Europe’s Energy Gamble: How the Iran Crisis Could Reshape the Gas War with Russia

Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and surging energy prices are exposing the fragility of Europe’s post-Russian energy strategy while potentially strengthening Moscow’s leverage in global energy markets.

The Costs of Strategic Dependency

The study identifies several risks: strategic vulnerability when economic dependencies translate into political pressure; loss of domestic credibility if governments repeatedly yield to external demands; weakened geopolitical authority when Europe struggles to uphold the rules it promotes internationally; and the gradual normalisation of transactional diplomacy, where coercion becomes a routine instrument of international bargaining.

European leaders often emphasise the costs of confronting powerful partners, particularly the United States or major energy exporters. Yet dependence carries its own risks, above all the slow erosion of political agency. The present energy crisis illustrates this dilemma vividly: Europe has tried to detach itself from Russian hydrocarbons while remaining deeply exposed to global supply shocks.

The result is a fragile equilibrium in which geopolitical turbulence far from European borders can quickly translate into domestic economic and political stress.

A Shock from the Gulf

That vulnerability is now being tested. The conflict with Iran has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. Roughly 20 per cent of global liquid hydrocarbons normally transit through this narrow passage every day. With maritime traffic suspended or severely restricted, the consequences for energy markets have been immediate.

Global oil prices surged after the joint military operation carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran, while European gas prices jumped by nearly 50 per cent within days.

The timing could hardly be worse for Brussels. The European Commission has been preparing a full ban on Russian energy imports after the Hungarian elections scheduled for April 2026. The new crisis raises uncomfortable questions: Does the turmoil strengthen Russia’s hand? And will the European Union ultimately be forced to soften its own sanctions under pressure from the energy market?

The global oil trade is already adjusting. Russian crude rejected by Western markets and sold at discounted prices has largely been redirected towards Asian buyers, particularly China and India, through complex trading networks. In theory, disruptions around Hormuz could increase competition for these discounted barrels.

Yet sanctions still cap the price of Russian oil, meaning that while the discount may shrink in tighter markets, it is unlikely to disappear entirely.

For Europe, the challenge is less about direct imports from the Persian Gulf—which account for roughly 0.53 million barrels per day, or about five per cent of total EU oil imports—and more about global competition for alternative supply.

As Russian oil is increasingly absorbed by Asian markets, other producers in the Gulf redirect shipments toward Europe. The result is a tightening global market where Europe must compete more aggressively for available cargoes, often at higher prices.

In other words, the real battlefield is not simply access to Russian oil, but access to the remaining pool of competitive global supply.

Panic in the European Energy Market

The consequences are already visible across the continent. European gas storage levels have fallen below 30.9 per cent, and in several EU countries, reserves have dropped close to the critical threshold of 25 per cent.

The situation is particularly tense in the United Kingdom. According to former British diplomat Alastair Crooke, the country currently holds gas reserves equivalent to only a few days of consumption. While the precise numbers remain debated, the message has reverberated through financial markets: Europe’s energy cushion is dangerously thin.

Britain is especially exposed because around one-fifth of its gas imports arrive as liquefied natural gas from Qatar. Any disruption to LNG shipments from the Gulf, therefore, feeds directly into British energy bills. Analysts estimate the current crisis could add hundreds of pounds annually to household energy costs.

Across the EU, policymakers are scrambling to respond. Governments are discussing possible price caps, the release of emergency oil reserves, and other emergency measures. Yet the European Commission has so far resisted calls to activate fiscal escape clauses that would allow large-scale public spending to shield consumers from rising prices.

Behind closed doors, European leaders are increasingly worried about political fallout. Energy inflation was already a sensitive issue after Russia’s special operation in Ukraine. A new spike in prices risks fuelling social discontent, strengthening populist parties, and deepening divisions within the Union.

This anxiety explains the flurry of diplomatic activity. Germany, Belgium, and Italy have organised emergency consultations ahead of the upcoming European Council meeting, where energy security will dominate discussions.

The fear in Brussels is simple: that Europe could face a replay of the inflation shock that followed the Ukraine conflict—only this time with even fewer policy tools available.

Moscow Signals a Different Energy Future

Against this backdrop, Russia is carefully repositioning itself. On 9 March, Vladimir Putin convened a meeting with government officials and energy executives to discuss the turmoil in global oil and gas markets.

During the meeting, Putin warned that instability around the Strait of Hormuz could disrupt global supply chains, push inflation higher, and destabilise industrial production worldwide. He emphasised that Russia remains a reliable supplier and suggested that energy exports could increasingly be redirected toward “stable and long-term partners.”

The message was unmistakable. Moscow will not wait passively for Europe’s planned embargo on Russian hydrocarbons, scheduled to tighten further in the coming years.

Instead, the Kremlin is accelerating a strategic pivot already underway. Russian gas exports are gradually shifting eastward, particularly through infrastructure such as the Power of Siberia pipeline supplying China. Additional projects under construction aim to expand this network significantly over the coming decade.

At the same time, Putin left the door partially open. Russia, he noted, would still be willing to supply European buyers—provided that cooperation is based on long-term contracts and free from what he described as “political opportunism.”

In practical terms, this means Europe now faces a stark strategic choice.

If Brussels maintains its sanctions regime, it risks confronting tightening global energy markets with limited bargaining power. But if it reopens the door to Russian energy imports, it risks undermining the political consensus that has shaped its response to Moscow since 2022. Either path carries high costs.

For now, the energy crisis triggered by the Middle East conflict is exposing the uncomfortable reality behind Europe’s energy transition: geopolitics still determines who keeps the lights on.

Political slogans alone will not refill depleted gas storage facilities—or stabilise prices in a volatile global energy market.

Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics

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