Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

How China’s Naval-Air Reach Is Offsetting the Malacca Dilemma

China remains exposed to maritime disruption, but its expanding regional reach is increasing the military and political costs of exploiting that vulnerability.

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Sterett (DDG 104) transit the Strait of Malacca, July 16, 2025.

In October 2026, China’s Liaoning carrier group transited the Basilan Strait toward the Celebes Sea, at least its second reported passage since December 2025. The deployment also included a transit through the Luzon Strait. Its significance lies in demonstrating additional routes through the First Island Chain. A CSIS analysis of Japanese observations recorded Liaoning and Shandong beyond the First Island Chain for a combined 58 days in 2025, up from 32 in 2024.

For China, those options have implications beyond mere navigation. China’s expanding naval and air reach gives it more opportunities to impose costs on forces seeking to interrupt its seaborne energy supply. A blockade coalition would have to protect its own operations and its members’ trade while sustaining pressure on China.

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In October 2026, China’s Liaoning carrier group transited the Basilan Strait toward the Celebes Sea, at least its second reported passage since December 2025. The deployment also included a transit through the Luzon Strait. Its significance lies in demonstrating additional routes through the First Island Chain. A CSIS analysis of Japanese observations recorded Liaoning and Shandong beyond the First Island Chain for a combined 58 days in 2025, up from 32 in 2024.

For China, those options have implications beyond mere navigation. China’s expanding naval and air reach gives it more opportunities to impose costs on forces seeking to interrupt its seaborne energy supply. A blockade coalition would have to protect its own operations and its members’ trade while sustaining pressure on China.

In China’s case, the Malacca dilemma refers to its exposure to disruption of the........

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