The Pulse | Politics | South Asia

The Graveyard of Rohingya Diplomacy: Is Bangladesh Stuck in an ‘Exhaustion Trap’?

For almost a decade now, the gap between official progress and political reality has stalled Rohingya diplomacy.

In this Sept. 9, 2017 file photo, hundreds of Rohingya people enter Bangladesh after fleeing from Rakhine State in Myanmar.

As Bangladesh navigates the Rohingya refugee crisis, the country is becoming stuck in an exhaustion trap: everyone knows the current situation cannot last, but all efforts only manage fatigue rather than change the strategy.

Bangladesh has often held up the repatriation of Rohingya refugees as a practical diplomatic answer, but in reality, it is not. While repatriation is considered the main “durable solution” in humanitarian work, similar cases have rarely succeeded, especially when a safe, voluntary, and dignified return is not possible. The gap between official progress and political reality has stalled Rohingya diplomacy. 

Bangladesh has faced this before. In 2018 and 2019, repatriation efforts failed because refugees would not return without real guarantees of safety, rights, citizenship, and dignity. That lesson was not learned.

Bangladesh’s approach to Rohingya diplomacy often frames repatriation failures as issues of transport, timing, or pressure, when they are really political and humanitarian problems. Rohingya refugees who visited Myanmar have made it clear they will not return just to face even worse conditions there. This feeling has only grown stronger.

Bangladesh has relied heavily on the international community to help with the refugee crisis, but that support is now uncertain. Global attention has shifted to Ukraine, Gaza, Iran, and West Asia. Donor fatigue is already eroding financial contributions. In this situation, Bangladesh needs to rethink and renew its Rohingya policy.

When Bangladesh’s new government took office on February 17, there was hope it would turn talk about the Rohingya crisis into real action. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party won by a large margin, and Tarique Rahman became prime minister. However, the election campaign barely addressed the Rohingya issue. Most voters were focused on corruption, prices, jobs, and restoring democracy, not the more than a million refugees in the southeast. Many Rohingya said they did not expect anything from the election.

The key question now is whether the new government will take bold steps to renew its approach to Rohingya diplomacy.

The Interim Government’s Approach

According to the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner, by January 31, 2026, Bangladesh was hosting 1,182,755 Rohingya refugees from 245,998 families, including 143,327 new arrivals. The 2025-26 Joint Response Plan, led by the Bangladeshi government and launched in March 2025, asked for $934.5 million in its first year to help 1.48 million people, including both Rohingya refugees and local communities. This burden cannot be sustained.

The interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus did try to bring international attention back to the crisis. It worked with the United Nations, pushed for higher-level diplomacy, and tried to frame the Rohingya issue as a regional and global security problem, not just a dispute with Myanmar. 

The interim government repeatedly tried to push the Rohingya issue back into international view. In November 2024, Yunus’ administration appointed Khalilur Rahman as the high representative on the Rohingya issue and priority affairs, and redesignated him in April 2025 as national security adviser, while keeping the Rohingya brief attached to his office. That move signaled that the interim government wanted a dedicated channel above routine bureaucracy to handle related discussions.

In August 2025, Dhaka hosted a stakeholders’ dialogue in Cox’s Bazar ahead of the U.N. high-level conference in New York. The meeting brought together Bangladeshi officials, diplomats, U.N. agencies, and civil society to frame a more unified international response. Yunus used the moment to insist that Bangladesh had “no scope whatsoever” to devote more resources to the refugee crisis. He later described Bangladesh as “the second victim after the persecuted Rohingya.”

Those statements were strong, but they also showed the main problem with the current policy. The interim government, like its predecessor, did not have a clear plan for what Bangladesh should do if repatriation remained blocked for years.

At the same time, the war in Myanmar changed the situation for returning refugees. In 2024 and 2025, the Arakan Army made significant gains. By late 2025, they had pushed the junta out of most towns in Rakhine State. Maungdaw, the main border town near Bangladesh, was taken by the Arakan Army in December 2024. The old repatriation plan assumed Bangladesh was dealing with a stable government across the border, but that is no longer true in Rakhine. Dhaka is no longer dealing with one government across the border. Instead, it faces a fractured border area where the junta, the Arakan Army, Rohingya armed groups, smugglers, aid agencies, and desperate civilians all interact in unpredictable ways.

Security problems have made the situation even more dangerous. Thousands of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh have reportedly been recruited to fight in Myanmar, whether coerced or driven by money, revenge, or the hopelessness of life in the camps. Risky sea journeys have also increased, with hundreds feared dead in one incident. When life in the camps becomes unbearable, people do not wait for diplomatic solutions. They get recruited by militants, fall into trafficking, become radicalized, or lose their lives at sea. 

