Flashpoints | Diplomacy | East Asia

Is China’s New Embassy in London Actually a Security Risk?

The reality depends on how the site fits into wider influence operations, the consolidation of diplomatic outposts, and renewed U.K. engagement with China amid shifting global alliances.

Last month, the U.K. government green-lit the development of a new Chinese embassy at Royal Mint Court. In doing so, the government said it had heeded cross-party warnings over espionage fears and intimidation of Chinese dissidents. Communities Secretary Steve Reed approved the plans after he was provided with assurances from the intelligence community, though the heads of GCHQ and MI5 cautioned in a joint letter to the home and foreign secretaries that “it’s not realistic to eliminate every potential risk.” 

Condemnation was swift from all sides of the political aisle, including within embattled Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s Labor Party, where several MPs raised concerns ranging from the disruption for residents to the vulnerability of minority groups. Mark Sewards, who is the MP for Leeds South West and Morley, called the embassy approval “a cold comfort to Hong Kongers whom I represent” and specifically mentioned Chloe Cheung, an exiled activist, who had a HK$1 million bounty placed on her for “secession” and “collusion.”

Since the sale of the complex in 2018 under the Theresa May government, the plans have been repeatedly deferred by ministers. Delays were in part caused by the borough of Tower Hamlets, whose council rejected a previous planning application over heritage and safety concerns. The application was resubmitted after the Labor Party took back power following the 2024 general election. 

Despite the recent approval, locals are planning a legal challenge and have crowdfunded over 200,000 pounds. The Royal Mint Court Residents’ Association represents around 100 families who live in apartments on a freehold that was contained in the sale of the development. Those residents worry about privacy and the potential for eviction. They also claim that, in addition to shutting them out of the planning process, the government potentially breached U.K. planning law by taking a predetermined view on the project. The latter pertains to whether Boris Johnson, who was foreign secretary at the time, granted consent for diplomatic premises without mentioning the required condition of receiving planning approval.

Part of the reasoning for allowing the construction of a larger embassy is to enable the consolidation of seven smaller Chinese diplomatic outposts around London. Security Minister Dan Jarvis told a parliamentary committee that the move would result in “clear national security advantages.” One component of the decision is the ability to monitor activities at a single site without having to physically follow Chinese state employees, a psychological tactic intended to discourage operations outside embassy perimeters. 

The current seven diplomatic premises are not wholly isolated from one another, but appear in clusters, concentrated around the embassy in Marylebone, and in Hempstead. In fact, the most “remote” location is a mere 11-minute commute to the next in normal traffic conditions. 

Criticism of the new mission at the old mint mentioned that these smaller sites are far less capable than what is planned and would involve a significant staffing increase. Luke de Pulford, who serves as executive director for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, said the “consolidation” argument does not solve security problems and questioned the notion behind allowing hundreds more employees of the Chinese state, so long as they are located in one spot.

Previous examples of unwelcome interference featuring Chinese spies attempting to recruit those with sensitive information through LinkedIn, or other state threat activities such as cyberattacks, suggest Beijing is willing to make use of backchannel methods to gain an economic and political edge. China doesn’t need a new embassy to undertake such activities.

News coverage of the decision appeared to correlate the new site’s physical footprint, through the usage of terms such as “mega” and “super,” with what influence the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may be able to exert. Coverage that broaches on sensationalism fails to adequately analyze real concerns. 

Among those concerns: unredacted documents published by the Daily Telegraph that revealed a network of 208 secret rooms, some with access to fiber optic cables that supply London’s central financial district. The chamber near the cables contains hot air extraction systems, which is standard practice for cooling computer servers. In addition, the demolition of a wall between the embassy and the cables, presents a risk of tampering beneath the ground. Though access to cables does present a threat for tapping, there’s only circumstantial evidence to go on. Still, it’s a reminder that espionage can no longer be confined by the historical parameters of hands-on tampering alone.

Approval of the project, and the decision-making behind it, can be understood within the context of the changing geopolitical landscape, which has seen the U.K. hit the reset button on their relationship with Beijing. Starmer’s visit to China in late January was the first by a British prime minister since 2018 and saw him return home with various agreements from visa-free access to cuts on tariffs. U.S. President Donald Trump reacted to the meeting between the two leaders by warning that it was “very dangerous” for the U.K. to make agreements with China. 

Dealings between Beijing and London have been cagey for the past few years and the two sides have been at odds over issues including China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims, the banning of Huawei 5G equipment and its subsequent phasing out – due to be completed by the end of next year, and China’s sanctioning of 5 MPs and two members of the House of Lords. 

