Opinion | Bangladesh’s Political Reset And India’s Strategic Test

Tarique Rahman’s dramatic return signals a new era in Dhaka and a delicate recalibration for New Delhi.

The 2026 Bangladesh general election marks a watershed moment in South Asian politics.

The first national vote since the July 2024 violence that ended the long tenure of Sheikh Hasina and forced her into exile has delivered what many are calling a political fairytale. Tarique Rahman, once dismissed by critics as the “dark prince" of Bangladeshi politics, is poised to lead a triumphant Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) back to power.

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Rahman’s ascent is nothing short of Shakespearean. Political royalty by South Asian standards, the 60-year-old is the son of former President Ziaur Rahman and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. Yet his journey back to Dhaka was paved with controversy. Arrested in 2017 on corruption and money-laundering charges, Rahman left the country under a cloud of suspicion. He spent 17 years abroad, returning only after his mother’s death in December 2025.

When he did return, he was greeted by massive crowds. His speech, echoing the rhetorical cadence of Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous “I Have a Dream," replaced dream with design: “I have a plan for Bangladesh." That line has become both a rallying cry for his supporters and a question mark for his neighbours, especially India.

Within hours of the election outcome becoming clear, Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated Rahman, offering “warm congratulations" and pledging support for a “democratic, progressive and inclusive Bangladesh." It was a standard diplomatic message, but the timing was strategic. New Delhi moved before Beijing or Islamabad could publicly shape the narrative.

For India, the past 18 months have been fraught. Hasina’s fall triggered uncertainty in Dhaka’s foreign policy orientation. There were signs of Bangladesh flirting with China and Pakistan, alongside troubling reports of attacks on Hindu minorities. The stable, pro-India equilibrium that had characterised much of Hasina’s rule was suddenly gone.

Delhi now faces a delicate recalibration.

The Baseline: From Stability To Uncertainty

Under Hasina and her Awami League, India and Bangladesh enjoyed one of the most stable bilateral relationships in South Asia. Agreements on trade, transport connectivity, border management, and water-sharing transformed what had historically been a tense relationship into a pragmatic partnership.

Hasina’s government cracked down on insurgent groups operating in India’s northeast and improved intelligence cooperation. Transit routes through Bangladesh improved connectivity to India’s landlocked northeastern states. Trade flourished, touching nearly $14 billion annually, with India enjoying a substantial surplus.

The BNP’s return does not automatically undo these gains. Rahman has signalled respect for India’s interests, suggesting a shift from his mother’s earlier “Bangladesh First" emphasis toward a more balanced approach. But history suggests that BNP governments tend to be more transactional and less instinctively aligned with Delhi than the Awami League.

For India, that means adopting a wait-and-watch posture.

The China–Pakistan Question

The most serious concern in New Delhi is the possibility of a Pakistan–China–Bangladesh axis. While such a nexus is far from inevitable, geopolitics is about anticipating worst-case alignments.

China’s footprint in Bangladesh has grown significantly over the past decade. Investments in infrastructure, including the modernisation of the Mongla Port, are officially commercial. Yet Indian strategic planners see potential dual-use implications. China’s experience in developing ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan has demonstrated how commercial projects can acquire military utility over time.

If Dhaka were to tilt decisively toward Beijing, it would expand China’s logistical reach into the Bay of Bengal, complicating India’s maritime security environment in the Indian Ocean Region.

Pakistan’s involvement presents a different but related challenge. An overt alignment between Dhaka and Islamabad could revive concerns about extremist elements using Bangladeshi soil as a staging ground against India’s northeast. During previous BNP tenures, Indian agencies expressed unease about cross-border insurgent safe havens. The absence of Jamaat-e-Islami as a coalition partner in the new government is reassuring to Delhi, but vigilance remains essential.

The strategic stakes are not abstract. Any destabilisation in India’s northeast could intersect with China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh, adding layers of complexity to an already tense Sino-Indian relationship.

India and Bangladesh share a 4,100-kilometre border, one of the longest and most densely populated in the world. Under Hasina, border cooperation improved markedly. Joint efforts reduced insurgent movement and curbed smuggling networks.

Since July 2024, however, reports suggest a spike in infiltration attempts. Illegal migration is not merely a bilateral issue; it has profound domestic political implications within India. Both West Bengal and Assam, states that share the border, are heading into assembly elections. Migration is a core campaign issue, particularly in Assam, where the BJP has built a strong narrative around border control and citizenship.

Rahman’s approach to border management will therefore be scrutinised not only in Delhi but also in state capitals. Effective cooperation on curbing illegal crossings, cross-border crime, and narcotics trafficking could stabilise the relationship. Laxity, whether perceived or real, would inflame political tensions.

Perhaps the most sensitive issue is the security of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, which constitutes about eight per cent of the population. Following Hasina’s fall, reports emerged of widespread attacks on Hindu homes, businesses, and temples. India has publicly stated that at least 23 Hindus were killed in the aftermath, while Bangladeshi authorities have offered different interpretations of the violence.

For New Delhi, the issue transcends humanitarian concern. It touches upon domestic political narratives and India’s broader civilisational self-perception. Prime Minister Modi’s government has taken a visibly strong stance on protecting Hindus in neighbouring countries.

Rahman has promised protection for minorities. However, the BNP’s historical associations with conservative elements mean that Delhi will judge the new administration not by rhetoric but by action, visible policing, swift prosecutions, and deterrence of communal violence.

Trade: Dependency And Leverage

Trade ties provide both stability and leverage. India enjoys a nearly $10 billion surplus with Bangladesh. A key component is cotton yarn, which accounts for over 80 per cent of Bangladesh’s imports in that category and fuels its readymade garments (RMG) industry, the backbone of its export economy.

An unfriendly Dhaka could attempt supplier diversification, possibly turning to China. But such a shift would entail economic risks for Bangladesh’s RMG sector, which depends on predictable supply chains.

Conversely, a stable BNP government seeking rapid economic recovery might deepen trade engagement with India. Economic pragmatism could temper geopolitical temptations.

For India, the equation boils down to two variables: capability and intent.

Capability refers to whether the new government in Dhaka can effectively control its territory, secure its borders, and prevent extremist activity. Intent concerns whether it chooses cooperation over confrontation.

Tarique Rahman’s political resurrection may indeed be a fairytale ending for a man once written off. But for India, this is not about personalities; it is about policy trajectories.

Delhi’s swift congratulatory message signals openness to partnership. Yet the coming months will test whether Rahman’s “plan for Bangladesh" aligns with India’s core interests: secure borders, minority protection, balanced geopolitics, and stability in the Indian Ocean region.

South Asia rarely offers neat narratives. Rahman’s return is dramatic, but the real story will unfold in the quiet, technical, and strategic decisions that follow. For India, vigilance paired with engagement is the only prudent course.

The writer is a technocrat, political analyst, and author. He pens national, geopolitical, and social issues. His social media handle is @prosenjitnth. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.

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