The Direct and Indirect Implications of the 2026 US–Israeli War against Iran for Intra-GCC Divergence

If a durable agreement with Iran is established, the GCC may gradually move toward a form of “integration.”

The 2017 GCC summit in Kuwait became a symbol of intra-GCC divergence. In 2021, the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar was “resolved.” However, the 2026 US–Israeli war against Iran has emerged as one of the most significant historical tests of cohesion within the GCC.

Various factors and variables have contributed to the emergence of divisions among the member states. Since the nineteenth century, independent or autonomous Arab ruling families have been engaged in intense internal rivalries.

Over the past decade, traditional patterns of bloc formation and tribal affiliations within the Council have also challenged the institutional effectiveness and organizational cohesion of the GCC.

Although considerable emphasis has been placed on GCC integration and cooperation at the declaratory level, practical developments reveal a more complicated picture. According to Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi GCC Secretary-General, the organization is more united than ever, has cooperated with all six of its member states across various fields, and has become even stronger.

Indeed, following February 28, the extraordinary GCC summit emphasized the expansion of cooperation in logistics, water connectivity, electricity-grid interconnection, strategic storage, railway projects, military affairs, security, food security, electricity, energy, and healthcare.

At the operational level, however, divergence is fundamental in nature. During 2025–2026, deep-seated strategic and structural fault lines became increasingly pronounced.

The Direct and Indirect Implications of the 2026 US–Israeli War against Iran for the GCC

The US and Israeli military aggression, conducted in two phases—the “12-Day War” and the “40-Day War”—failed to dismantle Iran’s defensive capabilities. Drawing on the resilience and cohesion of its political and institutional elites, it sustained the war, regionalized the conflict, and weaponized the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran shifted its defense doctrine toward “asymmetric, extensive, and high-volume retaliation,” thereby placing critical GCC infrastructure at risk.

The GCC, comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, is not homogeneous in terms of political structure or military capabilities.

GCC member states differ in their perspectives on Iran and the regional order, their perceptions........

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