The timing of the embassy approval, taking place shortly before Starmer’s trip, was in fact a prerequisite. Chinese officials had warned their British counterparts that official confirmation would not arrive without the embassy getting final approval. That brings into question the portrayal of the new embassy as a “win” for British intelligence.

In addition, the U.K. has not added China to the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), as it has with Iran and Russia. The FIRS is a measure which mandates the registration of individuals or entities in Britain who are engaging in activities at the direction of a foreign power. When probed over China’s omittance, the security minister said he “wouldn’t speculate on which countries [may be added]” and referred to the “long-term and strategic approach to managing the U.K.’s relationship with China.”

China’s new embassy also remains closely connected to the U.K.’s ambitions to initiate a 100-million-pound revamp of its own embassy in Beijing. 

The supposed “thaw” in relations didn’t appear to last long as China recently sentenced pro-democracy media mogul Jimmy Lai, who is also a British national, to 20 years in prison for foreign collusion and sedition. U.K. Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper deplored the prosecution as politically motivated, and urged China to follow the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Lai’s sentencing reminds observers that the “closeness” of the rekindled ties should not be overestimated. 

Pursuing new global partners or rekindling fractured ties isn’t a fruitless endeavor in and of itself, and the U.K.’s consideration for areas of commonality with partners represents a kind of forward-thinking diplomacy. However, when these commonalities override the national interest of one side, it risks destabilizing the balance of cooperation. With an eye on new partnerships emerging in Europe and being on the receiving end of frosty dialogue from Washington, the U.K. has sought a different kind of comfort. Short of options, Starmer has revealed he is willing to overlook a moderate amount of fragmentation, up to and including interference, to secure several valuable trade concessions. Whether a relationship can flourish with these underpinnings is up for debate. 

An apt warning for this type of engagement was provided by Michael Kovrig, a former Canadian diplomat who spent three years detained in China: “The CCP will continue to use [coercive behavior] as long as it believes it can get away with it.”

Get to the bottom of the story

Subscribe today and join thousands of diplomats, analysts, policy professionals and business readers who rely on The Diplomat for expert Asia-Pacific coverage.

Get unlimited access to in-depth analysis you won't find anywhere else, from South China Sea tensions to ASEAN diplomacy to India-Pakistan relations. More than 5,000 articles a year.

Unlimited articles and expert analysis

Weekly newsletter with exclusive insights

16-year archive of diplomatic coverage

Ad-free reading on all devices

Support independent journalism

Already have an account? Log in.

Last month, the U.K. government green-lit the development of a new Chinese embassy at Royal Mint Court. In doing so, the government said it had heeded cross-party warnings over espionage fears and intimidation of Chinese dissidents. Communities Secretary Steve Reed approved the plans after he was provided with assurances from the intelligence community, though the heads of GCHQ and MI5 cautioned in a joint letter to the home and foreign secretaries that “it’s not realistic to eliminate every potential risk.” 

Condemnation was swift from all sides of the political aisle, including within embattled Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s Labor Party, where several MPs raised concerns ranging from the disruption for residents to the vulnerability of minority groups. Mark Sewards, who is the MP for Leeds South West and Morley, called the embassy approval “a cold comfort to Hong Kongers whom I represent” and specifically mentioned Chloe Cheung, an exiled activist, who had a HK$1 million bounty placed on her for “secession” and “collusion.”

Since the sale of the complex in 2018 under the Theresa May government, the plans have been repeatedly deferred by ministers. Delays were in part caused by the borough of Tower Hamlets, whose council rejected a previous planning application over heritage and safety concerns. The application was resubmitted after the Labor Party took back power following the 2024 general election. 

Despite the recent approval, locals are planning a legal challenge and have crowdfunded over 200,000 pounds. The Royal Mint Court Residents’ Association represents around 100 families who live in apartments on a freehold that was contained in the sale of the development. Those residents worry about privacy and the potential for eviction. They also claim that, in addition to shutting them out of the planning process, the government potentially breached U.K. planning law by taking a predetermined view on the project. The latter pertains to whether Boris Johnson, who was foreign secretary at the time, granted consent for diplomatic premises without mentioning the required condition of receiving planning approval.

Part of the reasoning for allowing the construction of a larger embassy is to enable the consolidation of seven smaller Chinese diplomatic outposts around London. Security Minister Dan Jarvis told a parliamentary committee that the move would result in “clear national security advantages.” One component of the decision is the ability to monitor activities at a single site without having to physically follow Chinese state employees, a psychological tactic intended to discourage operations outside embassy perimeters. 

