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Doha and Ankara’s Approach and the Challenges of the Qatar-Syria-Turkey Gas Pipeline Project

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Doha and Ankara’s Approach and the Challenges of the Qatar-Syria-Turkey Gas Pipeline Project

Meanwhile, the continuation of historical challenges and delays in similar pipelines shows that security and geopolitical risks also pose an ambiguous prospect for the Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria-Turkey gas pipeline project, with repeated postponements.

The Qatar-Syria-Turkey Gas Pipeline Project, which aims to transport Qatari gas to Europe via the South Pars/Northern Dome gas field, starts in Qatar and goes through Saudi Arabia to Syria and then to Turkey.

The pipeline project (approximately 1,500 km long and costing $10-12 billion to build) was first considered in 2009 as an alternative to Qatar’s dominant liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. However, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar were largely forgotten due to geopolitical differences and regional instability, insecurity, and opposition from Syria.

Since late 2024, speculation has increased about the revival of the Qatar-Syria-Turkey gas pipeline project route. The regime change in Syria has created new opportunities for Turkish-Qatari cooperation in energy construction. Also on January 13, Damascus forces invaded northeastern Syria and seized cities, oil, and gas fields.

While Syria’s energy sector is improving, foreign energy companies are also planning to increase their presence in Syria. For example, two memoranda of understanding (MoUs) were signed in early January 2026 between Cairo and Damascus to supply gas to Syria from Egypt via Jordan, and on February 4, the Syrian National Oil Company signed a memorandum of understanding with Qatar.

Meanwhile, the Syrian interim government seems to see the Qatar-Turkey pipeline as a means to finance post-war reconstruction and economic cooperation with its neighbors.

Qatar-Turkey approach

Part of the main drivers remain Qatar’s diversification of exports and Turkey’s ambition to play the role of a transit hub. Turkey aims to become a gas and energy transit hub, exporting gas to Europe.

Turkey wants to play a greater role in global energy markets with the Qatar-Turkey pipeline project, apart from major pipelines such as TANAP and TurkStream, despite significant transit costs.

In addition, for Turkey, the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline could provide some economic resilience, reducing dependence on gas sources and bypassing Russia and Iran. Meanwhile, Turkey is increasing its role in the Syrian energy sector. After the fall of Assad, Turkish Energy Minister Bayraktar announced that Ankara intends to resume construction of a pipeline connecting Qatar’s gas reserves to Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) network.

Some sources reported in April 2025 that senior Turkish and Syrian officials had reached an initial and important agreement to resume construction of a gas pipeline that would bring Qatar’s vast natural gas reserves to Europe. Also, the gas pipeline between Syria and Turkey was inaugurated in August 2025 in the presence of Syrian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Qatari officials. The project will transport 3.4 million cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas per day through Turkish territory to Syria in the first phase. The project was implemented with the financial and technical support of the Qatari government.

Ankara is likely to sign an offshore energy exploration agreement with Syria off the coast of the country in 2026. Turkey has previously announced that Turkish companies are ready to take the lead in rebuilding Syria’s energy sector.

Qatar’s main strategic interest is in expanding natural gas exports to Europe via an overland route. Qatar, through its foreign policy and energy diplomacy, aims to gain a larger share of the European market by offering gas at competitive prices.

This approach circumvents the vulnerabilities of transporting liquefied LNG through the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.

Qatar has also increased its bilateral or multilateral gas connections with Syria in the past year. In March 2025, Qatar and Jordan announced that they would export approximately two million cubic meters of natural gas per day to Syria.

In fact, liquefied LNG will be transported by ship from Qatar to the Jordanian port of Aqaba, where it will be sent to Syria. In August 2025, Qatar, along with Azerbaijan, Syria, and Turkey, announced the inauguration of the Turkey-Syria natural gas pipeline and the start of natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan to Syria.

Although Qatari officials in January 2025 ruled out any prospect of resuming the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline through Syria. However, with rising tensions between the United States and Iran, and challenges to access maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, Qatar is also exploring land export options.

Challenges and Prospects

Amid political instability, regional competition, and divergent strategic interests, the success of the Qatar-Syria-Turkey gas pipeline project will depend on the cooperation of multiple regional and international actors.

Europe’s need for Middle Eastern natural gas (as a transit fuel) also depends on European carbon management strategies under the European Green Deal, renewable energy, and investment in new gas pipelines.

The Qatar-Turkey gas project route as an alternative to Russian gas exports to Europe, especially via Turkey, is a threat to Moscow’s interests. The pipeline project also effectively bypasses Iran’s vast gas reserves. In this situation, there is practically no possibility of the presence of Eastern partners in the construction of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline.

The project carries risks such as geopolitical tensions, security issues, and a possible decrease in gas demand.

The security issue in Syria is still a matter of consideration. ISIS is still present in various parts of Syria, and other groups will also have the ability to sabotage gas pipelines. Syria still does not have complete territorial integrity and is far from achieving complete security.

A length of around 1,500 to 1,700 km is important for a high-capacity gas pipeline transporting 30 to 40 billion cubic meters per year. But the construction of such a pipeline would require significant investment, and it is not yet clear how it will be financed.

Technical challenges, including navigating through deserts, logistical obstacles, an estimated $10-12 billion pipeline cost, geopolitical challenges, and the ongoing instability in Syria, undermine investor confidence.

Full agreement from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as the first transit countries, is needed. This approach would require bilateral agreements for rights of passage, pumping facilities, and border crossings in the four sovereign states of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey.

No binding agreement or major new feasibility study has yet been made on the Qatar-Syria-Turkey gas pipeline project, and balancing these benefits and risks is a key issue for the ultimate feasibility of the project.

The type of interactions this project will have with the major regional and global energy players is still a matter of debate for the success or failure of this project.

In terms of project feasibility, financial, environmental, geographical, and political instability factors in Syria and changes in global energy markets must be well assessed. For the final plan of this project, the benefits must be considered to outweigh the risks.

Meanwhile, the continuation of historical challenges and delays in similar pipelines shows that security and geopolitical risks also pose an ambiguous prospect for the Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria-Turkey gas pipeline project, with repeated postponements.

Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations

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