ASEAN Beat | Security | Southeast Asia

Indonesia-U.S. Blanket Overflight Access: A Door That Others Will Push

Whether or not it is approved, Washington’s request for overflight access could invite even more controversial proposals in the future.

A low altitude flypass formation of Indonesian Air force fighter jets.

Indonesia’s foreign policy has once again drawn international attention, this time following reports that Washington is seeking “blanket” overflight access for U.S. military aircraft across the archipelago. The proposal, which reportedly covers broad transit and contingency-related activities, was leaked just before Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin’s scheduled visit to the Pentagon on April 13.

Jakarta confirmed that such discussions are taking place, but both the defense and foreign ministries stressed that the proposal, which was submitted by Washington, remains under careful review and that the country’s national interest and sovereignty will be prioritized in any defense agreements with any countries. The new Major Defense Cooperation Partnership that was announced during Sjafrie’s visit also makes no explicit mention of airspace access.

Criticism within Indonesia has been unsurprisingly swift and strong because many see that granting the United States blanket military overflight access would weaken Indonesia’s practical control over its own airspace, undermine the country’s sovereignty, and make Jakarta appear less neutral at a time of sharpening U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

Indonesia’s own officials have also voiced these concerns. According to a report by Reuters, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry warned the Defense Ministry that the proposal could entangle the country in South China Sea tensions, affect relations with China, and create national security risks. These concerns appear to be justified. Commenting on the proposal, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said last week that defense cooperation in Southeast Asia should not target or harm third parties and undermine regional stability.

Not the First Test from Trump

This is not the first time that the U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has tested the boundaries of Indonesia’s foreign policy by seeking greater access for U.S. military assets. In 2020, Jakarta rejected a U.S. request to allow its P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to land and refuel in its territory, for similar geopolitical concerns.

The timing then was also striking: the proposal surfaced as then-Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto was concluding high-level talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper. The parallel with today’s controversy is hard to ignore. Once again, a sensitive U.S. military access proposal has emerged ahead of a senior-level defense engagement.

Taken together, these episodes suggest a recurring pattern. Trump’s administration continues to explore ways to expand operational access in and around Indonesia, as the archipelago lies along a critical air and sea corridor between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, therefore making access through Indonesian airspace strategically valuable for U.S. military activities.

The push may also reflect how Washington reads Prabowo himself. Since taking office, he has pursued a pragmatic and highly personal style of diplomacy, and his willingness to engage Trump on controversial initiatives may have convinced Washington that Indonesia is now more open to contentious proposals. Prabowo’s continuous support for the Board of Peace, his agreement to an unequal trade deal, and his relatively muted reaction to the U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran – all of which have drawn strong criticism at home – may have further encouraged Washington to ask for more, this time in the form of broader overflight access. In this regard, going forward, we might see more cases where Washington proposes sensitive ideas and Jakarta agrees to consider them.

However, the issue of airspace access itself is not new. For years, Indonesia and the United States have held differing views on overflight rights over archipelagic sea lanes, particularly on the question of whether foreign military aircraft may transit without prior notification or security as well as diplomatic clearance. Analysts note that this disagreement has surfaced repeatedly in operational practice, including in debates over U.S. military flights through Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes and broader questions about how the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) should be interpreted.

From Washington’s perspective, such access falls under customary international law governing freedom of navigation and overflight, while Jakarta has tended to apply a more restrictive, sovereignty-focused approach.

Past Special Airspace Access Agreements

Despite the current controversy, Indonesia is not against all forms of special foreign military air access in principle. Jakarta has, in some cases, given foreign militaries “extra” access to its airspace.

One example is Malaysia. In February 1982, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a Treaty on the Legal Regime of Archipelagic States and the Rights of Malaysia in order to manage movement between Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia, which are separated by Indonesian territory and waters.

The treaty grants Malaysian civilian and “state” aircraft, including military aircraft, the right to conduct continuous, fast, and unobstructed flights through designated airspace over Indonesian territorial seas and archipelagic waters in order to connect the two parts of the country. The agreement also goes further than simple transit. It allows Malaysian military aircraft to conduct certain maneuvers, including tactical exercises, in Indonesian airspace along these routes, but only under agreed conditions and limitations.

