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North Korea Needs China and Russia – But Doesn’t Want Its People Admiring Them

Pyongyang’s strict ideological controls apply to perceptions of its allies as well as to “hostile states” like the United States.

Citizens of North Korea waving at President of Russia Vladimir Putin’s motorcade as it passes by them in Pyongyang during Putin’s state visit to North Korea, June 19, 2024. Only state-sanctioned displays of enthusiasm for Russia are permitted.

For decades, North Korean authorities have taught ordinary citizens not to harbor illusions about South Korea, the United States, and Japan, on the grounds that admiring the culture and lifestyles of “hostile states” could erode faith in the system. But recent developments inside the country suggest the authorities’ vigilance extends well beyond these so-called hostile states. Even China and Russia – partners with whom North Korea is deepening strategic cooperation – are no exception.

North Korea needs Chinese goods and capital, and is expanding military and economic cooperation with Russia. Yet it does not permit ordinary citizens to envy China’s standard of living or Russia’s technological prowess. The state may draw closer to both countries; however, its people are not allowed to hold any “illusions” about them. This contradiction reveals less about North Korea’s foreign policy than about the underlying logic that keeps its system intact.

Even a Friendly Nation May Not Be Seen However One Wishes

According to Daily NK’s reporting, the Organization and Guidance Department of North Korea’s Central Committee instructed border-area party organizations and workers’ groups in June to tighten discipline and ideological control, emphasizing that people “must not harbor illusions about Chinese-style socialism.” The move has been widely interpreted as a preemptive effort to stop North Koreans from taking interest in China’s market economy and living standards – and comparing them to conditions at home – as cross-border trade and personal exchanges with China expand.

China is North Korea’s largest trading partner and its closest socialist ally – which may be exactly what makes it such a dangerous point of comparison. People might ask: If we are both socialist countries, why can individuals in China run businesses and earn money? Why are China’s cities and villages better off than ours? Why does the state accept Chinese goods and technology while demanding that ordinary people practice total self-reliance?

A similar pattern is visible with Russia. When a new destroyer capsized during launch at the Chongjin shipyard in May 2025, some officials in the munitions sector reportedly proposed importing a large Russian crane as the most realistic way to salvage the situation. Instead, they were dismissed from their posts, and Kim Jong Un reportedly rebuked them, warning against “harboring illusions about foreign countries.” North Korea’s relationship with Russia has effectively reached the level of a military alliance – yet treating Russian technology as superior to North Korea’s own has become a political liability.

The information controls surrounding North Korea’s troop deployment to Russia fit the same pattern. Family members of deployed soldiers interviewed by Daily NK said they had not been told in advance that their sons were headed to a war zone – only that they were leaving for “study-abroad training” or “training to represent the fatherland.” Word of the deployment reached families late, not through any official notice but through letters, rumor, and word-of-mouth. Before officially acknowledging the deployment, the authorities branded the rumors as false and moved to suppress them.

AsiaPress likewise reported that, even while Pyongyang refused to officially confirm the deployment, information about casualties among North Korean troops in Russia reached the country and unsettled parents. That information is believed to have spread through South Korean broadcasts, Chinese mobile phones in border areas, and word of mouth. Facts the authorities tried to conceal reached ordinary people through multiple informal information networks.

North Korean authorities present cooperation with Russia as a diplomatic achievement of Kim Jong Un’s. But specifics – the scale of the deployment, casualty figures, how the soldiers are treated, what Russia gives North Korea in return – remain matters ordinary people are not supposed to know, let alone ask about. What Pyongyang wants is not a population devoid of pro-Russia sentiment, but one that views Russia only in the terms the authorities permit.

What North Korea Fears Is Not Information but Comparison

North Korea holds up self-reliance and self-determination as basic principles of state governance. In its view, North Korea’s problems must be solved the North Korean way, and there is no alternative to the path laid out by the party and the leader.

Within this framework, admiration for foreign countries can never remain a matter of personal taste. The moment North Koreans compare wages, consumption levels, healthcare, education, or freedom of movement and communication abroad with conditions in their country, they risk reaching conclusions the authorities never sanctioned. What threatens the system is not so much the fact that life may be better elsewhere, but the fact that a society can be run differently from North Korea’s own model.

A Korea Institute for National Unification study published last year found that as marketization and the spread of information technology converge in North Korea, outside information is flowing in quietly but deeply, and reshaping people’s perceptions and desires. Markets are not simply places to trade goods; they function as spaces where all kinds of information circulates and new lifestyles and cultural habits take root. To rein in this organic change, North Korean authorities have stepped up controls on what they label........

© The Diplomat