The dust has now settled on the ostentatious summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang earlier this month. But perhaps the biggest takeaway was what was left unsaid.

Chinese readouts from the summit conspicuously excluded any mention of denuclearisation in North Korea (meaning North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons). This signals a shift away from a decades-long policy goal of Beijing.

It’s the latest in a long list of setbacks for international efforts to denuclearise North Korea, and my soon-to-be-published research shows experts are widely concerned about the depth of the challenge.

In early 2026 I ran a survey and focus groups involving over 70 international experts in nuclear weapons. I asked them to forecast the probability of six hypothetical nuclear scenarios occurring by 2035:

that China achieves a nuclear second-strike capability against the United States

that North Korea achieves the same

that Japan acquires nuclear weapons

that South Korea acquires nuclear weapons

that North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons

that the United States or China uses a nuclear weapon.

North Korean denuclearisation came in last, with experts assessing only a 3% probability by 2035.

After over 30 years, it seems the international mission to denuclearise North Korea has failed.

Why? And what does this mean for the region?

North Korea began pursuing nuclear weapons in earnest in the 1990s. This was driven by insecurity from the collapse of its superpower patron (the Soviet........

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