Features | Diplomacy | East Asia

How China Is Positioning Itself Ahead of the Trump–Xi Summit

Beijing is working subtly to shape the regional environment ahead of the meeting – and take advantage of Washington’s focus on the Iran war.

On April 10, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi concluded a two-day visit to North Korea – his first trip to Pyongyang in more than six years, where he emphasized strengthening high-level exchanges and expanding practical cooperation. With U.S. President Donald Trump set to arrive in Beijing in mid-May for a high-stakes summit with President Xi Jinping, the visit underscores China’s parallel diplomatic positioning. 

Wang’s North Korea trip is only one part of a broader set of initiatives Beijing has been assembling both to shape the regional environment ahead of the summit and to capitalize on Washington’s focus on the war in the Middle East. China is simultaneously shaping the regional security environment, stabilizing and selectively managing economic relations, and positioning itself as a potential diplomatic intermediary. Not every diplomatic move may have been pre-planned, but the cumulative effect is an increasingly coherent posture that seeks to maximize China’s leverage ahead of the summit while preserving flexibility.

The Iran conflict has created a strategic opening by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from Asia. Rather than acting aggressively, China has generally favored a patient approach that prioritizes building influence and keeping options open over immediate, high-profile gains. This reflects a Xi-era pattern in which structural advantage and long-term positioning often take precedence over headline-grabbing confrontation.

The delay of the Trump–Xi summit, from late March to mid-May due to the Iran war, has reinforced these dynamics. Beijing has gained additional time to shape the agenda and explore leverage points on technology controls, investment restrictions, tariffs, and Taiwan. With Washington managing multiple crises, China appears less as a challenger and more as a stabilizing presence, creating an emergent asymmetry likely to influence U.S. expectations and negotiation dynamics.

Reasserting Leverage on the Korean Peninsula

Wang Yi’s April 9-10 visit to Pyongyang offered one of the most strategically revealing elements of China’s pre-summit positioning. Historical precedent is instructive: Kim Jong Un traveled to Beijing in 2018 to steady ties and possibly coordinate positions ahead of his first meeting with Trump in Singapore. While it is impossible to know the full extent of China’s calculations, Beijing appears intent on maintaining centrality in any renewed North Korea-U.S. diplomacy.

There’s a broader context behind Wang’s visit as well. During the pandemic, and amid North Korea’s closer ties with Moscow, Beijing’s influence in Pyongyang waned. The resumption of rail and air links in early 2026 reflected a deliberate effort to prevent developments on the Korean Peninsula from unfolding without Chinese involvement. These incremental steps allow Beijing to assert influence while avoiding overt pressure that could provoke North Korean resistance.

Pyongyang is not a passive actor. Recent missile and other weapons tests, occurring just before Wang’s visit, signal North Korea’s effort to assert autonomy and shape engagement on its terms. Kim Jong Un’s February statement that there is “no reason” North Korea and the United States cannot “get along well,” provided Washington abandons its “hostile” policy, placed the onus on the U.S. while leaving space for maneuver. For Beijing, this ambiguity offers an opportunity to act as an intermediary but does not guarantee that role.

China is gradually consolidating its influence. Even limited North Korea-U.S. agreements could reduce tensions in a way that benefits Beijing, particularly if it retains a supportive role. Over time, successive diplomatic, economic, and security moves may coalesce into a more coherent position on the peninsula, though this remains contingent on Pyongyang’s choices and Washington’s responsiveness.

Strategic Restraint and Soft Power

China’s approach to the Middle East conflict reflects similar incremental logic. By emphasizing restraint and describing the war as one that “should never have happened,” Beijing preserves relationships with regional actors while avoiding overt alignment with any party. This posture allows diplomatic flexibility and reinforces its image as a stabilizing actor.

As Gulf states and European partners grow wary of an unpredictable United States, Beijing can appear as a reliable interlocutor, cultivating credibility in multiple arenas. Repeated demonstrations of restraint and offers of mediation may gradually strengthen China’s influence without requiring direct conflict resolution. The strategic patience approach signals competence and reliability, contrasting with U.S. unpredictability, and subtly elevates China as an alternative reference point for regional actors.

Gulf states and other Global South actors are observing both U.S. and Chinese approaches to conflict management, mediation, and diplomacy. Through patient engagement, Beijing enhances its soft power, projecting itself as a capable, responsible actor able to manage crises without resorting to force. 

Incremental successes – such as resumed rail links with North Korea, measured economic reciprocity, or quiet mediation in the Middle East – may cumulatively enhance China’s credibility, reinforcing its bargaining position with Washington.

These third-party perceptions matter for the summit because they shape expectations and influence U.S. calculations indirectly. A Washington that is aware of Chinese influence among regional partners may approach negotiations with a heightened sense of constraint, further........

© The Diplomat