The Koreas | Politics | East Asia

Constitutional Reform as the Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Political Watershed

South Koreans have long discussed changing the way the presidency is set up. Should it – and can it – happen now?

On September 18, President Lee Jae-myung convened a press conference. Unlike his other public appearances, this one was devoid of smiles. There were no pleasantries floated. He just trudged to the podium in his crisp dark navy suit, his presence and the ambience made heavier by the royal blue of the presidential office draped in the backdrop.

“I have been lacking fear and humility,” he said. “I shall revive the fear for the people and tackle every task more meticulously and fiercely, from a lower position of service.” 

The administration’s poor performance in opinion polls prompted this sense of crisis and humble words. Lee’s approval ratings have been taking a steady dive since the June local elections. 

Until late August, the two main factors behind the slide had been the government’s controversial housing policy and the Democratic Party’s much more controversial judicial reform, which entrusts all investigative powers to the police. That change seems premature, or even inappropriate, given the recent barrage of anecdotes of police corruption and incompetence. 

In September, Lee’s approval ratings plummeted still more following his ill-fated Cabinet nominations. Back in 2021, Kim Seung-won, Lee’s pick for the justice minister, allegedly streamlined the drug approval process for a pharmaceutical company on behalf of his friend. This allegation resurfaced during nomination hearings. 

Meanwhile, Lee picked Yong Hye-in, the only parliamentarian from the Basic Income Party, to lead the gender equality ministry. Yong’s insistence on holding both positions, however, garnered opprobrium. 

As opposed to constituency legislators – those who won the most votes from their districts – proportional representatives like Yong owe their positions to their parties. South Korea’s proportional representation ballot, designed to give minor parties a chance at lawmaking, accounts for 46 out of the National Assembly’s 300 total seats. Legislators in these seats are expected to resign when they take up another government job since someone else from their party can replace them without tarnishing the voters’ mandate. It seemed apparent that Yong had no other reason to retain her legislative seat than to enjoy the perks of being a lawmaker.

Kim and Yong both withdrew from their ministerial nominations after much damage to the Lee administration. And now they are both under investigation, the former for alleged sexual harassment of his former staff and the latter for allegedly funneling her political funds to her husband.

The public smarts all the more to questionable behavior by liberal figures. Lee’s approval ratings in major polls hit a nadir in mid-September, dropping to 33.8 percent in a poll by Realmeter and 37 percent in another by Gallup. 

So, Lee’s press conference was a revolving door of apology and resolution to do better on all the factors shaving his approval ratings. But the most emphatic point he made – and the one that received the most headlines – was his assertion that “I have no intention whatsoever for a second presidential term.” 

The Problematic Presidency

The current South Korean constitution allows the president to serve a single five-year term. In 2025, when Lee was running for the snap presidential election following Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment, one of his campaign policies was to amend the constitution so that the president can serve two four-year consecutive terms. At the time, almost two thirds of the voters approved of such reform. 

South Korea’s system of a single five-year term for the president has come under much flak. The populace has to wait too long until they can pass judgment on the president through ballots. Besides, without the prospect of another term, the incumbent president has no incentive to behave responsibly when it comes to their government. How frequently the people can make their voices heard through voting and how much accountability with which the president leads the country determine the soundness of democracy. And South Korea has been poor in this aspect.

On top of that, the strong, centralized nature of South Korea’s presidency – often called an “imperial presidency” – has exacerbated the problem. Consider the president’s monopoly on administrative decisions; the government’s monopoly on funding for the rest of the country; the president’s power to appoint some 10,000 top government agency and QUANGO posts; the president’s authority to wield some $400 billion through their budgetary decisions; their decrees overriding local government ordinances; and the National Assembly’s inability to monitor and check the president’s executive arms. 

Yoon’s presidency manifested everything that could go wrong, from rampant corruption due to lack of auditory mechanisms to toxic control over law enforcement. South Korea’s presidency depends too much on the good will of that one person at the top. 

Naturally, constitutional reform to trim down the imperial presidency and beef up the parliament and local government has been expected to materialize sometime soon. But the speaker of the National Assembly sparked an intense controversy in late July when he........

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