Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

Why East Asia Isn’t Surprised by the Rupture in the Global Order

East Asia has long balanced the competing dynamics of competition and cooperation, yet the challenge of navigating them has never been greater. 

President Donald J. Trump attends the Memphis Safe Task Force roundtable on public safety at Tennessee Air National Guard Base, Tennessee on Monday, March 23, 2026.

When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered his special address at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 20, 2026, it was widely lauded by commentators and political observers across the globe. His punchline, “We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition,” captured the anxieties and imagination of political elites in Europe, most significantly, but also around the world. 

Beyond the headline-grabbing word choice of “rupture,” Carney issued a clarion call for middle powers to band together and act together to avoid “being on the menu.” Since delivering his speech, Carney has made state visits to various Asian middle powers, such as Japan, Australia, India and others to reinforce the message and boost bilateral cooperation.

While the Canadian prime minister’s candor is welcome, East Asian states have already spent the better part of a decade proactively adapting and adjusting to a world where the American-led international order has waned. Though already felt during the Obama administration, the perennial fear of U.S. abandonment or disengagement was particularly deepened during President Donald Trump’s first term. 

Trump’s “America First” approach–marked by repeated criticism of long-standing “free-riding” alliances and withdrawals from major international agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — generated considerable anxieties in East Asia. Despite the subsequent Biden administration’s attempts to restore American leadership, these concerns have lingered in East Asia till today.

In response to Trump’s initial term, U.S. allies and partners in East Asia advanced a three-pronged strategy. First, they continuously deepened their engagement with Washington despite remaining cautious about the “America First” message. East Asian states regularly reminded the United States of the strategic importance of the region to Washington’s national strategy and how the existing alliance structures have underpinned regional stability since the postwar era. 

Second, the East Asian states accelerated efforts to strengthen their own military capabilities through increased defense spending and expressed greater political willingness to assume a larger role in regional security. 

Third, middle powers such as Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea doubled down on multilateral cooperation and normative frameworks, even as Washington itself retreated from them.

China, by contrast, responded to the uncertainties of the Trump era by reducing its dependence on American markets and technologies. Beijing expanded support for domestic industries considered vital to its strategic goals, specifically focusing on achieving self-sufficiency in high-end microchips and quantum computing as it seeks to gain a technological edge over Washington. Most critically, China moved to securitize and weaponize its dominance over the critical minerals essential to the global industrial base. This was demonstrated by the December 2024 total export ban on gallium, germanium, and antimony to the United States — a move that directly targeted the American defense and semiconductor sectors in retaliation for U.S. technology curbs.

China also intensified diplomatic outreach to Russia, North Korea and Iran — solidifying a coalition often termed the “axis of upheaval.” While the United States began treating international institutions as transactional burdens, China sought to occupy the leadership vacuum in various ways. By championing its four “Global Initiatives” and expanding the BRICS+ framework, Beijing has rebranded itself as the pragmatic defender of true multilateralism, offering middle powers a stable, if illiberal, alternative to Washington’s increasingly coercive and unpredictable foreign policies.

For East Asia, the prospect of Trump’s second presidency signalled further disruption in bilateral relations and global governance. While the first rupture — in Trump’s first term — eroded the liberal international order, this second phase signals a shift toward an overtly coercive reordering of global politics. The scale and speed of these developments have been historically significant, and East Asian states have been forced to adapt.

Trump’s second administration has adopted an even more transactional approach than his first, often applying this strategy more assertively toward allies and partners than toward rivals. The administration’s mistrust of existing institutions has driven the creation of new mechanisms, most notably the Board of Peace, as alternatives to the existing structures of global governance.

The most dramatic element of America’s reordering, however, is the recent full embrace of “Peace through Strength” — its willingness to employ military force to advance national interests and shape the global order. Although Trump campaigned as an anti-war candidate and self-described “peacemaker” — a message that energised his MAGA base and helped secure his return to office in 2024 — his administration has demonstrated a readiness to initiate and escalate military action. Within the span of eight weeks, the United States deposed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The Trump administration also joined Israel in launching a war against Iran — an undertaking from which previous U.S. presidents had refrained. These actions underscore Washington’s willingness to wield its military might as a unilateral tool of power, effectively discarding the constraints of international law in favor of immediate strategic results.

East Asia’s Two Realities

Amid profound shifts in the global order, East Asian states are navigating between two interrelated realities that shape their national strategic thinking. 

The first reality is marked by heightened danger and uncertainty as the global order moves away from a predictable, U.S.-centered security structure toward a more fragmented landscape. For American allies and partners, this could pose deeper challenges to international law and norms and accelerate the return to great power politics. In this scenario, the fear is not just of a single conflict, but of a systemic breakdown where there is a lack of legal guardrails and a normalization of “might makes right” in the region.

The second reality emphasizes cooperation and stability. As the United States retrenches, East Asian states are increasingly motivated to exercise greater autonomy in managing the transition of the regional order away from conflict and war. While they might not agree on their preferred endpoint, there is a general consensus on the means to adjust to the regional transition, even as we add that countries in the region have differing interests. Nonetheless, Japan and South Korea in particular are deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation, strengthening economic ties, and enabling middle powers to uphold and reinforce the rules-based order. 

Both realities can be true at the same time. East Asia has long balanced the competing dynamics of competition and cooperation, yet the challenge of navigating them has never been greater. How the region navigates this tension will ultimately determine whether East Asia moves toward renewed instability or succeeds in sustaining durable peace. 

