The Iran war and its effects on the future of US-GCC cooperation

The escalation of the conflict around Iran is significantly affecting the strategic, economic, and military relations between the Gulf states and the United States.

The US-Israeli attack on Iran on 28 February 2026 led to Iran’s retaliatory attack on the US military bases and assets in most of the GCC.

Israel’s previous attack on Iran, while causing more coordination and selling of weapons to allies and maintaining the security of the US and most of the GCC, also revived efforts to reduce dependence on the West.

According to some in the GCC, the defense priorities of the United States of America have so far been focused on its defense systems to support Israel and paying less or no attention to the defense of the GCC and prioritizing the support of Tel Aviv.

In a situation where American bases located in the region have become the targets of Iran’s retaliatory attacks, the expectation of the GCC governments and hosts of foreign bases was to receive full support. Therefore, the bases practically have a one-way function for the benefit of America and Israel and can be changed in the future.

In this situation, some existing security alliances may collapse.  By reorganizing geopolitics, the region will enter a new security order based on new alliances and different competitions.

Previously, US President Donald Trump completed his trip to the Middle East in May 2025 and expanded cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates by signing investment agreements worth more than 2 trillion dollars. These comprehensive agreements included areas such as the defense industry, aviation, and the development of artificial intelligence technologies.

But in the new conditions, the movement of the war towards an erosive and long-term conflict can be the gradual erosion of the economic capacities of the region. Also, commercial and economic infrastructures are damaged.

With the intensification of the war against Iran, the energy, transportation, and tourism revenues of the region will be completely stopped. Restrictions imposed on the Arab countries to use the Strait of Hormuz will affect oil prices, energy prices, transportation, and food prices in the region. In the meantime, the negative effects of the war with Iran on the GCC-US bilateral trade will become more apparent.

Now the deeper layers of America’s strategic cooperation with Arab countries in the fields of new technology, sustainable energy, public health, military development, and cultural interactions have been affected to some extent.

Therefore, despite profitable economic relations, the GCC as a main player is hesitant to invest in the US. In the meantime, the increase in incentives for the exit of 2 trillion dollars of investments can be the beginning of diversification of investments away from the influence of the United States.

Meanwhile, the agreements, including the previous $142 billion US-Saudi defense partnership agreement to provide Saudi Arabia with advanced military equipment and services, are remaining. Furthermore, in the military field, the US recently approved the sale of large-scale weapons to the region under the justification of a “state of emergency.”

But the concerns about the American policy in maintaining the qualitative military superiority of Israel, the export of some American fighters to key allies, and the sale of F-35s to the Persian Gulf countries have increased.

Therefore, a review of the defense doctrine in the GCC through the evaluation of security systems and the tendency to self-reliance or search for new defense alternatives could be under consideration. Even if Israel emerges as a rising hegemon, the GCC countries remain concerned.

In fact, most of the GCC Arab countries now realize the miscalculations of Washington’s support. Therefore, revision of defense systems and regional alliances is also possible.

The current geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf region has also made many in the GCC more flexible and cautious in their policies in dealing with big powers.

Although on March 18, the US reaffirmed the commitment to the security of the UAE. Qatar also wanted to strengthen the defense partnership with Washington. In February 2026, the Trump administration also authorized Saudi Arabia’s desire to enrich uranium without an additional protocol from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

But some in the Arab media and public opinion of the region pay attention to the review of security dependence on America and the creation of a common defense system (similar to NATO).

The GCC countries, in March 2026, paid attention to the right to individual and collective defense and increasing defense coordination.

In other words, although GCC-US relations have become stronger in the field of security and military and are focusing on deterrence against Iran, it appears that the differences are growing. Most of the GCC countries are reducing their dependence on America.

Iran’s role as a key driving factor in the shaping of the future of GCC-US relations has become more prominent. The recent attack on Iran will also have multi-dimensional short- and long-term effects on the future of GCC-US relations.

As well as some internal divisions of the GCC and Saudi-UAE disputes, the dissonance of national interests (especially between Oman and other members) has made it difficult to achieve collective Arab-Arab coordination and strengthen the defense alliance; many criticisms and attitudes have arisen in the GCC regarding future relations with Washington.

Several main scenarios can be foreseen.

In an unlikely scenario, a wider alliance, strengthening of the alliance, arms sales, and wider investments with America should continue, and more bilateral defense agreements should be signed. That means the GCC maintains its security dependence, and the US becomes a more important “main supporter.”

From this point of view, Iran brings the GCC closer to Washington.

An attack on Iran would lead to an unprecedented opportunity to sell more US weapons (such as the Patriot and advanced radars) and coordinate collective air defense and long-term defense pacts in the GCC.

In a more likely and more self-reliant GCC scenario, the countries will probably build a collective defense framework, a “regional NATO” (with Pakistan or even Russia, China, and Iran), or accelerate East-West diversification.

From this point of view, Iran’s role as a direct threat to the GCC has questioned the logic of the alliance with America. Therefore, any effort to diversify the value of strategic partners such as China and Russia will increase.

In this view, the GCC can maintain the balance between the US and its eastern partners by strengthening joint internal defense and diplomacy with Iran.

In this framework, trust in American security commitments will decrease, and the GCC may even limit the use of its territory for anti-Iranian operations.

In another unlikely scenario, GCC-US relations will suffer a widespread stagnation. That means the GCC countries may move towards a new regional security architecture in a national format without external dependence.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations

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