Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

An Opportunity or an Illusion? The Iran War and China’s Taiwan Calculus

The Iran war has shifted U.S. military capabilities out of the Indo-Pacific. Will Beijing try to take advantage?

On April 7, the United States and Iran formally agreed to a ceasefire, bringing the nearly seven weeks of fighting in the Middle East to a temporary pause. Still, the path to a more permanent peace remains uncertain, with a round of peace talks ending with no agreement and the U.S. announcing a naval blockade of Iran. 

Although the tenuous ceasefire continues to hold, it is clear that the United States’ defense posture in the Indo-Pacific is being strained by competing operational demands. The conflict has seen the U.S. burn through billions of dollars in missiles, redeploy a Marine Expeditionary Unit from Japan, and shift 48 THAAD interceptors off the Korean Peninsula. 

Replenishing the munitions inventory will certainly take time and money, as will the redeployment of weapons systems back to South Korea. Recognizing that the United States will possess fewer capabilities in the Indo-Pacific over the coming months, some commentators have expressed concern that China might view this as an opportune time to pursue unification with Taiwan. That possibility has raised alarm among some Taiwanese security officials, with one worried that “this is a moment for China to exercise influence.” 

The evidence so far shows that while China has begun applying certain measures, most notably persuasion campaigns, it has not escalated militarily in the Taiwan Strait – and likely remains deterred from doing so. Even so, the conflict may create opportunities for Beijing to ramp up coercive tactics, short of war, to test new boundaries and establish a new status quo.

Taipei and Washington should assess how the conflict may shape Beijing’s pathways to unification. The Iran war’s trajectory and ultimate outcome will not only influence the prospects for a successful invasion of Taiwan but also impact Beijing’s effective employment of measures short of war, including persuasion, coercion, and limited kinetic operations. 

Weighing the Risks and Rewards: Beijing’s Calculus for a Taiwan Invasion

In his first speeches as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping articulated the nation’s foremost goal as the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” – to be achieved by 2049, the nation’s centenary. Central to that vision has been the integration of the Chinese mainland with Taiwan. Beijing still has roughly two decades to meet that goal. 

China, however, may seek to seize on the window of opportunity before then. Xi reportedly ordered the PLA to be prepared for a Taiwan invasion by 2027. With Washington preoccupied in the Middle East, Beijing could entertain the idea of seizing Taiwan sooner. Taipei has yet to acquire many of the military capabilities it seeks, with many U.S. weapons platforms purchased by Taiwan facing years of delays in delivery. Beijing could perceive Taipei as militarily vulnerable, backed by a Washington that is slow – or unwilling – to provide military support to the island. These factors could raise Beijing’s chances of success while limiting the casualties it may incur. 

Nevertheless, an invasion in the near term seems ultimately unlikely, as there are three significant risks for Beijing. First, China’s ability to take Taiwan by force remains in question. Since 2022, Xi has purged over 100 high-ranking officials, and has removed officers in every service and regional command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Both the commander and the deputy commander of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command, the regional command overseeing the Taiwan Strait, were removed in 2025. As of now, only 21 percent of key PLA leadership positions are filled. 

The Department of Defense’s 2025 China Military Power Report assessed that the removals “very likely risk short-term disruptions in the operational effectiveness of the PLA.” Indeed, the dismissals of high-ranking operational commanders have negatively affected the PLA’s ability to coordinate large-scale, multi-domain exercises. Exercises in the Taiwan Strait have required longer planning periods and appear less organized than ones held prior to the purges. With a fractured command structure, the PLA’s ability to achieve the “strategic decisive victory” that Xi envisions appears improbable.

Second, the Trump administration has shown a greater appetite for kinetic action than its predecessors. Washington’s willingness to defend Taiwan – and Beijing’s perception of such – remains a decisive factor in China’s calculus. The Iran war demonstrates Trump’s willingness to employ military force to preserve “peace through strength.” That complicates Xi’s calculations, which have for years carefully balanced assertiveness with restraint. Beijing’s harassment of Filipino fishing vessels in the South China Sea, for instance, is intended to intimidate but stops shy of lethal force. Xi has been careful to prevent tensions from spiraling out of control. Trump’s unpredictability and willingness to use kinetic operations may turn Taiwan into a high-stakes gamble that Xi cannot afford to take.

Finally, the Iran war serves as a stark reminder of the PLA’s lack of combat experience. Recent U.S. operations – including the Venezuela mission that captured President Nicolás Maduro and prior strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities – have demonstrated the prowess of U.S. military might, showcasing exceptional coordination, lethality, and firepower. The Iran conflict so far has featured impressive AI-integrated operations, a high-risk extraction of a downed U.S. airman, and the ability to conduct deep-strikes against hardened targets. 

By contrast, the PLA has not fought a major, sustained conventional conflict since 1979, leaving most........

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