ASEAN Beat | Politics | Southeast Asia

Why the Bangsamoro Peace Process Still Depends on Trust

Elections set for September 14 will mark an important step forward, but the peace process will continue for long after the ballots have been counted.

The flag of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in the southern Philippines.

The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)’s first parliamentary elections, scheduled for September 14 after years of postponement, will complete one of the central political commitments under the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB): the transition from an appointed government to an elected one.

This milestone, however, will not mark the end of the peace process writ large.

The appointment in mid-July of a new chair of the Philippine Government Peace Implementing Panel illustrates why the implementation of the CAB remains an ongoing political process. After months without a permanent government counterpart to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a vacancy that had prompted the MILF to temporarily pause some peace process engagements, the appointment restored the principal bilateral mechanism responsible for implementing the CAB. More importantly, it signals that the difficult work of implementing the agreement will continue long after the ballots are counted.

Earlier this year, I argued that the elections would test the Bangsamoro peace process. That remains true, but just as important is the question of what comes after them. The remaining commitments under the CAB, including the completion of the decommissioning of combatants, the socioeconomic transformation of war camps, the dismantling of private armed groups, and transitional justice, still require sustained cooperation between the Philippine government and the MILF regardless of who wins the elections.

This challenge has become increasingly visible over recent months.

The MILF, long accustomed to operating as a relatively unified movement, has entered a period of genuine electoral competition. The United Bangsamoro Justice Party, led by many of the movement’s senior political leaders and peace negotiators, now competes against the Bangsamoro Federalist Party, which draws support from several former MILF commanders alongside established regional politicians. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)’s recognition of the two parties as the region’s dominant majority and dominant minority political parties institutionalized the electoral competition that had emerged within the MILF itself.

None of these developments represents a failure of political normalization. Peace agreements are expected to transform armed opposition into democratic competition, and political differences are inevitable. The question is whether those differences continue to be managed through democratic institutions rather than through force of arms.

This question has become more pressing as the elections approach.

COMELEC has placed several areas in the BARMM under its highest category of election concern because of longstanding security risks.  Recent localized attacks on military detachments have also prompted the Philippine government and the MILF, through the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), to jointly condemn the violence, warning that it threatens not only public safety but also the gains of the peace process.

The MILF’s decision to temporarily pause its bilateral peace process engagements with the national government did not extend to the ceasefire architecture established under the CAB.  The continued operation of peace implementing mechanisms such as the CCCH and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, therefore, demonstrates the MILF’s decision to preserve security cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Philippines despite growing strains in its political relationship with the national government.

Political tensions have also become more visible within Bangsamoro communities. Legal petitions on the constitutionality of the leadership and composition of the interim Bangsamoro government, parliamentary scrutiny of governance, and successive public rallies in Cotabato City framed respectively around anti-corruption and accountability and the faithful implementation of the CAB reflected concerns, both in BARMM and national arenas, about the political legitimacy of the transition.

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