The aid situation has also gotten worse. In March 2025, reports warned of possible ration cuts in Rohingya camps, showing how vulnerable the situation is. That month, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres visited Cox’s Bazar during Ramadan, met with Yunus, and tried to highlight the growing humanitarian emergency. The visit brought attention to the crisis, but it made little practical difference. As Bangladesh has learned repeatedly throughout the Rohingya refugee crisis, being seen does not mean having influence.

Likewise, the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner’s work on registration, documentation, camp management, fire safety, and coordination with UNHCR is important. These processes have become more organized and efficient over time. However, good administration is not the same as having a real strategy. A system can get better at managing a long-term crisis without actually solving it. This is a sign of the exhaustion trap: management improves, but real solutions move further away.

At times, however, the interim government’s approach hinted at more than just better administration. It showed the beginnings of a new way of thinking. In spring 2025, there was talk of a U.N.-supervised humanitarian corridor into Rakhine. Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain said the government agreed in principle to the idea under certain conditions, but after some controversy at home, it later clarified that no final deal had been made.

Still, that moment should not be dismissed. It showed that the interim government, especially through Khalilur Rahman’s role, was beginning to realize that the old approach was no longer sufficient. This is important now because Rahman is now the foreign minister in the current government. The question is whether he can lead a real effort to find new policy options.

Will the New Government Change Strategy?

For years, Bangladesh’s response to the Rohingya refugee crisis has been stuck: meetings continue and official statements get longer, but the outlook for real solutions is shrinking. Refugee camps are more crowded, donor interest is less reliable, and Myanmar is more divided. Dhaka is speaking more urgently without clear action.

Since taking office, the Rahman government has inherited many meetings, plans, and statements, but not many real policy options. It could continue the usual approach: making the issue international, insisting on repatriation as the only answer, asking donors for continued aid, and hoping that changes in Myanmar will help. This is the easiest political path in Dhaka, but it is also the one most likely to worsen the exhaustion trap, because it mistakes having a stance for having a real policy.

Any Bangladeshi government can claim that repatriation is the only lasting solution. The real challenge is to explain what Bangladesh will do before repatriation, during long delays, or if the situation in Rakhine makes traditional repatriation impossible for an extended period.

A strong Rohingya policy for the new government would need to work on several fronts at once. It should keep repatriation as the official goal, but stop pretending that repeating this mantra is enough. The government should understand the difference between talks with Myanmar’s official leaders and careful engagement with the groups now controlling areas near the border. It should use registration data to plan for security, education, movement, and camp management. The policy should also protect local communities in Cox’s Bazar from economic and environmental problems and treat shrinking aid as a national security concern.

There is still a tendency in Dhaka to think that because the Rohingya issue is morally clear, the policy can stay vague. But that is not true. The moral case is clear: the Rohingya were forced out by violence, Myanmar must make it possible for them to return, and Bangladesh should not have to handle this alone. Still, having a clear moral stance does not replace the need for careful policymaking.

In June 2025, Yunus warned in London that if the Rohingya are left with “no hope,” there will be an “explosion.” The question now is whether the new government will use this warning as just another talking point or as the basis for a real strategy to head off a disaster in the making.

Bangladesh is not just dealing with refugee, donor, or diplomatic fatigue. It is facing policy fatigue – a loss of new ideas. The country is not yet past the point of recovery, but it is close. 

Bangladesh is stuck treating repatriation as a goal, even though the situation has changed. Dhaka needs to take seriously the very real possibility that repatriation is not just “stuck” – it is never going to start. If the exclusive focus on repatriation continues, exhaustion will grow, and it will become much harder to recover good policy.

For that reason, the new government should establish a dedicated Rohingya policy wing capable of integrating diplomacy, security analysis, humanitarian planning, camp governance, host community stabilization, and regional scenario-building under one strategic roof. Without such a policy center, Bangladesh will continue to manage fragments of the crisis while lacking a doctrine for the whole.

Having continuity in government matters. Under the interim government, the appointment of Khalilur Rahman as foreign minister signalled a possible new direction. In the current government, he may be able to take that change further in a real effort to create a better Rohingya policy.

The new government started with a strong mandate and still has time to define the problem honestly. If it does not, the camps will keep growing as places of suffering, the border will keep feeling the effects of Myanmar’s war, and Dhaka will realize too late that what seemed like a delay was actually a policy choice. 

In the Rohingya crisis, doing nothing is not neutral – it is just the slowest way to make a decision.