The current seven diplomatic premises are not wholly isolated from one another, but appear in clusters, concentrated around the embassy in Marylebone, and in Hempstead. In fact, the most “remote” location is a mere 11-minute commute to the next in normal traffic conditions. 

Criticism of the new mission at the old mint mentioned that these smaller sites are far less capable than what is planned and would involve a significant staffing increase. Luke de Pulford, who serves as executive director for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, said the “consolidation” argument does not solve security problems and questioned the notion behind allowing hundreds more employees of the Chinese state, so long as they are located in one spot.

Previous examples of unwelcome interference featuring Chinese spies attempting to recruit those with sensitive information through LinkedIn, or other state threat activities such as cyberattacks, suggest Beijing is willing to make use of backchannel methods to gain an economic and political edge. China doesn’t need a new embassy to undertake such activities.

News coverage of the decision appeared to correlate the new site’s physical footprint, through the usage of terms such as “mega” and “super,” with what influence the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may be able to exert. Coverage that broaches on sensationalism fails to adequately analyze real concerns. 

Among those concerns: unredacted documents published by the Daily Telegraph that revealed a network of 208 secret rooms, some with access to fiber optic cables that supply London’s central financial district. The chamber near the cables contains hot air extraction systems, which is standard practice for cooling computer servers. In addition, the demolition of a wall between the embassy and the cables, presents a risk of tampering beneath the ground. Though access to cables does present a threat for tapping, there’s only circumstantial evidence to go on. Still, it’s a reminder that espionage can no longer be confined by the historical parameters of hands-on tampering alone.

Approval of the project, and the decision-making behind it, can be understood within the context of the changing geopolitical landscape, which has seen the U.K. hit the reset button on their relationship with Beijing. Starmer’s visit to China in late January was the first by a British prime minister since 2018 and saw him return home with various agreements from visa-free access to cuts on tariffs. U.S. President Donald Trump reacted to the meeting between the two leaders by warning that it was “very dangerous” for the U.K. to make agreements with China. 

Dealings between Beijing and London have been cagey for the past few years and the two sides have been at odds over issues including China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims, the banning of Huawei 5G equipment and its subsequent phasing out – due to be completed by the end of next year, and China’s sanctioning of 5 MPs and two members of the House of Lords. 

The timing of the embassy approval, taking place shortly before Starmer’s trip, was in fact a prerequisite. Chinese officials had warned their British counterparts that official confirmation would not arrive without the embassy getting final approval. That brings into question the portrayal of the new embassy as a “win” for British intelligence.

In addition, the U.K. has not added China to the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), as it has with Iran and Russia. The FIRS is a measure which mandates the registration of individuals or entities in Britain who are engaging in activities at the direction of a foreign power. When probed over China’s omittance, the security minister said he “wouldn’t speculate on which countries [may be added]” and referred to the “long-term and strategic approach to managing the U.K.’s relationship with China.”

China’s new embassy also remains closely connected to the U.K.’s ambitions to initiate a 100-million-pound revamp of its own embassy in Beijing. 

The supposed “thaw” in relations didn’t appear to last long as China recently sentenced pro-democracy media mogul Jimmy Lai, who is also a British national, to 20 years in prison for foreign collusion and sedition. U.K. Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper deplored the prosecution as politically motivated, and urged China to follow the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Lai’s sentencing reminds observers that the “closeness” of the rekindled ties should not be overestimated. 

Pursuing new global partners or rekindling fractured ties isn’t a fruitless endeavor in and of itself, and the U.K.’s consideration for areas of commonality with partners represents a kind of forward-thinking diplomacy. However, when these commonalities override the national interest of one side, it risks destabilizing the balance of cooperation. With an eye on new partnerships emerging in Europe and being on the receiving end of frosty dialogue from Washington, the U.K. has sought a different kind of comfort. Short of options, Starmer has revealed he is willing to overlook a moderate amount of fragmentation, up to and including interference, to secure several valuable trade concessions. Whether a relationship can flourish with these underpinnings is up for debate. 

An apt warning for this type of engagement was provided by Michael Kovrig, a former Canadian diplomat who spent three years detained in China: “The CCP will continue to use [coercive behavior] as long as it believes it can get away with it.”

Harrison Budak is a freelancer specializing in impact investing, legacies of corruption within post-communist societies and the EU integration of small states. He is currently completing a bachelor’s degree in political science at McMaster University in Canada.

China mega-embassy London

Chinese embassy in the U.K.

Starmer trip to China

© The Diplomat