The Pulse | Politics | South Asia

5 Years After the Fall: Why the World Still Misreads the Taliban

The international community assumed that governing would change the Taliban. The Taliban, however, viewed government as a means of transforming society according to their ideology.

Armed fighters of the Taliban in Kabul, Aug. 17 2021.

Five years have passed since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan. During this period, the international community tried a wide range of policies to influence the Taliban’s behavior, from humanitarian assistance and political and economic pressure to diplomatic engagement and negotiations that began through indirect channels and, today, in some cases, have developed into direct talks. 

At the same time, human rights defenders, political opponents of the Taliban, and many ordinary Afghans did not abandon their resistance. From street protests and underground schools to human rights campaigns and various forms of civil disobedience, they sought to prevent the normalization of Taliban rule both within Afghanistan and internationally.

Yet neither the international community’s main expectations nor the hopes of many Afghans were realized. An inclusive government did not emerge, political and social restrictions continued, and rather than becoming more flexible, the Taliban further consolidated their system of rule based on their own ideological interpretation of religion. Women were excluded from education, universities, employment, and much of public life, while civic space and fundamental rights came under even tighter restrictions.

The most common response to this reality has been to conclude: “The Taliban never changed.” But that answer leaves a more important question unresolved. Why were so many international policies based, from the outset, on the assumption that the Taliban would change? Why did a world that had invested two decades in state-building, modern governance, and rule-based institutions in Afghanistan continue to believe that engagement, economic pressure, or the promise of international legitimacy could change the group’s behavior?

Perhaps the central problem was never simply that the Taliban failed to change. Rather, it was that the international community analyzed them through a framework that was ill-suited to understanding the nature of such a movement. The shortcomings of international policy in Afghanistan were not due only to the failure to change the Taliban. Instead, they were rooted in the analytical framework through which the international community understood the movement.

Accordingly, this article does not ask why the Taliban govern as they do. Instead, it asks why, despite the experience of the Taliban’s first regime, two decades of war, and state-building, and five years of direct observation of their rule after returning to power, the international community continued to analyze the movement through a framework that did not fit its actual nature. The answer to this question is important not only for understanding Afghanistan’s recent past, but also for rethinking how ideological movements are analyzed and how future peace processes are designed in other international crises.

How the International Community Understands the Taliban

Much of the international community’s policy toward the Taliban was built on a set of assumptions that ultimately proved inconsistent with the reality of the group’s rule. These policies were shaped by the belief that, after two decades of war, the Taliban’s primary objective was to secure political power, end their international isolation, and become a political actor operating within the established rules of international politics and international relations. It was therefore expected that participation in negotiations, the responsibilities of governing, economic pressure, and the need for international legitimacy would gradually moderate the group’s behavior and priorities.

In practice, this analytical framework rested on three core assumptions. First, that the Taliban understood concepts such as the state, legitimacy, peace, the rule of law, and human rights in the same way these concepts are generally understood in international political and legal discourse. Second, that the transition of an armed movement from the battlefield to a peace process and eventually into government would gradually transform it into an actor compatible with the principles of modern governance. Third, that the responsibilities of governing and the need to engage with the outside world would outweigh the group’s ideological priorities.

These assumptions did not emerge solely from analyses of the Taliban themselves. They also reflected the broader political context of the time. After two decades of war, the international community had grown weary of prolonged conflict, heavy military costs, the failure of the state-building project, and widespread corruption within the former Afghan Republic. In such an environment, reaching a peace agreement became an urgent priority – one that, at times, took precedence over a careful understanding of the Taliban’s nature and the conditions necessary for a durable peace.

The shortcomings of international policy, therefore, cannot be explained simply by tactical mistakes or political optimism. They were rooted in an analytical framework that viewed the Taliban primarily as a political actor rather than as an ideological movement, assuming that holding power would gradually bring the group into line with the demands of modern governance.

The Taliban vs the Logic of States

From the very beginning of their emergence, the Taliban were less a political actor than an ideological movement with a religious mission. In such movements, governing is not the ultimate goal; rather, it is a means of establishing an order rooted in the movement’s ideological beliefs. Accordingly, the legitimacy of a government is measured not by the consent of citizens or international recognition, but by its fidelity to that mission.

Within this framework, many Taliban policies that appeared costly – or even irrational – to foreign policymakers were entirely consistent with the movement’s internal logic. The Taliban did not merely change the structure of government; they also redefined the concept of citizenship according to loyalty to their own ideological interpretation. The consequences of this approach extended far beyond the exclusion of women from education, employment, and much of public life. Religious and ethnic minorities, intellectuals, civil society activists, independent media, political critics, and many other social groups also faced restrictions and marginalization in public life. 

At the same time, the Taliban strengthened religious institutions, expanded the authority of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, and placed much of the administrative and security structure in the hands of loyal followers. In all these actions, the Taliban demonstrated that they were willing to bear considerable economic, political, and diplomatic costs in areas they regarded as part of their ideological mission.

This does not mean that the Taliban are indifferent to the economy, foreign relations, or the survival of their government. On the contrary, they have shown a pragmatic approach in certain areas, from regional trade to engagement with neighboring countries. However, they draw a clear distinction between what they consider politically negotiable and what they regard as part of their ideological mission. In their view, issues such as the status of women, the structure of the education system, the role of religion in government, the limits of social freedoms, and the definition of citizenship are not merely matters of public policy; they are essential elements of an order that the government is obliged to implement and protect.

For this reason, the expectation that the responsibilities of governing........

© The Diplomat