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As Bangladesh navigates the Rohingya refugee crisis, the country is becoming stuck in an exhaustion trap: everyone knows the current situation cannot last, but all efforts only manage fatigue rather than change the strategy.

Bangladesh has often held up the repatriation of Rohingya refugees as a practical diplomatic answer, but in reality, it is not. While repatriation is considered the main “durable solution” in humanitarian work, similar cases have rarely succeeded, especially when a safe, voluntary, and dignified return is not possible. The gap between official progress and political reality has stalled Rohingya diplomacy. 

Bangladesh has faced this before. In 2018 and 2019, repatriation efforts failed because refugees would not return without real guarantees of safety, rights, citizenship, and dignity. That lesson was not learned.

Bangladesh’s approach to Rohingya diplomacy often frames repatriation failures as issues of transport, timing, or pressure, when they are really political and humanitarian problems. Rohingya refugees who visited Myanmar have made it clear they will not return just to face even worse conditions there. This feeling has only grown stronger.

Bangladesh has relied heavily on the international community to help with the refugee crisis, but that support is now uncertain. Global attention has shifted to Ukraine, Gaza, Iran, and West Asia. Donor fatigue is already eroding financial contributions. In this situation, Bangladesh needs to rethink and renew its Rohingya policy.

When Bangladesh’s new government took office on February 17, there was hope it would turn talk about the Rohingya crisis into real action. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party won by a large margin, and Tarique Rahman became prime minister. However, the election campaign barely addressed the Rohingya issue. Most voters were focused on corruption, prices, jobs, and restoring democracy, not the more than a million refugees in the southeast. Many Rohingya said they did not expect anything from the election.

The key question now is whether the new government will take bold steps to renew its approach to Rohingya diplomacy.

The Interim Government’s Approach

According to the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner, by January 31, 2026, Bangladesh was hosting 1,182,755 Rohingya refugees from 245,998 families, including 143,327 new arrivals. The 2025-26 Joint Response Plan, led by the Bangladeshi government and launched in March 2025, asked for $934.5 million in its first year to help 1.48 million people, including both Rohingya refugees and local communities. This burden cannot be sustained.

The interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus did try to bring international attention back to the crisis. It worked with the United Nations, pushed for higher-level diplomacy, and tried to frame the Rohingya issue as a regional and global security problem, not just a dispute with Myanmar. 

The interim government repeatedly tried to push the Rohingya issue back into international view. In November 2024, Yunus’ administration appointed Khalilur Rahman as the high representative on the Rohingya issue and priority affairs, and redesignated him in April 2025 as national security adviser, while keeping the Rohingya brief attached to his office. That move signaled that the interim government wanted a dedicated channel above routine bureaucracy to handle related discussions.

In August 2025, Dhaka hosted a stakeholders’ dialogue in Cox’s Bazar ahead of the U.N. high-level conference in New York. The meeting brought together Bangladeshi officials, diplomats, U.N. agencies, and civil society to frame a more unified international response. Yunus used the moment to insist that Bangladesh had “no scope whatsoever” to devote more resources to the refugee crisis. He later described Bangladesh as “the second victim after the persecuted Rohingya.”

Those statements were strong, but they also showed the main problem with the current policy. The interim government, like its predecessor, did not have a clear plan for what Bangladesh should do if repatriation remained blocked for years.

At the same time, the war in Myanmar changed the situation for returning refugees. In 2024 and 2025, the Arakan Army made significant gains. By late 2025, they had pushed the junta out of most towns in Rakhine State. Maungdaw, the main border town near Bangladesh, was taken by the Arakan Army in December 2024. The old repatriation plan assumed Bangladesh was dealing with a stable government across the border, but that is no longer true in Rakhine. Dhaka is no longer dealing with one government across the border. Instead, it faces a fractured border area where the junta, the Arakan Army, Rohingya armed groups, smugglers, aid agencies, and desperate civilians all interact in unpredictable ways.

Security problems have made the situation even more dangerous. Thousands of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh have reportedly been recruited to fight in Myanmar, whether coerced or driven by money, revenge, or the hopelessness of life in the camps. Risky sea journeys have also increased, with hundreds feared dead in one incident. When life in the camps becomes unbearable, people do not wait for diplomatic solutions. They get recruited by militants, fall into trafficking, become radicalized, or lose their lives at sea. 

The aid situation has also gotten worse. In March 2025, reports warned of possible ration cuts in Rohingya camps, showing how vulnerable the situation is. That month, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres visited Cox’s Bazar during Ramadan, met with Yunus, and tried to highlight the growing humanitarian emergency. The visit brought attention to the crisis, but it made little practical difference. As Bangladesh has learned repeatedly throughout the Rohingya refugee crisis, being seen does not mean having influence.

