democratic legitimacy.

The SIR is a legally recognized mechanism under Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, designed to ensure updated electoral rolls, remove duplicates, correct errors, and enroll new eligible voters. The Election Commission launched the nationwide Phase II of the SIR in October 2025, covering around 510 million electors across 321 districts.

In West Bengal, the exercise became deeply contested almost immediately. Allegations emerged of hurried verification, confusing notices, excessive documentation demands and the large-scale deployment of micro-observers drawn from BJP-ruled states. Reports documented fatalities, hospitalizations and attempted suicides linked to anxiety over voter list deletions.

Over 6.3 million names were removed from the final voters list published on February 28, and a further 6 million voters were issued notices under a new “logical discrepancy” category, many for minor spelling variations arising from transliterating Bengali names into English. 

The Commission insists the exercise is neutral, lawful and necessary. It points to violence, intimidation, and obstruction of its officials in the state, and contends that the 2025 rolls were compromised by entries for voters who were absent, deceased, or had relocated. Both positions, taken on their own terms, carry weight. That is precisely what makes the constitutional questions so difficult to resolve cleanly.

The Commission holds plenary powers to supervise, direct and control elections under Article 324(1) of the Constitution. These powers are broad and intentionally insulating, designed to keep elections free from political interference. But they are not absolute. The Commission’s acts remain subject to judicial review where they are arbitrary, unreasonable or violative of fundamental rights.

In Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), the Supreme Court held that free and fair elections are part of the Constitution’s basic structure, a principle that cannot be abrogated by any amendment. Judicial intervention is therefore not only permissible but necessary when electoral processes threaten equality, due process or the right to vote enshrined in Article 326.

Electoral roll revision sits uncomfortably between two competing imperatives. Errors, opacity and overzealous verification can produce exclusions that are difficult, if not impossible, to remedy once an election is over. But excessive judicial micromanagement risks paralyzing election administration and undermining the Commission’s constitutional authority. The question, therefore, is not whether courts may intervene, but how far they may legitimately go.

Banerjee’s personal appearance before the Supreme Court raises significant institutional questions. She appeared as a petitioner, not as an advocate-on-record, a distinction that matters considerably. Under Bar Council of India Rules, a person holding a full-time salaried government position, including a chief minister, is expected to suspend active legal practice. An appearance as an advocate would have amounted to a breach of professional conduct.

As a petitioner, it is technically permissible, but convention ordinarily requires that a state government initiate or defend legal proceedings through the chief secretary or the relevant department secretary. Symbolism matters in constitutional practice. Courts derive their legitimacy not only from legal correctness but from public perception of independence and distance from political contestation. Deviations from institutional norms, if normalized, may set precedents that strain judicial neutrality in politically charged disputes.

The West Bengal case reflects a broader trend: the growing judicialization of electoral disagreements. Issues once resolved through administrative dialogue – officer deployment, campaign restrictions, scheduling disputes increasingly arrive........

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