Asia Defense | Security | East Asia

Expanding Frontiers: China’s Military Push Beyond the First Island Chain

Beijing has a deliberate, long-term strategy – one that prioritizes persistence and gradual advantage. 

China’s defense and security presence beyond the Western Pacific is set to intensify over the next decade, expanding its access, influence, and operational reach across the Indo-Pacific.

In the Southwest Pacific, Beijing is likely to build its position through security cooperation, infrastructure development, and a more regularized presence, while activity across the Indian Ocean and Australia’s maritime approaches is likely to become more frequent, capable and strategically purposeful.

We are not likely to see sudden military breakthroughs or dramatic shows of force. Rather, Beijing has a deliberate, long-term strategy – one that prioritizes persistence and gradual advantage. China is seeking to normalize its presence across the Indo-Pacific in ways that expand its freedom of action, complicate the calculations of others and incrementally shift the strategic balance in its favor.

These judgments draw on Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) war gaming in March that explored how China’s defense and security agencies might extend influence out to 2036. The exercise examined two pathways: one in which activity grew steadily over time, and another where it accelerated more rapidly in response to opportunity or crisis. The details of these war games will be unpacked in this and three further articles this week.

China’s Push Beyond the First Island Chain

For much of the past decade, analysis of China’s military rise has focused on its actions within the First Island Chain. Yet beyond this immediate theater, a quieter but significant shift is underway. Beijing is expanding its defense and security engagement across three interconnected regions: the Southwest Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and Australia’s maritime approaches.

This outward push reflects a strategy. Rather than seeking rapid breakthroughs or dramatic shows of force, China is pursuing a long-term effort to extend operational reach, build familiarity and shape regional environments in ways that favor its interests. The goal is not to displace the United States or its partners overnight but to challenge the status quo and ensure that China’s military and paramilitary presence becomes a normalized feature of the Indo-Pacific security landscape.

At the center of this effort is the modernization of China’s navy. Over the past two decades, it has evolved from a largely near-seas force into a highly sophisticated navy capable of sustained blue-water operations. Regular deployments into the Indian Ocean for counter-piracy missions, long-range task group operations and increasingly complex exercises demonstrate a growing capacity to operate far from China’s shores. These capabilities underpin Beijing’s ability to maintain a persistent, if still carefully calibrated, presence across the wider Indo-Pacific.

But naval power alone does not define China’s approach. Beijing increasingly relies on a layered toolkit that combines military, paramilitary and civilian instruments. The China Coast Guard, now the world’s largest, plays a central role in projecting presence while maintaining a law-enforcement narrative. Maritime militia vessels, research ships and survey ships further expand China’s reach, often operating in ways that are difficult to categorize as purely civilian or military.

What Might the Region Look Like by 2031?

Results of the ASPI wargame suggest that this pattern of activity will intensify over the coming five years. In the Southwest Pacific, Chinese engagement is likely to focus on building access and influence through security cooperation, infrastructure development and more regularized presence. Port visits, training programs, and maritime enforcement cooperation will be framed as responses to local needs, such as disaster relief, fisheries protection, and capacity building. Over time, however, these activities will create the conditions for more consistent access, including storing supplies and rotational deployments, in which one ship or another will always be present.

In Australia’s maritime approaches, the emphasis is less on access and more on operational familiarity and signaling. Naval flotillas, intelligence collection vessels, and survey ships are likely to operate with increasing frequency in waters to Australia’s north and west. These deployments will allow Beijing to map seabed infrastructure, monitor communications routes, and better understand Australian and allied responses. The presence of increasingly capable naval task groups will also serve as a clear signal to Australia as one of the United States’ primary regional allies. Crucially, such operations can be conducted within the bounds of international law, enabling China to apply pressure without crossing clear red lines.