Likewise, the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner’s work on registration, documentation, camp management, fire safety, and coordination with UNHCR is important. These processes have become more organized and efficient over time. However, good administration is not the same as having a real strategy. A system can get better at managing a long-term crisis without actually solving it. This is a sign of the exhaustion trap: management improves, but real solutions move further away.

At times, however, the interim government’s approach hinted at more than just better administration. It showed the beginnings of a new way of thinking. In spring 2025, there was talk of a U.N.-supervised humanitarian corridor into Rakhine. Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain said the government agreed in principle to the idea under certain conditions, but after some controversy at home, it later clarified that no final deal had been made.

Still, that moment should not be dismissed. It showed that the interim government, especially through Khalilur Rahman’s role, was beginning to realize that the old approach was no longer sufficient. This is important now because Rahman is now the foreign minister in the current government. The question is whether he can lead a real effort to find new policy options.

Will the New Government Change Strategy?

For years, Bangladesh’s response to the Rohingya refugee crisis has been stuck: meetings continue and official statements get longer, but the outlook for real solutions is shrinking. Refugee camps are more crowded, donor interest is less reliable, and Myanmar is more divided. Dhaka is speaking more urgently without clear action.

Since taking office, the Rahman government has inherited many meetings, plans, and statements, but not many real policy options. It could continue the usual approach: making the issue international, insisting on repatriation as the only answer, asking donors for continued aid, and hoping that changes in Myanmar will help. This is the easiest political path in Dhaka, but it is also the one most likely to worsen the exhaustion trap, because it mistakes having a stance for having a real policy.

Any Bangladeshi government can claim that repatriation is the only lasting solution. The real challenge is to explain what Bangladesh will do before repatriation, during long delays, or if the situation in Rakhine makes traditional repatriation impossible for an extended period.

A strong Rohingya policy for the new government would need to work on several fronts at once. It should keep repatriation as the official goal, but stop pretending that repeating this mantra is enough. The government should understand the difference between talks with Myanmar’s official leaders and careful engagement with the groups now controlling areas near the border. It should use registration data to plan for security, education, movement, and camp management. The policy should also protect local communities in Cox’s Bazar from economic and environmental problems and treat shrinking aid as a national security concern.

There is still a tendency in Dhaka to think that because the Rohingya issue is morally clear, the policy can stay vague. But that is not true. The moral case is clear: the Rohingya were forced out by violence, Myanmar must make it possible for them to return, and Bangladesh should not have to handle this alone. Still, having a clear moral stance does not replace the need for careful policymaking.

In June 2025, Yunus warned in London that if the Rohingya are left with “no hope,” there will be an “explosion.” The question now is whether the new government will use this warning as just another talking point or as the basis for a real strategy to head off a disaster in the making.

Bangladesh is not just dealing with refugee, donor, or diplomatic fatigue. It is facing policy fatigue – a loss of new ideas. The country is not yet past the point of recovery, but it is close. 

Bangladesh is stuck treating repatriation as a goal, even though the situation has changed. Dhaka needs to take seriously the very real possibility that repatriation is not just “stuck” – it is never going to start. If the exclusive focus on repatriation continues, exhaustion will grow, and it will become much harder to recover good policy.

For that reason, the new government should establish a dedicated Rohingya policy wing capable of integrating diplomacy, security analysis, humanitarian planning, camp governance, host community stabilization, and regional scenario-building under one strategic roof. Without such a policy center, Bangladesh will continue to manage fragments of the crisis while lacking a doctrine for the whole.

Having continuity in government matters. Under the interim government, the appointment of Khalilur Rahman as foreign minister signalled a possible new direction. In the current government, he may be able to take that change further in a real effort to create a better Rohingya policy.

The new government started with a strong mandate and still has time to define the problem honestly. If it does not, the camps will keep growing as places of suffering, the border will keep feeling the effects of Myanmar’s war, and Dhaka will realize too late that what seemed like a delay was actually a policy choice. 

In the Rohingya crisis, doing nothing is not neutral – it is just the slowest way to make a decision.

Dr. Helal Mohiuddin is a Rohingya researcher, author, and editor of two internationally acclaimed books on the Rohingya crisis. He is currently the director of research at the Conflict and Resilience Research Institute (CRRIC) in Canada and an assistant professor of liberal arts at Mayville State University in North Dakota.

Bangladesh Rohingya refugees

Bangladesh Rohingya repatriation

Bangladesh Rohingya response

Rohingya refugee crisis

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