Another example is Singapore. In 2022, Indonesia inked a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the city-state that includes Military Training Area provisions. These allow Singapore’s military aircraft to use designated areas in Indonesian airspace for training, testing, and exercises, including some joint activities with third parties.

These two cases show that Indonesia is not inherently opposed to granting special access to its airspace, especially when the purpose is clear, the scope is limited, and the rules are well defined. Nonetheless, geopolitical context matters: granting such special access to immediate neighbors carries far lower political and security risk. In contrast, granting blanket access to the United States – a superpower that is increasingly acting unilaterally – amid intensifying great-power competition would have very different implications for Indonesia.

A Broader Unease with U.S. Leadership

Beyond concerns about sovereignty and security, it is hard to ignore the wider context behind the strong rejection of a U.S. blanket overflight proposal. The backlash reflects a growing unease in Indonesia about American global leadership and strategic intentions.

This year’s State of Southeast Asia Survey, published earlier this month by the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, shows that Indonesian respondents have a high level of concern about U.S. leadership under President Trump, with 67.8 percent identifying it as a top geopolitical concern, the second highest after respondents from Singapore. The survey also found that if forced to choose, 80.1 percent of Indonesian respondents would choose China over the United States, the highest percentage of any nation in the region.

In the end, the debate over blanket overflight access brings together Washington’s desire for its military to have a greater operational flexibility, long-standing legal disagreements on archipelagic access, Prabowo’s perceived willingness to accommodate Trump, domestic political sensitivities, and growing unease about great-power competition.

For Jakarta, the episode may have longer-term implications. Even if the current proposal is eventually rejected or scaled back, the fact that it was considered signals a degree of openness to non-traditional and politically sensitive arrangements.

That could invite similar or even more controversial proposals in the future – not only from the United States, but also from other major powers such as China and Russia, both of which Indonesia is also seeking to engage more closely. In the near term, this suggests that we will see similar debates over new security cooperation ideas – and about Indonesia’s strategic limits.

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Indonesia’s foreign policy has once again drawn international attention, this time following reports that Washington is seeking “blanket” overflight access for U.S. military aircraft across the archipelago. The proposal, which reportedly covers broad transit and contingency-related activities, was leaked just before Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin’s scheduled visit to the Pentagon on April 13.

Jakarta confirmed that such discussions are taking place, but both the defense and foreign ministries stressed that the proposal, which was submitted by Washington, remains under careful review and that the country’s national interest and sovereignty will be prioritized in any defense agreements with any countries. The new Major Defense Cooperation Partnership that was announced during Sjafrie’s visit also makes no explicit mention of airspace access.

Criticism within Indonesia has been unsurprisingly swift and strong because many see that granting the United States blanket military overflight access would weaken Indonesia’s practical control over its own airspace, undermine the country’s sovereignty, and make Jakarta appear less neutral at a time of sharpening U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

Indonesia’s own officials have also voiced these concerns. According to a report by Reuters, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry warned the Defense Ministry that the proposal could entangle the country in South China Sea tensions, affect relations with China, and create national security risks. These concerns appear to be justified. Commenting on the proposal, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said last week that defense cooperation in Southeast Asia should not target or harm third parties and undermine regional stability.

Not the First Test from Trump

This is not the first time that the U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has tested the boundaries of Indonesia’s foreign policy by seeking greater access for U.S. military assets. In 2020, Jakarta rejected a U.S. request to allow its P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to land and refuel in its territory, for similar geopolitical concerns.

The timing then was also striking: the proposal surfaced as then-Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto was concluding high-level talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper. The parallel with today’s controversy is hard to ignore. Once again, a sensitive U.S. military access proposal has emerged ahead of a senior-level defense engagement.

Taken together, these episodes suggest a recurring pattern. Trump’s administration continues to explore ways to expand operational access in and around Indonesia, as the archipelago lies along a critical air and sea corridor between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, therefore making access through Indonesian airspace strategically valuable for U.S. military activities.