Across the Indian Ocean, China’s approach will continue to center on protecting sea lines of communication, particularly for oil and gas supply from the Middle East. What is changing is the scale and permanence of its presence. A network of port access arrangements, logistics hubs, and strategic partnerships is gradually emerging, from Djibouti to Pakistan and potentially beyond. While these facilities are typically framed as commercial or dual-use, they provide the foundation for sustained naval operations and, over time, a more enduring military footprint.

What unites these three regions is not a single operational plan but a common method. Chinese activity is persistent but measured, incremental rather than abrupt, and almost always framed in cooperative or non-threatening terms. Individually, many of these actions, such as port visits, research missions, and coast guard patrols, appear routine. Collectively, however, they expand China’s operational freedom, deepen its regional ties, and complicate the strategic calculations of other actors.

This approach reflects consideration of escalation risk. Beijing has strong incentives to avoid actions that would trigger a unified or forceful response from the United States and its allies. Permanent overseas bases, large-scale combat deployments, and overtly coercive military operations will likely continue to be approached with caution in the near term. Instead, China will seek to operate below the thresholds that would provoke crisis, using ambiguity and legal framing to manage perceptions and strengthen its relative position.

The result is a form of strategic competition that unfolds in the grey zone between peace and conflict. It is characterized not by decisive moments but by the accumulation of presence, access and influence. Over time, this accumulation can reshape regional environments in ways that are difficult to reverse.

For Australia and its partners, the challenge is not simply responding to individual Chinese activities but understanding how they fit into a broader pattern of gradual expansion. A port visit here, a survey mission there, a new security agreement with a Pacific Island state – each may seem manageable in isolation. But together they point to a long-term effort to shift the balance of presence and influence across the Indo-Pacific.

This first article has set out the logic behind China’s expanding engagement beyond the First Island Chain, focusing on likely developments to 2031. The next will examine how this activity could become normalized by 2036. ASPI will also outline China’s likely actions and regional responses out to 2036 on the next iteration of the Pressure Points website, to be released in June 2026.

This article was originally published in ASPI’s The Strategist.

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China’s defense and security presence beyond the Western Pacific is set to intensify over the next decade, expanding its access, influence, and operational reach across the Indo-Pacific.

In the Southwest Pacific, Beijing is likely to build its position through security cooperation, infrastructure development, and a more regularized presence, while activity across the Indian Ocean and Australia’s maritime approaches is likely to become more frequent, capable and strategically purposeful.

We are not likely to see sudden military breakthroughs or dramatic shows of force. Rather, Beijing has a deliberate, long-term strategy – one that prioritizes persistence and gradual advantage. China is seeking to normalize its presence across the Indo-Pacific in ways that expand its freedom of action, complicate the calculations of others and incrementally shift the strategic balance in its favor.

These judgments draw on Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) war gaming in March that explored how China’s defense and security agencies might extend influence out to 2036. The exercise examined two pathways: one in which activity grew steadily over time, and another where it accelerated more rapidly in response to opportunity or crisis. The details of these war games will be unpacked in this and three further articles this week.

China’s Push Beyond the First Island Chain

For much of the past decade, analysis of China’s military rise has focused on its actions within the First Island Chain. Yet beyond this immediate theater, a quieter but significant shift is underway. Beijing is expanding its defense and security engagement across three interconnected regions: the Southwest Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and Australia’s maritime approaches.

This outward push reflects a strategy. Rather than seeking rapid breakthroughs or dramatic shows of force, China is pursuing a long-term effort to extend operational reach, build familiarity and shape regional environments in ways that favor its interests. The goal is not to displace the United States or its partners overnight but to challenge the status quo and ensure that China’s military and paramilitary presence becomes a normalized feature of the Indo-Pacific security landscape.

At the center of this effort is the modernization of China’s navy. Over the past two decades, it has evolved from a largely near-seas force into a highly sophisticated navy capable of sustained blue-water operations. Regular deployments into the Indian Ocean for counter-piracy missions, long-range task group operations and increasingly complex exercises demonstrate a growing capacity to operate far from China’s shores. These capabilities underpin Beijing’s ability to maintain a persistent, if still carefully calibrated, presence across the wider Indo-Pacific.

