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Watching Iran, China Hopes to Learn New Tricks for the Taiwan Strait

Beijing is learning a lot from Iran’s Hormuz Strait closure and how it could apply Tehran’s methods to a future conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces began setting conditions for clearing mines in the Strait of Hormuz, as two U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers conducted operations on Apr. 11, 2026.

Even as China wants the latest Middle Eastern conflict to wind down so it doesn’t damage China’s export-oriented economy, militarily, the conflict has been an intelligence gold mine for China. Beijing has shown it is tracking U.S. efforts in the Strait of Hormuz closely, fine-tuning its estimates of U.S. capabilities. China is also studying how Iran has largely succeeded in keeping the U.S. Navy outside the Persian Gulf and disrupting commercial shipping there.

Iran’s use of geography and low-cost units to impose economic pressure on the United States and its allies is a plan China may seek to implement itself in the Taiwan Strait during any future confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan.

Today the Strait of Hormuz, Tomorrow the Taiwan Strait?

Since the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran began on February 28, China has maintained an arm’s length position from Tehran in public. Diplomatically, China has walked a fine line between condemning the U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran and expressing concern about Iranian attacks against targets in the Gulf states.

Beijing buys around 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, and the United States believes the Chinese government allows China-based firms to continue shipping parts and materials to Iran to manufacture new drones and missiles. However, China’s relationships with the Gulf states are far more important for its economic and foreign policy goals than the discounted energy it buys from Iran. As a result, China has urged both sides to de-escalate.

However, China and Iran’s strategic situations share some similarities, with both seeking to counter U.S. air and naval superiority in the event of a conflict. We’re unlikely to see Washington deploy significant numbers of ground troops in either Iran or the Taiwan Strait. Iran borders the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which around 25 percent of seaborne oil and almost 20 percent of global LNG supplies pass, alongside other vital goods like fertilizer. Meanwhile, Chinese territory runs along the western side of the Strait of Taiwan, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Around 44 percent of global container shipping passed through the Taiwan Strait in 2022.

Iran’s use of cheap, long-range one-way attack aerial drones, ballistic missiles, and suicide drone boats to disrupt commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz gives China a potential template to copy in the event of a future crisis with the United States over Taiwan. Iran also possesses significant stockpiles of Chinese-made anti-ship cruise missile batteries. Beijing will be interested in assessing the deterrent effect these still have on the United States, given its own use of shore-based missiles and artillery to threaten Taiwan and any U.S. Navy assets that come to the self-ruling island’s defense.

Would China Really Disrupt Global Trade?

An obvious difference between the two countries, however, is the structure of their economies. Iran’s economy is in ruins due to U.S. sanctions and state mismanagement, but this has helped insulate it from the fallout of its tactics in the current conflict. Meanwhile, China’s economy is export-oriented and therefore vulnerable to the kind of economic disruption that Iran has caused in the Strait of Hormuz. 

Nevertheless, China’s regime has made preventing Taiwan’s formal separation from the mainland a key plank of its legitimacy. Moreover, given Western countries’ reliance on tools like sanctions to punish aggressors in past conflicts, like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has likely already priced in a severe economic shock for China as part of its planning for a future conflict over the island.

Indeed, starting a blockade and disrupting commercial shipping, often belonging to Taiwan’s allies, during a crisis over Taiwan may appeal to Beijing........

© The Diplomat