Interviews | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia

‘We Have Friends, No Enemies’: Timor-Leste’s First Year in ASEAN

Dili will seek to “ensure that ASEAN’s principles work together in support of peace and the well-being of its peoples,” says the country’s vice minister for ASEAN affairs.

Timor-Leste’s Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão addresses the 47th ASEAN Summit following a ceremony marking Timor-Leste’s accession to the Southeast Asian bloc in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Oct. 26, 2025.

On October 26, Timor-Leste marks the first anniversary of its admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a milestone that followed 14 years of efforts and a much longer history of struggle for independence. Its accession as the bloc’s 11th member was celebrated as the completion of Southeast Asia’s regional family. Yet behind the diplomatic celebrations lies a more complicated reality. Timor-Leste is entering an organization whose political traditions and practices do not always sit comfortably with the principles that have shaped its own foreign policy.

While Timor-Leste’s resistance against Indonesian occupation is well known, considerably less attention has been paid to its foreign policy and relations with major powers. Dili has occasionally taken positions that have unsettled its neighbors. Myanmar’s military authorities expelled Timorese diplomats twice, first in 2023 following Dili’s engagement with the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), and again in February 2026, following the filing of a criminal complaint in Timor-Leste against senior Myanmar military officials over alleged atrocities. The second expulsion came barely four months after ASEAN accession, exposing the tensions between Dili’s commitment to international justice and the bloc’s longstanding principle of non-interference.

These tensions extend beyond Myanmar. Timor-Leste’s relationship with Indonesia remains shadowed by unresolved questions of justice, accountability, and reparations, while its relationships with China, the United States, and Australia require careful navigation amid intensifying geopolitical competition. At home, ASEAN membership brings demanding economic and institutional obligations, growing concerns over transnational crime and the responsibility of chairing ASEAN in 2029. For a small state whose independence depended heavily on international solidarity, membership offers greater diplomatic influence, but also new pressures to compromise. How Dili manages these competing pressures will reveal much about the kind of regional actor it intends to become.

In this inaugural interview for Conversations on Southeast Asia, a new Diplomat interview series hosted by Khoo Ying Hooi, Timor-Leste’s Vice Minister for ASEAN Affairs, Milena Maria da Costa Rangel, speaks about the country’s first year in ASEAN and the political and practical choices confronting Dili.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Timor-Leste joined ASEAN on October 26, 2025, with substantial legal and institutional commitments under its accession roadmap and access to development assistance through the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). One year on, how far has Dili progressed in fulfilling these commitments, and how much of the promised assistance has actually materialized? Beyond the diplomatic achievement of accession, what tangible benefits can ordinary Timorese, particularly businesses and young people, expect?

We remain grateful for the welcome and solidarity extended to Timor-Leste by ASEAN member states. But becoming a member is only the beginning of a much longer process.

Our first year of membership has focused on translating the achievement of accession into coordinated implementation across government. On the legal instruments, Timor-Leste had acceded to most of the 66 instruments under Priority 1 of the accession roadmap [the Roadmap for Timor-Leste’s Full Membership in ASEAN] before joining ASEAN. Two instruments relating to the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement remain under discussion, particularly regarding the common legal framework and domestic procedures required by member states.

We are also working with the ASEAN Secretariat to review the economic agreements under the remaining priorities. Some agreements have expired, have not entered into force, or have been replaced. As a result, the number under Priority 2 has been reduced from 48 to 35, and under Priority 3 from 106 to 62. The review has also identified 45 additional agreements that Timor-Leste will need to address. Domestic preparations for accession to the remaining economic agreements are under way.

In terms of assistance, Timor-Leste has benefited from the IAI since May 2024, even before becoming a full member. We are now covered by IAI Work Plan V for 2026–2030, which offers technical assistance and capacity-building in trade, agriculture, education, skills development, and institutional strengthening.

We have established a national task force with focal points in relevant ministries to identify priorities and develop proposals. So far, we have developed six initial project concepts, three of which have been finalized and submitted to the ASEAN Secretariat. They cover areas including sustainable tourism, youth capacity-building, digital skills for primary school teachers, and more resilient coffee production. The challenge now is to turn these proposals into funded projects that produce practical results.