But naval power alone does not define China’s approach. Beijing increasingly relies on a layered toolkit that combines military, paramilitary and civilian instruments. The China Coast Guard, now the world’s largest, plays a central role in projecting presence while maintaining a law-enforcement narrative. Maritime militia vessels, research ships and survey ships further expand China’s reach, often operating in ways that are difficult to categorize as purely civilian or military.

What Might the Region Look Like by 2031?

Results of the ASPI wargame suggest that this pattern of activity will intensify over the coming five years. In the Southwest Pacific, Chinese engagement is likely to focus on building access and influence through security cooperation, infrastructure development and more regularized presence. Port visits, training programs, and maritime enforcement cooperation will be framed as responses to local needs, such as disaster relief, fisheries protection, and capacity building. Over time, however, these activities will create the conditions for more consistent access, including storing supplies and rotational deployments, in which one ship or another will always be present.

In Australia’s maritime approaches, the emphasis is less on access and more on operational familiarity and signaling. Naval flotillas, intelligence collection vessels, and survey ships are likely to operate with increasing frequency in waters to Australia’s north and west. These deployments will allow Beijing to map seabed infrastructure, monitor communications routes, and better understand Australian and allied responses. The presence of increasingly capable naval task groups will also serve as a clear signal to Australia as one of the United States’ primary regional allies. Crucially, such operations can be conducted within the bounds of international law, enabling China to apply pressure without crossing clear red lines.

Across the Indian Ocean, China’s approach will continue to center on protecting sea lines of communication, particularly for oil and gas supply from the Middle East. What is changing is the scale and permanence of its presence. A network of port access arrangements, logistics hubs, and strategic partnerships is gradually emerging, from Djibouti to Pakistan and potentially beyond. While these facilities are typically framed as commercial or dual-use, they provide the foundation for sustained naval operations and, over time, a more enduring military footprint.

What unites these three regions is not a single operational plan but a common method. Chinese activity is persistent but measured, incremental rather than abrupt, and almost always framed in cooperative or non-threatening terms. Individually, many of these actions, such as port visits, research missions, and coast guard patrols, appear routine. Collectively, however, they expand China’s operational freedom, deepen its regional ties, and complicate the strategic calculations of other actors.

This approach reflects consideration of escalation risk. Beijing has strong incentives to avoid actions that would trigger a unified or forceful response from the United States and its allies. Permanent overseas bases, large-scale combat deployments, and overtly coercive military operations will likely continue to be approached with caution in the near term. Instead, China will seek to operate below the thresholds that would provoke crisis, using ambiguity and legal framing to manage perceptions and strengthen its relative position.

The result is a form of strategic competition that unfolds in the grey zone between peace and conflict. It is characterized not by decisive moments but by the accumulation of presence, access and influence. Over time, this accumulation can reshape regional environments in ways that are difficult to reverse.

For Australia and its partners, the challenge is not simply responding to individual Chinese activities but understanding how they fit into a broader pattern of gradual expansion. A port visit here, a survey mission there, a new security agreement with a Pacific Island state – each may seem manageable in isolation. But together they point to a long-term effort to shift the balance of presence and influence across the Indo-Pacific.

This first article has set out the logic behind China’s expanding engagement beyond the First Island Chain, focusing on likely developments to 2031. The next will examine how this activity could become normalized by 2036. ASPI will also outline China’s likely actions and regional responses out to 2036 on the next iteration of the Pressure Points website, to be released in June 2026.

This article was originally published in ASPI’s The Strategist.

Joe Keary is a senior analyst at ASPI.

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

Dr. Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Resident Senior Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in Canberra, Australia.

Linus Cohen is a researcher at ASPI.

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