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Arakan Army Chief Twan Mrat Naing on Talks With the Myanmar Government, and Relations With India and Bangladesh

“The military government wants to negotiate from a position of strength but we will not succumb to such pressure.”

Arakan Army and United League of Arakan chief Twan Mrat Naing gives an interview to Rajeev Bhattacharyya (left) at an undisclosed location somewhere in Myanmar’s Arakan region, on March 2, 2026.

The Arakan Army (AA) and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), are among the largest revolutionary organizations in Myanmar currently battling the government. Seventeen years after it was formed in 2009, the AA controls almost 90 percent of Arakan, the narrow coastal region on the Bay of Bengal in the western region of Myanmar. That is arguably the largest area to be liberated so far by any armed outfit in the country. Arakan has been in the limelight since the 1970s because of the military operations that have been conducted by the government against Rohingya Muslims in the region.

Twan Mrat Naing, who heads the AA and the ULA, has given online interviews to media outlets in the past, but never a one-on-one interview to a foreign correspondent. In a first, he met The Diplomat’s correspondent Rajeev Bhattacharyya at a location somewhere in Myanmar’s Arakan region on March 2. For this correspondent, reaching the meeting spot entailed a long journey by road and river, and a trek through jungle and hilly terrain.

Twan Mrat Naing spoke his mind on various issues, including talks with the Myanmar government, the AA’s relations with Bangladesh and India, and allegations of human rights violations that have been leveled against the outfit.

Could you tell us about your background, and how you became the leader of the Arakan Army?

I studied at a law school in Sittwe, but I could not complete the course. I was active as a student leader, and one day, when I was in Grade 9, I got into a confrontation with the military. But nothing serious happened. That was my first encounter with the military.

I began to cross the border into Bangladesh in the late 1990s. The first time was in 1998 after the demise of some Arakan revolutionaries during Operation Leech. We learned a lot from the movements launched by the Arakan Liberation Party and the National United Party of Arakan, but soon realized that these groups were not as strong as we had imagined. I realized that there was a need for unity. Until 2006, we were hoping to get all these Rakhine groups united.

That year, I traveled to India without documents. After crossing the Indian border at Manipur, we stayed in Imphal and then at Guwahati in Assam, where we interacted with many leaders, including a leader from Tripura. From Guwahati, we went to Delhi by train. In Delhi, we stayed for 20 days and attended the first meeting of the Arakan National Congress at Vikaspuri. The leaders were squabbling over petty issues. I was convinced here that it was impossible to achieve the unity we desired. I realized that we could not waste time with them.

Subsequently, I began entertaining the idea of establishing ties with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and organizations in other parts of Myanmar. We succeeded in establishing links with the Karen National Liberation Army through friends at Yangon University. I began working as a tourist guide and selling gems even as I enrolled in a law course at Sittwe University. All this helped me expand my network through tourists from Germany, Switzerland, and other countries. Some American friends I was in touch with invited me to the U.S. to study, but I was interested more in fieldwork.

I was already married in 2005 and had told my wife about my plans for Arakan. My elder brother, who is vice-chairman number three in our organization, helped establish links with the KIA. I sold my Omega watch for $400 to go to Kachin State. The first trip to Kachin in 2006 was to exchange views with the KIA and to observe the training there for two weeks. It took us three years to build trust with KIA. KIA was in a ceasefire with the government then, and there was pressure on the organization to transform into border guards. There was a difference of opinion within the KIA on this proposal. We received the green signal for training from the KIA in 2008, and the sessions began a year later.  KIA accepted only 26 trainees, although we planned to have 50 of our members trained. Some of our friends were apprehended by the military intelligence en route to Kachin.

We thought of returning from Kachin after two years with 200 rifles. We learnt about military affairs. I also started reading a lot about military strategies and tactics. Around the same time, we established contacts along the Thailand-Myanmar border with youths studying abroad and began scouting for new cadres for training. The KIA was worried as these training modules must be kept under wraps (it was in a ceasefire with Myanmar’s military).  In two years, we were able to train about 300 cadres. On some occasions, we ran out of rations, and later, we were involved in the jade business along the border. In 2013, we sent 19 people to the Golden Triangle area and to the Bangladesh border to increase our network. We also developed a rapport with Kokang and Palaung in Shan State. We could gather some weapons from these areas.

The Arakan Army’s first encounter with the military was on March 28, 2015, in Paletwa near the Bangladesh border, where we killed a captain of the Myanmar military.

You do not have military experience, yet what the AA has achieved militarily is stupendous.  What is the secret of your success?

There are things that you have to say but don’t do. There are things that you do but don’t say, and there are things that you say and do. Rakhine State is a tiny place of land, but we were not that small earlier. Instead of wrangling over a piece of territory, we will have to do what we need to do. Instead of talking about territorial ambition, it is better to be committed to the mission.

There are so many factors contributing to our success. But we haven’t yet reached a spectacular level of success. We have to be patient, remain focused, and manage with limited resources.

The main factor contributing to our success has been the support of the people. We could rebuild trust among different communities in Arakan. There was a lot of distrust, especially with the Muslim communities, after what happened with them in 2012 and 2017, when a large section of the community was driven out of Myanmar. In normal times, it would have been impossible to approach them. They were also looking for friends and we explained to them our agenda, which was an important step.

And terrain was another significant factor. The military had a better infrastructure. Our resources were limited, but we made optimum use of them. I am very proud of our soldiers and officers who demonstrated extreme bravery and prowess in the wars. Our headquarters has utilized all available technologies, including satellite communication, effectively, and synthesized them for effective communication.

In retrospect, when I make a review, I find that my entire team has a huge number of committed people who prepare a lot. I could work in harmony with them.

2025 was a year of stalemate. The AA refrained from launching attacks on Kyaukphyu and Sittwe, but it ventured into the Burmese heartland in alliance with other resistance groups.  Does it indicate a change of strategy? 

It is still too early to go into details of the strategy. It will be premature.

There is speculation that AA could welcome a proposal from the military for a negotiated settlement…

Political dialogue and stability are in everybody’s interest. We need to be politically mature. Let me keep it that way.

Since I arrived in Arakan almost a month ago, there have been six airstrikes in the region. On February 24, I visited an area in Ponnagyun township, where 17 people were killed.  There could be more airstrikes now that the elections are completed.  How do you plan to tackle this danger?

Civilian safety is our priority.  We are exploring every option for effective protection of the civilian population. It is difficult. We are working with the international community to record these aerial bombings, but they have not been very effective.  It is a very serious humanitarian concern.  That is why, as long as the military keeps bombing civilians, it will be very difficult for us to explore the political process. The military government wants to talk from a position of strength. But we will not succumb to such pressure.

The AA had discussions with representatives of the Myanmar junta in China two years ago. It had insisted then that junta forces should not be stationed in Arakan, and the talks collapsed. Would you be willing to have such discussions with the government now? 

You are correct; that is what we wanted. The government wants us to go back to the position that existed pre-2023. In that case, we also want to go back to 1784 [Arakan ceased to exist as an independent kingdom in 1784]. Instead of........

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