What can the “middle powers” do?

American dominance is fading, but no new hegemon is rising to—or even willing to—replace it. The world is drifting into a multipolar order without a clear centre. In this uncertain landscape, stability will not come from a single superpower.

The Fading of the Unipolar Era

For roughly three decades after the Cold War, the international system revolved around the US. Washington possessed unmatched military reach, financial dominance, and institutional influence. That structure is now eroding. China’s economic rise, Russia’s strategic assertiveness, and the broader diffusion of economic power across Asia have reduced the relative weight of the US. America remains enormously powerful, but it is no longer unchallenged.

What is emerging is not a simple transfer of hegemony. China has grown into the world’s second-largest economy by nominal GDP and the largest by purchasing power parity, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yet Beijing has consistently framed its global vision in terms of “multipolarity,” not domination. Russia, too, has long argued for a world of multiple power centres rather than a single hegemon. Within this multipolar world, middle powers have an enormous space to fill. In fact, they do have the capacity for such a role.

The numbers reflect this capacity. According to IMF data for 2024–2025, India accounts for roughly 8–9 per cent of global GDP in purchasing-power-parity terms, making it the world’s third-largest economy by that measure. Indonesia contributes around 2.5 to 3 per cent, Turkey about 2 per cent, and Canada roughly 1 to 1.5 per cent. Taken together, these four countries represent well over 13 per cent of global output, comparable to the economic weight of a major great-power bloc.

More broadly, the IMF projects that by the end of this decade, emerging and developing economies will account for nearly 60 per cent of global GDP at PPP. The centre of gravity is clearly shifting away from the old Atlantic core. This is the structural foundation of multipolarity: not just the rise of China, but the collective ascent of several mid-sized powers.

Why Middle Powers Matter

Thus, middle powers occupy a unique position in the international system. They are large enough to influence outcomes, but not large enough to dominate. They rely on an open global economy, but also maintain strategic autonomy. Consider their trajectories.

India is now the world’s most populous country and one of the fastest-growing major economies. The World Bank projects that India will remain among the top growth performers globally over the next decade. Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest country by population, has steadily climbed into the ranks of the top ten economies by PPP. Turkey sits at the intersection of Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, controlling key transit routes and regional security dynamics. Canada, meanwhile, remains a G7 economy with deep institutional and financial influence. These countries differ in political systems, alliances, and regional priorities. But they share three important structural traits. First, none of them seeks global hegemony. Second, each maintains working relations with multiple great powers. Third, all depend on a stable, open international system for their economic growth.

This combination gives them unusual diplomatic flexibility. India participates in the US-led Quad while continuing defence and energy ties with Russia. Turkey remains a NATO member but coordinates closely with Moscow geopolitically and geo-economically. Indonesia maintains strategic neutrality while expanding economic ties with both China and the US. Canada, though closely aligned with Washington historically, has also pursued independent trade arrangements, including its most recent deal with China. These strategies are often labelled as hedging. But hedging is essentially defensive. It assumes that the structure of the system is determined elsewhere. The current transition offers middle powers a chance to move beyond hedging to influence the future of the system itself.

A New Concert for a Multipolar World

History offers a useful, if limited, analogy. After the Napoleonic Wars, Europe’s leading states created what became known as the Concert of Europe. It was not a formal organisation. Instead, it was a diplomatic understanding: the major powers would consult, balance each other, and avoid the kind of unilateral domination that had plunged the continent into decades of war. The lesson for today is simple. Stability does not always come from a single dominant power. It can also emerge from a balance maintained by several influential states. In the twenty-first century, middle powers are well placed to play such a role. Their combined economic weight is already significant. What they must do is build a shared strategic approach to preserve multipolarity.

They can do this by, for instance, forming issue-based coalitions. Instead of rigid blocs, middle powers can cooperate flexibly on trade, climate, technology, and maritime security. Such coalitions dilute the dominance of any one great power overall and within such coalitions. Such coalitions would also allow them to act as diplomatic bridges. Turkey, for instance, has been playing such a role between Russia and Ukraine. Because they maintain ties across rival camps, middle powers are uniquely positioned to mediate crises and reduce escalation between major powers.

From the Middle to the Centre

Data shows that global output is increasingly dispersed. No single country is likely to command the overwhelming share of economic and military resources that the US enjoyed in the 1990s. Thus, the unipolar moment is effectively over, but the multipolar order is still taking shape. This transition period is inherently unstable. Without a stabilizing force, the world could drift toward either renewed hegemony or rigid great-power blocs. Both scenarios would shrink the autonomy of middle powers.

But these states are not destined to remain on the margins. The lesson of the old Concert of Europe is not about nineteenth-century diplomacy. It is about a principle: stability can come from balance rather than domination. In today’s world, that balance may depend less on the great traditional powers and more on the countries in between. If middle powers move from hedging to coordinating, they can become the quiet architects of a stable multipolar system.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

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