Asia Defense | Security | East Asia

Expanding Frontiers: China’s Military Push Beyond the First Island Chain

Beijing has a deliberate, long-term strategy – one that prioritizes persistence and gradual advantage. 

China’s defense and security presence beyond the Western Pacific is set to intensify over the next decade, expanding its access, influence, and operational reach across the Indo-Pacific.

In the Southwest Pacific, Beijing is likely to build its position through security cooperation, infrastructure development, and a more regularized presence, while activity across the Indian Ocean and Australia’s maritime approaches is likely to become more frequent, capable and strategically purposeful.

We are not likely to see sudden military breakthroughs or dramatic shows of force. Rather, Beijing has a deliberate, long-term strategy – one that prioritizes persistence and gradual advantage. China is seeking to normalize its presence across the Indo-Pacific in ways that expand its freedom of action, complicate the calculations of others and incrementally shift the strategic balance in its favor.

These judgments draw on Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) war gaming in March that explored how China’s defense and security agencies might extend influence out to 2036. The exercise examined two pathways: one in which activity grew steadily over time, and another where it accelerated more rapidly in response to opportunity or crisis. The details of these war games will be unpacked in this and three further articles this week.

China’s Push Beyond the First Island Chain

For much of the past decade, analysis of China’s military rise has focused on its actions within the First Island Chain. Yet beyond this immediate theater, a quieter but significant shift is underway. Beijing is expanding its defense and security engagement across three interconnected regions: the Southwest Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and Australia’s maritime approaches.

This outward push reflects a strategy. Rather than seeking rapid breakthroughs or dramatic shows of force, China is pursuing a long-term effort to extend operational reach, build familiarity and shape regional environments in ways that favor its interests. The goal is not to displace the United States or its partners overnight but to challenge the status quo and ensure that China’s military and paramilitary presence becomes a normalized feature of the Indo-Pacific security landscape.

At the center of this effort is the modernization of China’s navy. Over the past two decades, it has evolved from a largely near-seas force into a highly sophisticated navy capable of sustained blue-water operations. Regular deployments into the Indian Ocean for counter-piracy missions, long-range task group operations and increasingly complex exercises demonstrate a growing capacity to operate far from China’s shores. These capabilities underpin Beijing’s ability to maintain a persistent, if still carefully calibrated, presence across the wider Indo-Pacific.

But naval power alone does not define China’s approach. Beijing increasingly relies on a layered toolkit that combines military, paramilitary and civilian instruments. The China Coast Guard, now the world’s largest, plays a central role in projecting presence while maintaining a law-enforcement narrative. Maritime militia vessels, research ships and survey ships further expand China’s reach, often operating in ways that are difficult to categorize as purely civilian or military.

What Might the Region Look Like by 2031?

Results of the ASPI wargame suggest that this pattern of activity will intensify over the coming five years. In the Southwest Pacific, Chinese engagement is likely to focus on building access and influence through security cooperation, infrastructure development and more regularized presence. Port visits, training programs, and maritime enforcement cooperation will be framed as responses to local needs, such as disaster relief, fisheries protection, and capacity building. Over........

© The Diplomat