China Power | Diplomacy | East Asia | South Asia

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Bangladesh, 10 Years Later

It’s been almost a decade since Bangladesh joined the BRI. What has the Belt and Road actually accomplished in the country?

In this Oct. 14, 2016 file photo, Chinese President Xi Jinping and then-Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina oversee the signing of Belt and Road Initiative agreements in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

On October 14, 2016, during the historic visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Bangladesh, Dhaka and Beijing formally upgraded their relationship to a Strategic Partnership of Cooperation, and Bangladesh became a participant in the Chinese-financed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since then, several Chinese-sponsored major infrastructure projects have been completed in Bangladesh, and several more are underway. 

On July 11, 2024, Dhaka and Beijing further elevated their partnership to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership. Even the subsequent political upheavals in Bangladesh – including the July Uprising that removed the Hasina government less than a month later, the formation of the interim government, and the victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 2026 general elections – have not hindered Bangladesh’s continued participation in the BRI.

Since 2016, Bangladesh’s involvement in the BRI has been widely discussed and dissected. Depending on their political orientation, some have championed Bangladesh’s growing partnership with China and commended infrastructure development through the BRI, while some others have voiced concerns about possible fallout in relations with India and the United States and a potential “debt trap.” However, the reality is far more nuanced than the simplified polemics presented by many commentators.

BRI Projects in Bangladesh: Expectations versus Reality

Under the BRI, Bangladesh was supposed to receive approximately $40 billion in investments from China: $26 billion for independent projects and $14 billion for joint venture projects. However, most of these investments are yet to be materialized. Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen stated in 2023 that China had disbursed $4.45 billion – just over one-tenth of the promised amount – for 35 BRI projects in the country. However, the exact amount disbursed by China to Bangladesh under the BRI between October 2016 and April 2026 is not known. 

Most of the BRI projects in Bangladesh are related to transport and energy infrastructure, but there are difficulties in determining the exact number of BRI projects in the country based on publicly available data. Most estimates mention 35–40 projects, with one website listing as many as 64 projects under the BRI, albeit mistakenly. Hence, the unavailability of exact data about the BRI in Bangladesh is a major hindrance to examining its real effects. That said, based on the available data, getting a general picture is still possible.

So far, the completed BRI projects in Bangladesh include the Padma Multipurpose Bridge, the Eighth Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge, the Padma Bridge Rail Link, the Chattogram-Cox’s Bazar Rail Line, the Chattogram Elevated Expressway, the Karnaphuli Tunnel, the Payra Thermal Power Plant, the Banshkhali Coal-fired Power Plant, the Dasherkandi Sewage Treatment Plant, the IV Tier National Data Center, and the Bangladesh-China Friendship Exhibition Center. Partially completed, under-construction, and proposed BRI projects in the country include the Payra Seaport, the Ninth Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge, the Dhaka Elevated Expressway, the Dhaka-Ashulia Elevated Expressway, the expansion of the Mongla Port, the Maheshkhali Single Point Mooring Project, the development of power supply line under the Power Grid Bangladesh PLC, the development of power supply system under the Dhaka Power Distribution Company (DPDC) the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram, the extension of the national information technology network, the Teesta River Comprehensive Management Project, the Rajshahi Surface Water Treatment Plant, the Bangladesh-China Friendship General Hospital in Nilphamari, and the Bangladesh-China Maitree Hall at the University of Dhaka.

Meanwhile, several BRI projects in Bangladesh have been canceled. For instance, Dhaka scrapped the Sonadia deep seaport project in August 2020 owing to strong opposition from the United States, Japan, and India coupled with environmental concerns. In February 2021, Dhaka decided to drop five BRI projects – the Dhaka-Sylhet four-lane highway project, the extension of Barapukuria coal mine’s existing underground operations, the distribution zones of the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), the Gazaria Coal-fired Power Plant, and the rejuvenation of the jute mills under the Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation (BJMC) – due to power overcapacity and rising costs. At the same time, China informed Bangladesh that it would no longer undertake projects involving high pollution and high energy consumption, such as coal mines and coal-fired power plants, in the country. Moreover, in April 2021, Bangladesh shelved the Payra deep seaport project, and instead decided to construct a regular seaport at Payra, citing high dredging costs, shallow depth, concerns about natural disasters, and the prioritization of the more viable Matarbari Deep Seaport. Similarly, in May 2024, Dhaka put on hold the proposed Dhaka-Chattogram High-speed Railway, citing economic reasons.

Hence, under the BRI, China has completed and is currently implementing numerous infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, particularly in the transport and energy sectors, and Chinese companies have secured contracts worth more than $22.94 billion in the country. However, despite the scale of Chinese involvement in infrastructure development in Bangladesh, this should not be construed as some sort of Chinese infrastructural monopoly over the country. Bangladesh has demonstrated its maneuverability by shelving several Chinese projects, and several other states – including India, Japan, Russia, and Belgium – are involved in major infrastructure and energy projects in the country.

Moreover, while China had pledged massive amounts of investments in Bangladesh in 2016, only a fraction of the pledged amount has been actually invested so far. The slow pace........

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