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When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered his special address at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 20, 2026, it was widely lauded by commentators and political observers across the globe. His punchline, “We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition,” captured the anxieties and imagination of political elites in Europe, most significantly, but also around the world. 

Beyond the headline-grabbing word choice of “rupture,” Carney issued a clarion call for middle powers to band together and act together to avoid “being on the menu.” Since delivering his speech, Carney has made state visits to various Asian middle powers, such as Japan, Australia, India and others to reinforce the message and boost bilateral cooperation.

While the Canadian prime minister’s candor is welcome, East Asian states have already spent the better part of a decade proactively adapting and adjusting to a world where the American-led international order has waned. Though already felt during the Obama administration, the perennial fear of U.S. abandonment or disengagement was particularly deepened during President Donald Trump’s first term. 

Trump’s “America First” approach–marked by repeated criticism of long-standing “free-riding” alliances and withdrawals from major international agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — generated considerable anxieties in East Asia. Despite the subsequent Biden administration’s attempts to restore American leadership, these concerns have lingered in East Asia till today.

In response to Trump’s initial term, U.S. allies and partners in East Asia advanced a three-pronged strategy. First, they continuously deepened their engagement with Washington despite remaining cautious about the “America First” message. East Asian states regularly reminded the United States of the strategic importance of the region to Washington’s national strategy and how the existing alliance structures have underpinned regional stability since the postwar era. 

Second, the East Asian states accelerated efforts to strengthen their own military capabilities through increased defense spending and expressed greater political willingness to assume a larger role in regional security. 

Third, middle powers such as Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea doubled down on multilateral cooperation and normative frameworks, even as Washington itself retreated from them.

China, by contrast, responded to the uncertainties of the Trump era by reducing its dependence on American markets and technologies. Beijing expanded support for domestic industries considered vital to its strategic goals, specifically focusing on achieving self-sufficiency in high-end microchips and quantum computing as it seeks to gain a technological edge over Washington. Most critically, China moved to securitize and weaponize its dominance over the critical minerals essential to the global industrial base. This was demonstrated by the December 2024 total export ban on gallium, germanium, and antimony to the United States — a move that directly targeted the American defense and semiconductor sectors in retaliation for U.S. technology curbs.

China also intensified diplomatic outreach to Russia, North Korea and Iran — solidifying a coalition often termed the “axis of upheaval.” While the United States began treating international institutions as transactional burdens, China sought to occupy the leadership vacuum in various ways. By championing its four “Global Initiatives” and expanding the BRICS+ framework, Beijing has rebranded itself as the pragmatic defender of true multilateralism, offering middle powers a stable, if illiberal, alternative to Washington’s increasingly coercive and unpredictable foreign policies.

For East Asia, the prospect of Trump’s second presidency signalled further disruption in bilateral relations and global governance. While the first rupture — in Trump’s first term — eroded the liberal international order, this second phase signals a shift toward an overtly coercive reordering of global politics. The scale and speed of these developments have been historically significant, and East Asian states have been forced to adapt.

Trump’s second administration has adopted an even more transactional approach than his first, often applying this strategy more assertively toward allies and partners than toward rivals. The administration’s mistrust of existing institutions has driven the creation of new mechanisms, most notably the Board of Peace, as alternatives to the existing structures of global governance.

The most dramatic element of America’s reordering, however, is the recent full embrace of “Peace through Strength” — its willingness to employ military force to advance national interests and shape the global order. Although Trump campaigned as an anti-war candidate and self-described “peacemaker” — a message that energised his MAGA base and helped secure his return to office in 2024 — his administration has demonstrated a readiness to initiate and escalate military action. Within the span of eight weeks, the United States deposed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The Trump administration also joined Israel in launching a war against Iran — an undertaking from which previous U.S. presidents had refrained. These actions underscore Washington’s willingness to wield its military might as a unilateral tool of power, effectively discarding the constraints of international law in favor of immediate strategic results.

East Asia’s Two Realities

Amid profound shifts in the global order, East Asian states are navigating between two interrelated realities that shape their national strategic thinking. 

The first reality is marked by heightened danger and uncertainty as the global order moves away from a predictable, U.S.-centered security structure toward a more fragmented landscape. For American allies and partners, this could pose deeper challenges to international law and norms and accelerate the return to great power politics. In this scenario, the fear is not just of a single conflict, but of a systemic breakdown where there is a lack of legal guardrails and a normalization of “might makes right” in the region.

The second reality emphasizes cooperation and stability. As the United States retrenches, East Asian states are increasingly motivated to exercise greater autonomy in managing the transition of the regional order away from conflict and war. While they might not agree on their preferred endpoint, there is a general consensus on the means to adjust to the regional transition, even as we add that countries in the region have differing interests. Nonetheless, Japan and South Korea in particular are deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation, strengthening economic ties, and enabling middle powers to uphold and reinforce the rules-based order. 

Both realities can be true at the same time. East Asia has long balanced the competing dynamics of competition and cooperation, yet the challenge of navigating them has never been greater. How the region navigates this tension will ultimately determine whether East Asia moves toward renewed instability or succeeds in sustaining durable peace. 

Bhubhindar Singh is an Associate Professor at the Public Policy and Global Affairs Division, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is also the Director of the NTU-University Scholars Programme.

Dylan M.H. Loh is an Associate Professor at the Public Policy and Global Affairs Division, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Kei Koga is Associate Professor/ Head of Division at the Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU). 

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