The push may also reflect how Washington reads Prabowo himself. Since taking office, he has pursued a pragmatic and highly personal style of diplomacy, and his willingness to engage Trump on controversial initiatives may have convinced Washington that Indonesia is now more open to contentious proposals. Prabowo’s continuous support for the Board of Peace, his agreement to an unequal trade deal, and his relatively muted reaction to the U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran – all of which have drawn strong criticism at home – may have further encouraged Washington to ask for more, this time in the form of broader overflight access. In this regard, going forward, we might see more cases where Washington proposes sensitive ideas and Jakarta agrees to consider them.

However, the issue of airspace access itself is not new. For years, Indonesia and the United States have held differing views on overflight rights over archipelagic sea lanes, particularly on the question of whether foreign military aircraft may transit without prior notification or security as well as diplomatic clearance. Analysts note that this disagreement has surfaced repeatedly in operational practice, including in debates over U.S. military flights through Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes and broader questions about how the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) should be interpreted.

From Washington’s perspective, such access falls under customary international law governing freedom of navigation and overflight, while Jakarta has tended to apply a more restrictive, sovereignty-focused approach.

Past Special Airspace Access Agreements

Despite the current controversy, Indonesia is not against all forms of special foreign military air access in principle. Jakarta has, in some cases, given foreign militaries “extra” access to its airspace.

One example is Malaysia. In February 1982, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a Treaty on the Legal Regime of Archipelagic States and the Rights of Malaysia in order to manage movement between Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia, which are separated by Indonesian territory and waters.

The treaty grants Malaysian civilian and “state” aircraft, including military aircraft, the right to conduct continuous, fast, and unobstructed flights through designated airspace over Indonesian territorial seas and archipelagic waters in order to connect the two parts of the country. The agreement also goes further than simple transit. It allows Malaysian military aircraft to conduct certain maneuvers, including tactical exercises, in Indonesian airspace along these routes, but only under agreed conditions and limitations.

Another example is Singapore. In 2022, Indonesia inked a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the city-state that includes Military Training Area provisions. These allow Singapore’s military aircraft to use designated areas in Indonesian airspace for training, testing, and exercises, including some joint activities with third parties.

These two cases show that Indonesia is not inherently opposed to granting special access to its airspace, especially when the purpose is clear, the scope is limited, and the rules are well defined. Nonetheless, geopolitical context matters: granting such special access to immediate neighbors carries far lower political and security risk. In contrast, granting blanket access to the United States – a superpower that is increasingly acting unilaterally – amid intensifying great-power competition would have very different implications for Indonesia.

A Broader Unease with U.S. Leadership

Beyond concerns about sovereignty and security, it is hard to ignore the wider context behind the strong rejection of a U.S. blanket overflight proposal. The backlash reflects a growing unease in Indonesia about American global leadership and strategic intentions.

This year’s State of Southeast Asia Survey, published earlier this month by the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, shows that Indonesian respondents have a high level of concern about U.S. leadership under President Trump, with 67.8 percent identifying it as a top geopolitical concern, the second highest after respondents from Singapore. The survey also found that if forced to choose, 80.1 percent of Indonesian respondents would choose China over the United States, the highest percentage of any nation in the region.

In the end, the debate over blanket overflight access brings together Washington’s desire for its military to have a greater operational flexibility, long-standing legal disagreements on archipelagic access, Prabowo’s perceived willingness to accommodate Trump, domestic political sensitivities, and growing unease about great-power competition.

For Jakarta, the episode may have longer-term implications. Even if the current proposal is eventually rejected or scaled back, the fact that it was considered signals a degree of openness to non-traditional and politically sensitive arrangements.

That could invite similar or even more controversial proposals in the future – not only from the United States, but also from other major powers such as China and Russia, both of which Indonesia is also seeking to engage more closely. In the near term, this suggests that we will see similar debates over new security cooperation ideas – and about Indonesia’s strategic limits.

Muhammad Fauzan Malufti

Muhammad Fauzan Malufti (@FMalufti) is an Indonesian defense analyst specializing in Indonesia’s national security affairs, with a particular focus on arms modernization, civil-military relations, defense diplomacy, and the defense industry.

U.S.-Indonesia relations

US-Indonesia defense relations

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