Milena Maria da Costa Rangel, Timor-Leste’s vice minister for ASEAN affairs. (Photo credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor-Leste)

For businesses and young people, ASEAN membership opens access to a much larger market and new opportunities in trade, investment, education, and skills development. But these benefits will not come automatically. Our businesses still face challenges in production capacity, competitiveness, and meeting regional standards. We also need to improve young people’s skills and qualifications so they can make use of these opportunities.

We recognize that many of the obligations require action now, while some of the economic benefits will take longer to emerge. That is why we are taking a phased approach, based on national priorities, institutional capacity, and the timelines agreed with ASEAN.

On October 21, the Council of Ministers approved the National Roadmap for the Implementation of ASEAN Economic Commitments for 2026–2030, accompanied by 19 sectoral strategic action plans and 19 sectoral work plans. These set out the reforms and responsibilities across government. Our focus is not simply to meet legal requirements, but to use membership to support economic diversification, stronger institutions, private sector development, and better opportunities for our people.

Turning to relations with Indonesia, the two countries often present their relationship as a model of post-conflict reconciliation. Yet the 2008 Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) acknowledged the serious violations committed during the 1999 violence, while justice and reparations remain unresolved for many victims. Has political reconciliation moved ahead at the expense of justice? Now that both countries sit together in ASEAN, is this chapter effectively closed?

Timor-Leste and Indonesia share a difficult and bitter history. Over the years, however, we have made significant progress in building a peaceful and constructive relationship based on mutual respect, dialogue, and cooperation. This reconciliation is something both countries can be proud of.

At the same time, reconciliation does not mean forgetting the past. We recognize the suffering of victims and their families, and we understand that justice, accountability, and reparations remain important. The CTF helped acknowledge what happened in 1999. At the national level, the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation documented past human rights violations in its Chega! report and made important recommendations.

We need to continue preserving historical memory, supporting victims, and advancing a national reparations policy. Membership of ASEAN does not close this chapter. It provides an additional setting for cooperation between two sovereign neighbors, while the needs and dignity of victims remain important in their own rights.

Indonesia is one of our closest neighbors and an important partner in trade, investment, education, security, and regional cooperation. For us, reconciliation means acknowledging the past, addressing its consequences, and building a better relationship for the future. But there is still work to be done on the recommendations of the Chega! report. In that sense, reconciliation remains an ongoing process.

One of ASEAN’s most contentious issues is Myanmar. Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s military-backed leader, has visited five ASEAN member states, most recently Malaysia. These developments raise concerns about the gradual normalization of Myanmar’s military-backed leadership, despite the lack of meaningful progress on ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. How does Timor-Leste view these developments? What is Dili’s position on engagement with the NUG, and how should Myanmar’s representation in ASEAN relate to progress on the Five-Point Consensus?

Timor-Leste’s position on Myanmar is guided by our commitment to peace, democracy, and international law. These principles remain central to our foreign policy as we engage with other ASEAN member states.

We recognize that the situation in Myanmar is complex, and we are deeply concerned about the continued violence, humanitarian suffering, and its impact on civilians. We believe inclusive dialogue is essential.

Engagement with all relevant stakeholders, including different political groups, should contribute to ending the violence, facilitating political dialogue, and achieving meaningful reconciliation and lasting peace.

Regarding the NUG and other stakeholders, our position is that an inclusive process is indispensable to a peaceful and sustainable solution. We should not focus on only one group while excluding others. At the same time, we respect Myanmar’s sovereignty and recognize its importance in addressing the crisis.

ASEAN membership does not require Timor-Leste to abandon its principles. It provides another platform through which we can advance them collectively. We continue to support the full and effective implementation of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus as the principal framework for addressing the crisis, and we support ASEAN’s established position concerning Myanmar’s representation at high-level meetings. Engagement should help reduce violence, improve humanitarian access, and create conditions for an inclusive, Myanmar-owned political process.

We take note of the engagement by some ASEAN member states with the Myanmar authorities and will continue........

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