This month marks 22 years since the nuclearization of India and Pakistan. These last 22 years have seen multiple Indo-Pak crises, each evoking at least some nuclear overtones. In the past year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s August 5, 2019 decision to abrogate Articles 370 and 35A, revoking Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)’s special semi-autonomous status, has brought New Delhi and Islamabad to the crossroads of a permanent state of tension. Kashmiris in Indian-administered J&K are still under restrictions after almost 300 days, and the Line of Control has constantly been on fire.

The most recent Pulwama/Balakot crisis highlighted the evolving nature of India-Pakistan nuclear escalation. India believed that attacking Pakistan across the international boundary would test its resolve and call its nuclear bluff. However, the assumptions upon which India launched the Balakot strikes were flawed and based on its misunderstanding of two new realities: the changing and increasing indigenization of the Kashmir insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir, and a misreading of Pakistan’s response options under Full Spectrum Deterrence. Pakistan’s demonstration of its resolve and credibility in the Pulwama/Balakot crisis likely addressed the second of these misunderstandings and could strengthen deterrence going forward. India’s continued lack of recognition of the changing reality of the Kashmiri freedom struggle, however, remains an issue that could presage continued Indo-Pak crises in the coming years. The result could be escalation, with each side willing to show high resolve and risk acceptance while ascending the escalation ladder.

Changing Nature of Insurgency in Kashmir

India’s continued lack of recognition of the changing reality of the Kashmiri freedom struggle remains an issue that could presage continued Indo-Pak crises in the coming years. The result could be escalation, with each side willing to show high resolve and risk acceptance while ascending the escalation ladder.

On February 14, 2019, in the town of Pulwama in Indian-administered Kashmir, Kashmiri resident Adil Ahmad Dar attacked a convoy of India’s Central Reserve Police Force, killing 40 security personnel. Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) took credit for the attack. After an investigation, Pakistan rejected Indian claims of Pakistani involvement in the attack. The UN designated JeM chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist a few months later while dropping any references to his linkage with the attack. However, going by Jaish’s own social media admissions, the linkage cannot be denied. Azhar had previously been released from Indian custody in 1999 in exchange for passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines Flight 814. The point to consider is: why do groups like JeM continue to find space in J&K, and why are they successful in recruiting young Kashmiris? For how long will India turn a blind eye to its own structural vulnerabilities in Indian-administered Kashmir and seek an escape in “punishing” Pakistan?

To understand how the nature of insurgency in Kashmir has changed over time, it is important to grasp the difference between the symbolic Kashmir and the strategic Kashmir. From the 1990s onwards until the death of Burhan Wani in 2016,

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